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ABSTRACT 
 
In this dissertation, I systematically study whether the arguments of the North 
Korean government regarding its protection of domestic human rights and its adherence 
to international human rights treaties in the DPRK Official Reports are accurate.  My 
starting point is the analysis of the sharp conflict of argument on the human rights issue 
between North Korea and the liberal democratic camp, which includes the U.S., U.K., 
and South Korea.  In the DPRK Official Reports, North Korea uses a theoretical 
approach, focusing on the presence of Fundamental Rights Articles of its Constitution, 
to argue that the fundamental rights of the people have been protected internally, and 
that the particular rights prescribed in the international human rights treaties are 
guaranteed successfully.  In contrast, the liberal democratic camp, in their reports on 
North Korean human rights compliance, contend that the government of North Korea 
has seriously infringed the fundamental freedoms of its people and has severely violated 
the international human rights treaties to which it is party.  To make their arguments 
about North Korea’s human rights practices, the U.S., South Korea, and the U.K. use a 
factual approach, centering on the analyses of testimony by North Korean refugees in 
the report.  
 iv 
This situation leads the North Korean government to aggressively rebuff the 
arguments of the U.S., U.K., and South Korea by denying and discounting the contents 
of their annual reports.  North Korea especially concentrates on casting doubt on the 
credibility of the testimony.  Notably, the LDC Annual Reports do not thoroughly 
analyze the core implementation mechanism of the Fundamental Rights Articles of the 
North Korean Constitution and contain very few logical rebuttals.  However, 
considering that North Korea has attempted to deceive the world under the guise of 
claiming to provide human rights protections through its core implementation 
mechanism, the methodology of the liberal democratic camp in dealing with North 
Korea’s claims in defense of its human rights practices is inarguably unsuccessful.  
Thus, in such a debate, a neutral third party, who does not possess actual information 
regarding the human rights situation in North Korea, may not only believe that North 
Korea’s arguments are true, but may also believe that the liberal democratic camp’s 
demand for an improvement of North Korea’s human rights practices are merely 
politically-motivated fabrications.  Additionally, the fundamental difference in the 
method of argumentation between the North Korean government and the liberal 
democratic countries means that there are necessarily few points of direct collision 
within their arguments.  That is to say, these two opposing sides do not actually collide 
 v 
but run parallel, and are left without the real opportunity to challenge each other’s 
arguments as to the fundamental difference between their methodologies.  
The most effective way to solve the problems inherent in the overreliance by the 
LDC on a factual approach is to form an opposition structure of a theoretical approach 
to match the theoretical approach of North Korea.  To remedy this failure, I developed 
and formulated my own detailed theory to refute the assertions of North Korea in its 
official reports.  The heart of the theory proposed by this dissertation is the 
incapacitation mechanism model of the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Articles against the 
core implementation mechanism model of the Fundamental Rights Articles.  The 
incapacitation mechanism model proves that all of the claims of North Korea in the 
DPRK Official Reports—that it guarantees the fundamental rights of its people or that it 
complies with the major international human rights treaties—are totally unrealizable, 
given its constitutional structure, from a theoretical standpoint.  Additionally, the 
mechanism model proves that the liberal democratic countries’ arguments about North 
Korea’s violation of the fundamental rights and the international human rights treaties in 
the LDC Annual Reports, which are based on a factual approach, are true.  Thus, we 
can draw an objective and logical conclusion to the central issue of this dissertation 
through the new refuting theory and its theoretical mechanism model proposed by this 
 vi 
dissertation. 
I expect the arguments of the new refuting theory and its incapacitation 
mechanism model presented by this dissertation to be useful reference material, which 
will enable the liberal democratic camp to make more effective responses against North 
Korea’s specious arguments grounded in the core implementation mechanism of the 
Fundamental Rights Articles in the DPRK Official Reports and official Implementation 
Reports to be released in the future. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
                        “This nation [North Korea] is the most repressive, 
closed regime in the world today.” 
– United States Senator Sam Brownback, 
Statement in the 107th Congress, 2nd Session, July 15, 2002 
  
I. The Central Issue of the Dissertation 
The central issue of this dissertation is whether the claims of the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (“North Korea” or “DPRK”) regarding its protection of 
domestic human rights and its adherence to international human rights treaties are true.  
North Korea’s view of its protection of domestic human rights sharply conflicts with 
that of the liberal democratic camp, which includes the United States (the “U.S.”), the 
European Union (especially the United Kingdom (the “U.K.”)), and the Republic of 
Korea (“South Korea” or the “ROK”).  Specifically, the U.S., the U.K., and South 
Korea often condemn many actions of North Korea as violations of the Fundamental 
Rights Articles of the North Korean Constitution and international human rights treaties 
and urge it to begin improving its human rights record.  Much of the liberal democratic 
camp’s conclusions are based on factual evidence centering on the analyses of testimony 
 2 
of North Korean refugees and information gathered from foreign visitors to the 
country.
1
  In response, North Korea uses a theoretical approach, focusing on the 
Fundamental Rights Articles of its Constitution as the core implementation mechanism, 
to defend itself.
2
  
 
A. The Arguments of the North Korean Government in Defense of Its Human 
Rights Practices and Its Main Grounds for the Arguments 
In the last three decades, North Korea has acceded to four major international 
human rights treaties.  On September 14, 1981, North Korea entered into the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the “ICCPR”)
3
 and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the “ICESCR”).
4
  It 
later signed the Convention on the Rights of the Child (the “CRC”)
5
 on September 21, 
1990.  More recently, on February 27, 2001, the state entered into the Convention on 
                                            
1
 See infra Chapter One.I.B. 
 
2
 See infra Chapter One.I.A. 
 
3
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 
4
 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 
993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
 
5
 Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered 
into force Sept. 2, 1990) [hereinafter CRC]. 
 3 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (the “CEDAW”).
6
 
North Korea has submitted its official implementation reports to each relevant 
United Nations body to fulfill its obligation as a signatory power to the international 
human rights treaties.  In sequence, the State submitted the Second Periodic Report of 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on Its Implementation of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
7
 in 2000 (the “Second ICCPR Implementation 
Report”), the Second Periodic Report of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on 
Its Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights
8
 in 2002 (the “Second ICESCR Implementation Report”), the Initial Report of 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on Its Implementation of the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
9
 also in 2002 (the 
“Initial CEDAW Implementation Report”), and finally the Combined Third and Fourth 
Periodic Reports of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on Its Implementation 
                                            
6
 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, opened for signature 
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter CEDAW]. 
 
7
 U.N. Human Rights Comm., Second Periodic Report of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on 
Its Implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ¶ U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/PRK/2000/2 (May 4, 2000) [hereinafter 2000 Second ICCPR Implementation Report]. 
 
8
 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: Second Periodic Reports Submitted by States Parties under Articles 16 and 
17 of the Covenant: Addendum: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, ¶ U.N. Doc. E/1990/6/Add.35 
(May 15, 2002) [hereinafter 2002 Second ICESCR Implementation Report].  
 
9
 U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Consideration of Reports Submitted 
by States Parties under Article 18 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (Initial Report of States Parties: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, ¶ U.N. Doc. 
CEDAW/C/PRK/1 (Sept. 11, 2002) [hereinafter 2002 Initial CEDAW Implementation Report]. 
 4 
of the Convention on the Rights of the Child
10
 in 2007 (the “Combined CRC 
Implementation Report”).  In addition to implementation reports, North Korea 
submitted its National Report Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 15 (A) of the 
Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1
11
 in 2009 (“National Report”) in 
cooperation with the process of Universal Periodic Review (“UPR”).
12
  These 
Implementation Reports and the National Report
13
 (collectively, “DPRK Official 
Reports”) are the official sources containing North Korea’s theoretical arguments in 
defense of its human rights practices.
14
 
In these official reports, North Korea depends on a theoretical approach that 
                                            
10
 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under 
Article 44 of the Convention: The Combined Third and Fourth Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in 
2007: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, ¶ U.N. Doc. CRC/C/PRK/4 (Jan. 15, 2008) [hereinafter 
2007 Combined CRC Implementation Report]. 
 
11
 U.N. GAOR, Human Rights Council Working Grp. on the Universal Periodic Review, National Report 
Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 15 (A) of the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1: 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, ¶ U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/6/PRK/1 (Aug. 27, 2009) [hereinafter 
2009 National Report].  
 
12
 The Universal Periodic Review (UPR) involves a review of the human rights records of all 192 United 
Nations Member States every four years.  See The Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, 
Universal Periodic Review, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/UPRMain.aspx (last visited 
Oct. 14, 2011). 
 
13
 I conducted a thorough analysis of these DPRK official reports to draw correct and objective 
conclusions about the government’s arguments in defense of its human rights practices and the main 
grounds for its arguments. See supra Chapter One.I.A.  
As of 2012, North Korea has submitted nine Implementation Reports, including two ICCPR 
Implementation Reports, two ICESCR Implementation Reports, one CEDAW Implementation Report, 
four CRC Implementation Reports, and one National Report. However, I have intentionally selected the 
abovementioned five official reports, which are best fit to ensure the accuracy, objectivity, and neutrality 
of the analysis. 
 
14
 See infra Chapter Four.I.A; see also infra Chapter Four.II.A; infra Chapter Four.III.A; infra Chapter 
Five.I.A; infra Chapter Five.II.A; infra Chapter Five.III.A. 
 5 
centers on the general implementation mechanism of its Constitution as the main 
grounds for its defense of its human rights practices.  In effect, the country uses its 
Constitution as the guaranteed mechanism of basic rights as well as compliance with 
international human rights treaties.
15
 
Some examples of the State’s claims regarding the North Korean Constitution as 
the general implementation mechanism are as follows: 
• “The rights set forth in the international human rights instruments are effectively 
guaranteed in the DPRK through the Constitution . . . .”
16
  
• “Respect for the dignity of a human person is a requirement set out in the 
Constitution . . . .”
17
  
• “The Socialist Constitution of the DPRK . . . comprehensively provides . . . the 
fundamental rights . . . of citizens in all spheres of social activity, and the principles 
                                            
15
 See Patricia Goedde, Legal Mobilization for Human Rights Protection in North Korea: Furthering 
Discourse or Discord?, 32.3 HUM. RTS. Q. 530, 534 (2010) (“It [North Korean government] claims that it 
has a legal system in place for human rights protection and has submitted periodic reports to the UN 
treaty committees explaining its observance of international human rights treaties.(citation omitted)”). 
The United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office has done a similar analysis in its Annual Report 
on Human Rights 2009. The relevant parts of its analysis include the following statement:  
The DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] consistently denies the existence of 
any human rights problems and rejects as unjust both this resolution and that tabled each 
year at the UN Human Rights Council. However, the DPRK engaged with the UN Universal 
Periodic Review (UPR) process in December. It submitted a national report asserting that 
their constitution ensures the protection of citizens’ rights to freedoms of opinion, 
expression and assembly, and that all religions are treated equally.  
U.K. FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS 2009 at 108 (2010) 
[hereinafter 2009 U.K. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT]. 
 
16
 2009 National Report, supra note 11, at 6. 
 
17
 Id. at 7. 
 6 
of their materialization.”
18
  
• “The stipulation in the Constitution that the State shall respect and protect human 
rights is the manifestation of the commitment of the State to ensuring full 
enjoyment by citizens of human rights on a high standard.”
19
  
• “The Constitution comprehensively provides for the fundamental rights and 
freedoms in all fields of State and public activity . . . . It also explicitly stipulates 
that these rights and freedoms are provided to everyone equally and 
practically . . . .”
20
 
• “Education on the Constitution . . . and [] [its] studies and dissemination are 
organized and conducted systematically with a view to making the citizens fully 
aware of their rights . . . [to] exercise the full range of their rights . . . .”
21
  
• “The State secured legal guarantees for bringing up children to be reliable leaders of 
the future and guaranteeing their rights to the fullest possible extent through the 
adoption of the Constitution . . . .”
22
  
• “The Constitution provides for the principles and popular policies to be maintained 
                                            
18
 Id. at 4.   
 
19
 Id.   
 
20
 Id. at 4-5.  
 
21
 Id. at 6.  
 
22
 Id. at 13. 
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in political, economic, cultural and all other fields of social life, declares that every 
citizen is particularly ensured the true democratic rights, freedom, happy material 
and cultural life and stipulates the basic rights of citizens . . . .”
23
  
• “The DPRK has embodied the rights contained in the [international human rights] 
instruments . . . in the Constitution, and has taken or is taking practical measures to 
realize them. As a result, the rights are well protected.”
24
  
• “The rights provided by the international instruments on human rights are reliably 
protected by the Constitution . . . .”
25
  
• “After ratifying several international human rights instruments, the DPRK amended 
and supplemented the Constitution . . . .”
26
  
• “The Constitution . . . of the DPRK comprehensively and concretely provide for the 
rights and freedom that citizens ought to be endowed with and enjoy in the political, 
economic, social, cultural, civil and all other fields.”
27
  
• “The fundamental guarantee for the advancement of women is contained in the 
                                            
23
 2000 Second ICCPR Implementation Report, supra note 7, at 4-5.  
 
24
 2002 Initial CEDAW Implementation Report, supra note 9, at 9.  
 
25
 Id. at 8. 
 
26
 Id. at 9.  
From the context of the statement, this paragraph connotes that the North Korean government amended 
and supplemented its Constitution to fulfill the requirements of major international human rights treaties. 
Thus, it can be distinguished as the part indirectly letting us know the assertion of North Korea that its 
Constitution is the mechanism for the implementation of human rights treaties including CEDAW. 
 
27
 Id. at 10. 
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Constitution which provides for the basic freedoms and rights of citizens in 
political, economic, social and cultural life.”
28
  
• “The Constitution stipulates the fundamental rights . . . of citizens; the State shall 
effectively guarantee genuine democratic rights and liberties to all citizens . . . .”
29
 
Most notable in the analysis of North Korea’s defense methodology in its official 
reports is its use of the Fundamental Rights Articles in the State’s Constitution.  North 
Korea’s main contention is that the Fundamental Rights Articles of its Constitution play 
specific, de facto, and critical roles in guaranteeing and supporting the general 
implementation mechanism that is the Constitution.  For the purposes of this 
dissertation, the Fundamental Rights Articles will be called the “core implementation 
mechanism.” 
In the DPRK Official Reports, North Korea provides several paragraphs arguing 
that the basic rights of the people have been protected internally, and that the particular 
rights prescribed in the international human rights treaties are guaranteed successfully 
through the de facto roles of the core implementation mechanism of the Fundamental 
Rights Articles of its Constitution.
30
 
                                            
28
 Id. at 14. 
 
29
 2007 Combined CRC Implementation Report, supra note 10, at 17. 
 
30
 See infra Chapter Four.I.A.1; see also infra Chapter Four.I.A.2; infra Chapter Four.II.A.1; infra 
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The core implementation mechanism model of the North Korean Constitution, 
which shows both North Korea’s arguments in defense of its human rights practices and 
the main grounds for its arguments in the DPRK Official Reports, is diagrammatized 
below:  
 
<Diagram 1> The Core Implementation Mechanism Model of the North Korean 
Constitution in the DPRK Official Reports 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                
Chapter Four.II.A.2; infra Chapter Four.III.A.1; infra Chapter Four.III.A.2; infra Chapter Five.I.A.1; infra 
Chapter Five.I.A.2; infra Chapter Five.II.A.1; infra Chapter Five.II.A.2; infra Chapter Five.III.A.1; infra 
Chapter Five.III.A.2. 
 
Fundamental Rights Articles of 
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B. The Arguments of the Liberal Democratic Camp Attacking the Human Rights 
Practices of North Korea and the Main Grounds for their Arguments 
Members of the liberal democratic camp, including the U.S., South Korea, and the 
U.K., annually release and regularly update authoritative reports on North Korea’s 
human rights practices.
31
  These reports, collectively called the “Liberal Democratic 
Camp Annual Reports” or “LDC Annual Reports,” include the following: Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices by the U.S. Department of State (“U.S. Human 
Rights Reports”);
32
 the Annual Report of the United States Commission on 
                                            
31
 The ROK Human Rights Report only covers North Korean human rights while the others have relevant 
sections dealing with the human rights situations in North Korea.  
 
32
 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
PRACTICES FOR 1979: REP. SUBMITTED TO THE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, U.S. H. OF REP. AND THE 
COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, U.S. S. BY THE DEP’T OF STATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 116(d) 
AND 502B(b) OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961, AS AMENDED. (J. Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter 
1979 U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT]; see also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 98th Cong., 2D SESS., COUNTRY 
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1983: REP. SUBMITTED TO THE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 
U.S. H. OF REP. AND THE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, U.S. S. BY THE DEP’T OF STATE IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH SECTIONS 116(D) AND 502B(B) OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961, AS AMENDED. (J. Comm. 
Print 1984) [hereinafter 1983 U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT]; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 99th Cong., 2D SESS., 
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1985: REP. SUBMITTED TO THE COMM. ON 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, U.S. H. OF REP. AND THE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, U.S. S. BY THE DEP’T OF 
STATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 116(D) AND 502B(B) OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961, 
AS AMENDED. (J. Comm. Print 1986) [hereinafter 1985 U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT]; U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE, 102D Cong., 2D SESS., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1991: REP. 
SUBMITTED TO THE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, U.S. H. OF REP. AND THE COMM. ON FOREIGN 
RELATIONS, U.S. S. BY THE DEP’T OF STATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 116(D) AND 502B(B) OF THE 
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961, AS AMENDED. (J. Comm. Print 1992) [hereinafter 1991 U.S. HUMAN 
RIGHTS REPORT]; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2000 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: 
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (2001), available at 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/eap/726.htm (last visited July 9, 2011) [hereinafter 2000 U.S. 
HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT]; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2004 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: 
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (2005), available at 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41646.htm (last visited July 9, 2011) [hereinafter 2004 U.S. 
HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT]; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2005 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: 
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (2006), available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61612.htm (last visited July 9, 2011) [hereinafter 2005 U.S. 
HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT]; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2006 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: 
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (2007), available at 
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International Religious Freedom (“USCIRF Human Rights Reports”);
33
 White Paper 
on Human Rights in North Korea by the Korea Institute for National Unification 
(KINU), a South Korean government-affiliated research institute (“ROK Human Rights 
Reports”);
34
 and the Human Rights Annual Report by the U.K. Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (UKFCO) (“U.K. Human Rights Reports”).
35
  Each member of 
                                                                                                                                
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78777.htm (last visited July 9, 2011) [hereinafter 2006 U.S. 
HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT]; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2008 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: 
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (2009), available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eap/119043.htm (last visited May 31, 2010) [hereinafter 2008 
U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT]; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2009 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
PRACTICES: DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (2010), available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/eap/135995.htm (last visited May 31, 2010) [hereinafter 2009 
U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT]; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2010 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
PRACTICES: DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (2011), available at 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/eap/154388.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2013) [hereinafter 2010 
U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT]; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2011 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
PRACTICES: DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (2012), available at 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?dlid=186279 (last visited July 9, 2013) 
[hereinafter 2011 U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT]; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2012 COUNTRY REPORTS ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (2013), available at 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2012&dlid=204210 (last visited 
July 9, 2013) [hereinafter 2012 U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT].  
 
33
 See, e.g., U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES 
COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 2008 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 USCIRF HUMAN 
RIGHTS REPORT]; see also U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNITED 
STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 2009 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 USCIRF 
HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT]; U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNITED 
STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 2010 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 USCIRF 
HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT]. 
 
34
 See, e.g., OK, TAE HWAN ET AL., WHITE PAPER ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTH KOREA 1996 (1996) 
[hereinafter 1996 ROK HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT]; see also LEE, KEUM-SOON ET AL., WHITE PAPER ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTH KOREA 2004 (Lee, Keum-Soon et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter 2004 ROK 
HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT]; LIM SOON-HEE ET AL., WHITE PAPER ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTH KOREA 
2006 (Lim Soon-Hee et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter 2006 ROK HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT]; LEE, KEUM-
SOON ET AL., WHITE PAPER ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTH KOREA 2009 (Center for North Korean Human 
Rights Studies at KINU ed., 2009) [hereinafter 2009 ROK HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT]; PARK YOUNG-HO ET 
AL., WHITE PAPER ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTH KOREA 2010 (Center for North Korean Human Rights 
Studies at KINU ed., 2010) [hereinafter 2010 ROK HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT]; KIM, KOOK-SHIN ET AL., 
WHITE PAPER ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTH KOREA 2011 (Center for North Korean Human Rights Studies 
at KINU ed., 2011) [hereinafter 2011 ROK HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT].  
 
35
 See, e.g., U.K. FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS 2006 (2006) 
[hereinafter 2006 U.K. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT]; see also U.K. FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, 
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the liberal democratic camp expends significant effort and resources to collect related 
information, analyze it thoroughly, and evaluate whether the human rights of the North 
Korean people are being domestically protected and whether the country is complying 
with the major international human rights treaties.  Accordingly, the LDC Annual 
Reports provide an official basis from which to cull out the main arguments of the U.S., 
South Korea, and the U.K. regarding the human rights practices of North Korea.
36
  In 
addition, the LDC Annual Reports appear to also serve as rebuttals to the assertions of 
North Korea in its official reports.
37
  In contrast to the arguments of the North Korean 
government, the liberal democratic camp contends that the government of North Korea 
has seriously infringed the fundamental freedoms of its people and has severely violated 
                                                                                                                                
ANNUAL REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS 2007 (2008) [hereinafter 2007 U.K. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT]; U.K. 
FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS 2008 (2009) [hereinafter 2008 
U.K. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT]; 2009 U.K. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 15; U.K. FOREIGN & 
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY: THE 2010 FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH 
OFFICE REPORT (2011) [hereinafter 2010 U.K. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT]; U.K. FOREIGN & 
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY: THE 2011 FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH 
OFFICE REPORT (2012) [hereinafter 2011 U.K. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT]; U.K. FOREIGN & 
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY: THE 2012 FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH 
OFFICE REPORT (2013) [hereinafter 2012 U.K. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT].  
 
36
 In addition to these LDC Annual Reports, there are other authoritative reports on the human rights 
situation in North Korea, including those by the U.N. and several international non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) for human rights. Nevertheless, the starting point of this dissertation is to analyze 
the sharp conflict of argument on the human rights issue between North Korea and the liberal democratic 
camp, which includes the U.S., U.K., South Korea. Therefore, the basic framework of their arguments 
takes the opposition structure of “country versus country.” In this sense, it is natural that the reports of the 
U.N. and international human rights NGOs cannot be used as main sources to show the official assertions 
of the liberal democratic countries. 
 
37
 It is worthwhile to mention that the LDC Annual Reports were not originally published in order to 
refute the arguments of North Korea in its four Implementation Reports and the National Report. 
However, looking at the results, these reports are ideal and official sources containing not only the 
relevant assertions of the liberal democratic countries on the issue of this dissertation but also offering 
refutations to North Korea’s claims in the DPRK Official Reports.  
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the international human rights treaties to which it is party.
38
  
To make their arguments about North Korea’s human rights practices, the U.S., 
South Korea, and the U.K. use a factual approach in the LDC Annual Reports, centering 
on the testimony of North Korean refugees and the interpretation of information 
gathered from foreign visitors to North Korea.
39
  Thus, the “Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea” section of the 2006 U.S. Human Rights Report indicates that the 
U.S. compiled this section with “[i]nformation from interviews, press reports, 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) reports, and refugee testimony obtained over 
the past decade, and supplemented where possible by information drawn from more 
recent reports from visitors, both private and official, to the country and NGOs working 
on the Chinese border.”
40
  Although there appear to be a variety of sources relied upon, 
the most compelling sources are the testimony of North Korean refugees and 
information from private and official visitors to the country.  
That the reports would rely on testimony of refugees is not surprising; North 
Korea, after all, is a closed society.
41
  For example, the government of North Korea 
                                            
38
 See infra Chapter Four.I.D; see also infra Chapter Four.II.D; infra Chapter Four.III.D; infra Chapter 
Five.I.D; infra Chapter Five.II.D; infra Chapter Five.III.D. 
 
39
 See infra id.  
 
40
 2006 U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 32. 
 
41
 See LARRY DIAMOND, THE SPIRIT OF DEMOCRACY: THE STRUGGLE TO BUILD FREE SOCIETIES 
THROUGHOUT THE WORLD 341 (2009) (“[T]he world’s most brutally closed society, North Korea.”); see 
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does not allow the visitation of the UN special rapporteur for human rights in North 
Korea
42
 nor of human rights activists who are involved with international human rights 
NGOs.
43
  Notwithstanding its closed-door policy, North Korea has allowed certain 
international NGOs and international organizations which are not directly related to 
human rights activities to visit its territory.
44
  However, even such foreign visitors are 
subjected to unfriendly conditions and are prohibited from coming in contact with 
citizens to obtain information about their treatment and fundamental freedoms.
45
 
                                                                                                                                
also PAUL FRENCH, NORTH KOREA: THE PARANOID PENINSULA – A MODERN HISTORY 32 (2nd ed. 2007) 
(“Even the Albanians described North Korea as ‘an unbelievably closed society’ . . . .”).  
 
42
 See Soo-Am Kim, A Strategy for the Coevolution of North Korean Human Rights 13, (The East Asia 
Inst., Working Paper No. 12, 2011) (“The North Korean authorities do not recognize the existence of the 
UN Special Rapporteur for North Korean Human Rights and refused to allow its visit, because the 
Rapporteur was nominated by a UN Human Rights Resolution.”); see also Special Rapporteur for Human 
Rights in North Korea, [Rep. on the] Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/61/349 (Sept. 15, 2006) (by Vitit Muntarbhorn) [hereinafter 2006 U.N. Human 
Rights Report]. (“It is regrettable that, to date, the authorities of the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea have declined to invite him into the country, despite several requests from the Special Rapporteur 
to visit the country.”).  
 
43
 See Kim, supra note 42, at 13 (citing “[R]epeated turndowns on . . . international human rights NGOs’ 
requests for visits, without the North’s having a self-monitoring system, will only aggravate the conflict 
between the North and the international community.”).  
 
44
 See, e.g., Scott Snyder, American Religious NGOs in North Korea: A Paradoxical Relationship, 21.4 
ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 423, 426 (2007) (“[F]our American NGOs that continue their operations in North 
Korea with religious funding but with differing backgrounds and motivations are the American Friends 
Service Committee (AFSC), the Eugene Bell Foundation (EBF), Christian Friends of Korea (CFK), and 
Global Resource Services (GRS).”); see also id. (“All of these NGOs are still operating projects in the 
North despite the end of the food crisis and the ramping up of tensions over the North Korean nuclear 
program; and all of these programs continue with the awareness by DPRK counterparts that they are 
religiously backed . . . .”); AFP (Agence France-Presse), WFP Launches Food Aid Programme in Flood-
Hit North Korea, CHANNEL NEWSASIA (SINGAPORE) (Aug. 22, 2007), 
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/295270/1/.html (“The WFP [World Food 
Programme] said visits by its own assessment teams to 11 counties in two provinces [of North Korea] 
have confirmed the extent of the losses there, adding that more visits would be made.”). 
 
45
 One NGO confirms that “a considerable problem for all NGOs in this area [North Korea] is not only 
the persistent state monitoring, but the limited access to the people.” The Center for Applied Policy 
Research at the University of Munich, The NGO Experience in North Korea, http://www.cap-
lmu.de/transatlantic/topics/korea_ngo.php (last visited Sept. 29, 2011) (“In particular, NGOs from the US 
 15 
In congruity with its closed-door policy, the government of North Korea, as a 
general rule, prohibits visits by outside journalists and foreign news reporters.
46
  
Although a limited number of foreign government officials, outside journalists, and 
foreign news reporters of the liberal democratic camp have had the chance to visit North 
Korea, these visitors cannot talk to or freely interview North Korean citizens, or travel 
anywhere beyond authorized areas.
47
  Even the ambassadors of liberal democratic 
countries
48
 residing in North Korea are prohibited from interacting with ordinary North 
Koreans,
49
 as the regime keeps a tight grip on the activities of foreign diplomats.
50
  
                                                                                                                                
and South Korea are subject to continual suspicion [in North Korea] . . . .”); See Norbert Vollertsen, The 
Reality of North Korea, in THE 3RD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON NORTH KOREAN HUMAN RIGHTS & 
REFUGEES: 2002 TOKYO JAPAN 29, 31 (Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights ed., 2002) 
(“Knowledge about the overall humanitarian situation in North Korea is . . . not available for the normal 
foreign visitors, aid worker . . . .”); see also 2006 U.K. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 35, at 61 
(“Humanitarian aid workers . . . in Pyongyang are subject to severe internal travel restrictions . . . .”).  
 
46
 See Pan Suk Kim, Government and Politics, in NORTH KOREA: A COUNTRY STUDY 165, 194 (Andrea 
Matles Savada ed., 4th ed. 1994) (“No external media are allowed free access to North Korea. . . .”); see 
also Sharon LaFraniere, Visitors See North Korea Still Stunted by Its Isolation, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2010, 
at A1 (“Journalists are rarely granted visas to North Korea, one of the world’s most secretive and 
militaristic societies.”). 
 
47
 The U.S. Department of State confirms that “North Korea does not allow representatives of foreign 
governments, journalists, or other invited guests the freedom of movement that would enable them to 
fully assess human rights conditions or confirm reported abuses.” 2006 U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, 
supra note 32. See 2006 ROK HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 34, at 118 (“[N]orth Korea stated that 
journalists could travel to any region in North Korea to meet with individuals they wish to meet. North 
Korea also insisted that foreign reporters are free to collect information and report it . . . . However, the 
facts indicate that contact with foreign journalists remains controlled.”); see also id. (“North Korea did 
agree to guarantee the activities of foreign reporters at the time it opened diplomatic relations with 
Germany. But the State Department report pointed out that the North Korean government continued to 
strictly control the activities of foreign visitors.”).  
  
48
 The U.S. and South Korea do not have any official diplomatic relations with North Korea. However, 
the U.K. established diplomatic relations with the country in 2000. 
 
49
 See Kim Young-Jin, ‘Doubt over NK Succession Not Enough for Revolt,’ THE KOREA TIMES (Sept. 28, 
2011), http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2011/09/116_95649.html (“[U.K. ambassador to 
North Korea] Hughes said while it remained exceedingly difficult to interact with citizens . . . .”); see also 
Martin Uden, Visit to Pyongyang – 11-14 March. The Programme, AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF 
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In addition to restrictions of visitors, all domestic mass media such as television, 
radio, newspapers, and books are subject to strict censorship.
51
  The North Korean 
government completely controls all information, including those regarding human rights 
violations in the country, so that such violations rarely leak out to the rest of the world.
52
 
Given these restrictions, there is little alternative, if reports are to use factual 
information, to relying on the testimony of North Korean refugees, as well as those of 
private and official visitors to the country, to analyze, interpret, and assess human rights 
conditions in North Korea. 
                                                                                                                                
KOREA MARTIN UDEN’S BLOG (Mar. 23, 2011), http://blogs.fco.gov.uk/martinuden/2011/03/23/visit-to-
pyongyang-11-14-march-the-programme/ [hereinafter U.K. AMBASSADOR TO SOUTH KOREA’S BLOG] 
(“Life for my colleagues in Pyongyang is undoubtedly challenging. . . . There is virtually no social 
interaction with North Koreans, other than with the local Embassy staff provided by the DPRK 
government . . . .”); Vollertsen, supra note 45, at 31 (“Knowledge about the overall humanitarian situation 
in North Korea is . . . not available for the . . . diplomat [in the country].”).  
 
50
 See Moon Gwang-Lip, Jong-Un Still in Shadow: Envoy, KOREA JOONGANG DAILY (Sept. 29, 2011), 
http://koreajoongangdaily.joinsmsn.com/news/article/html/111/2942111.html?cloc=joongangdaily%7Cho
me%7Cnewslist1 (“The ambassador said that what he observed in North Korea was limited because of 
the regime’s tight control of foreign diplomats’ activities . . . .”); see also U.K. AMBASSADOR TO SOUTH 
KOREA’S BLOG, supra note 49 (“[L]ife [in Pyongyang] is very circumscribed and restricted, as well as 
somewhat oppressive in such a state-controlled environment.”); 2006 U.K. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra 
note 35, at 61 (“[D]iplomats in Pyongyang are subject to severe internal travel restrictions . . . .”).  
 
51
 See 2005 U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 32 (“Domestic media censorship continued to be 
enforced strictly, and no deviation from the official government line was tolerated.”); see also HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2006 (EVENTS OF 2005) at 292 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH REPORT] (“All media are either run or controlled by the state, and all publications are subject to 
official censorship.”).  
 
52
 See 2009 USCIRF HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 33, at 22 (“The DPRK . . . tightly controls the 
flow of information in and out of the country. This tight control makes it difficult to gather detailed and 
timely data about . . . related human rights in North Korea.”); see also Special Rapporteur for Human 
Rights in North Korea, Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 60/251of 15 March 2006 Entitled 
“Human Rights Council”: Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/15 (Feb. 7, 2007) (by Vitit 
Muntarbhorn) [hereinafter 2007 U.N. Human Rights Report] (“Freedom of expression and association 
and access to information are impeded by the closed nature of the State and rigid State control over the 
information flow . . . .”). 
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Similarly, USCIRF uses the same methodology.  It states in its 2009 Religious 
Freedom Report that given North Korea’s many restrictions, its investigation relies on 
the testimony of North Korean refugees.  The USCIRF states: 
In addition to the government’s strict control over religion, the DPRK also 
tightly controls the flow of information in and out of the country. This tight 
control makes it difficult to gather detailed and timely data about religious 
freedom and related human rights in North Korea. Therefore, in 2005 the 
Commission authorized researchers to begin interviews with North Korean 
refugees to study conditions in the country and for refugees seeking asylum 
in China. These interviews resulted in two studies.(citation omitted)
53
  
Like both the U.S. Human Rights Reports and USCIRF Report, the 2011 edition 
of the ROK Human Rights Reports clearly shows that its main argument methodology 
is also based on the testimony of North Korean refugees.  The 2011 ROK Human 
Rights Report states: 
The [North Korean Human Rights Research] Center
54
 has . . . periodically 
conducted systematic and professional in-depth personal interviews with 
North Korean defectors [North Korean refugees]
55
 in South Korea to 
                                            
53
 2009 USCIRF HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 33, at 22. 
 
54
 See 2011 ROK HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 34, at 8 (“The Korea Institute for National 
Unification (KINU) in Seoul established its North Korean Human Rights Research Center in December 
1994 for the purpose of managing various data and source materials related to the human rights situation 
in North Korea in a systematic and professional way.”).  
 
55
 Throughout this dissertation, I use the terms “refugees,” “defectors,” and “escapees” interchangeably. 
All North Korean defectors are technically recognized as “refugees” in the 1951 U.N. Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, even though they 
are economic migrants. One study notes:  
The North Korean refugees have been variously referred to as “defectors,” “escapees,” and 
“illegal [economic] immigrants.” These labels accord them little legal protection. 
Advocacy groups have argued for these North Koreans to be officially recognized as 
refugees on two fundamental premises. First, they have a well-grounded fear of 
persecution – a key determinant of refugee status – as a result of the oppressive social and 
political control in North Korea (citation omitted). Second, the North Koreans are 
considered refugee sur place, that is, refugees who did not leave their country of origin for 
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ascertain the reality of the human rights situation behind the walls of North 
Korea. Based on the information obtained through our research and 
investigations we have built an extensive computerized database, and since 
1996 we have published this “White Paper on Human Rights in North 
Korea” every year in both Korean and English. In order that we may better 
grasp the North Korean realities on the ground, the contents of this White 
Paper are based on in-depth personal interviews with North Korean 
defectors in South Korea, with emphasis on recent arrivals. . . .
56
   
In addition, the 2009 ROK Human Rights Report states:  
In our efforts to look at the reality more closely, the “2009 White Paper on 
Human Rights in North Korea” has attempted to compare, analyze, and 
verify every aspect of the recent situation based on in-depth personal 
interviews with “defectors” (or North Korean refugees) who came into 
South Korea recently . . . .
57
 
The U.K. Human Rights Reports also relies on defector testimony.  In its 2010 
Report, UKFCO reveals:  
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has repeatedly 
claimed that international concern about its human rights has the sole aim 
of undermining the regime, and that it has its own, adequate system for the 
protection of human rights. However, information from a variety of sources, 
much of it from North Korean defectors, paints a picture of serious and 
widespread abuse. This includes political prisons and labour “rehabilitation” 
camps; regular use of the death penalty, including extrajudicial and public 
                                                                                                                                
fear of persecution but who fear persecution upon return. Claims of severe punishment, 
including death, incarceration in labor camps, and further discrimination, have been 
documented to support the North Koreans’ bid for asylum. 
Jaime Koh, Human Insecurities or Liabilities? The Changing Security Paradigms and the Case of the 
North Korean Refugees, in HUMAN SECURITY: SECURING EAST ASIA’S FUTURE 17, 19 (Benny Teh Cheng 
Guan ed., 2012); See GLYN FORD & SOYOUNG KWON, NORTH KOREA ON THE BRINK: STRUGGLE FOR 
SURVIVAL, 134 (2008) (“[E]conomic migrants can be turned into refugees. When they set off they are not 
refugees but they become so when they arrive. This is because North Korea punishes those it apprehends 
on their return; economic migrants become, according to the UNHCR, refugee sur place because of this 
threat.”); see also infra Chapter Two.II.A. 
 
56
 2011 ROK HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 34, at 8-9. 
 
57
 2009 ROK HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 34, at 9. 
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executions; routine use of torture and inhumane treatment; and severe 
restrictions on freedom of speech, movement, assembly, and information.
58
 
In the same way, its Report of 2008 also discloses that “As the DPRK refuses to 
accept any independent human rights monitoring, much evidence of this comes from 
North Koreans who have left the country as defectors . . . . They provide consistently 
shocking reports of serious and widespread violations of basic human rights in the 
country.”
59
 
 
II. Statement of Problem 
North Korea’s response to the arguments of the liberal democratic countries is 
predictable.  The government aggressively rebuffs the arguments of the U.S., U.K., and 
South Korea by denying and discounting the contents of their annual reports.  North 
Korea especially concentrates on casting doubt on the credibility of the testimony.  For 
example, the government insists that the so-called North Korean “defectors,” on whose 
testimony the liberal democratic camp relies, were actually kidnapped or fooled into 
betraying their country by South Korea and American interest groups.
60
  Additionally, 
                                            
58
 2010 U.K. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 35, at 180. 
The name of the report has been changed from “Annual Report on Human Rights by the United Kingdom 
Foreign & Commonwealth Office” to “Human Rights and Democracy: The Foreign & Commonwealth 
Office Report” in March 2011. 
 
59
 2008 U.K. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 35, at 139. 
 
60
 See Korea News Service [KNS] in Tokyo, KCNA [Korean Central News Agency] Commentary Blasts S. 
Korean Puppet Group’s Abduction of Inhabitants of DPRK, KNS IN TOKYO (Apr. 9, 2011), 
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the DPRK contends that the South Korean government and these American interest 
groups brainwashed the North Korean people they kidnapped and also bribed others to 
vilify the government.
61
  The government of North Korea further argues that the 
arguments of liberal democratic camp regarding its alleged violations of human rights 
are politically-motivated attacks that are nothing but complete lies, deception, and 
fabrication.
62
  Along with these defenses, North Korea points to the Fundamental 
                                                                                                                                
http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2011/201104/news09/20110409-26ee.html (“Most of ‘the defectors from the 
north’ touted by the group [of traitors in south Korea] were lured and abducted by the south Korean 
authorities and pro-U.S. right-wing conservative forces in an organized and planned manner in disregard 
of their will or wishes.”); see also id. (“It is nobody’s secret that the south Korean authorities have long 
conducted operations to abduct inhabitants of the DPRK by all conspiratorial methods after laying a dense 
network of its intelligence agents, organizations for anti-DPRK operations under the guise of 
‘organizations for rescuing defectors from the north’ . . . .”); Id. (“[T]he south Korean authorities have . . . 
hired abductors in the areas close to the DPRK.”); Yonhap News, S. Korea Rejects N. Korea’s Repeated 
Proposal for Talks on Defectors, YONHAP NEWS (Apr. 22, 2011), 
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2011/04/22/33/0401000000AEN20110422004100315F.HTM
L (“[P]yongyang accused Seoul of kidnapping the defectors and attempting to force them to stay.”); Id. 
(“[T]he North held a press conference where 10 repatriated citizens repeated the regime’s allegations, 
according to the North’s official Korean Central News Agency [KCNA]. One of them, identified as Ok 
Song-hyok, alleged that his group was ‘kidnapped, mistreated and pressed to remain in South Korea,’ 
according to the KCNA.”); Lee Seok Young, Drifting Defectors ‘Kidnapped,’ Says NK, DAILY NK (July 1, 
2011), http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk01500&num=7903 (“‘There was a lecture by 
a local NSA [National Security Agency] official on the 26th, where he said that traitors who were fooled 
into defecting by the persuasion and deception of the South Chosun [Korea] puppets would be open to the 
stern judgment of the motherland.’”).  
 
61
 See KNS in Tokyo, NRC [National Reconciliation Council] Accuses S. Korea of Using ‘North 
Defectors’ for Smear Campaign, KNS IN TOKYO (Mar. 23. 2010), 
http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2010/201003/news23/20100323-15ee.html (“This [puppet conservative] 
group . . . drastically increased a budget for ‘assisting defectors from the north’ while cutting down a 
budget for cooperation with the DPRK and set up ‘Hana centers’ in more areas of south Korea as centers 
for brainwashing ‘defectors from the north’ and educating them in conspiratorial plots against the 
DPRK.”); see also UPI [United Press International], North, South Korea set for talks, UPI (Mar. 7, 2011), 
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2011/03/07/North-South-Korea-set-for-talks/UPI-
14481299518663/ (“North Koreans apparently trying to flee state repression are being brainwashed in 
South Korea, the government in Pyongyang claims.”). 
 
62
 See 2009 National Report, supra note 11, at 15 (“The United States is making an undisguised attempt 
to interfere in the internal affairs of the DPRK and change its system under the pretext of ‘human rights 
protection.’”); see also KCNA, S. Korean Group of Traitors’ ‘White Paper on Human Rights of North’ 
under Fire, ANGLO-PEOPLES KOREA FRIENDSHIP BLOG (July 15, 2011), http://juche007-anglo-
peopleskoreafriendship.blogspot.com/2011/07/s-korean-group-of-traitors-white-paper.html [hereinafter 
ANGLO-PEOPLES KOREA FRIENDSHIP BLOG] (“The south Korean puppet group of traitors is distributing 
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Rights Articles of its Constitution. 
Despite its far-fetched arguments and the untruthfulness of its rebuttals, North 
Korea’s defense demonstrates that it understands well the liberal democratic camp’s 
chief method of argumentation and, for its part, deals with the camp’s method very 
effectively. 
On the other hand, the liberal democratic camp fails to refute the theory of the 
core implementation mechanism of the North Korean Constitution.  The LDC Annual 
Reports do not thoroughly analyze the core implementation mechanism of the North 
Korean Constitution and contain very few logical rebuttals.  The camp bases its entire 
argument on the testimony of defectors and private and official visitors to North Korea.  
Therefore, considering that North Korea has attempted to deceive the world under the 
guise of claiming to provide human rights protections and to the adherence of the 
international human rights treaties through the core implementation mechanism of the 
Fundamental Rights Articles, the LDC’s methodology dealing with North Korea’s 
                                                                                                                                
the so-called ‘2011 white paper on human rights of north’ malignantly slandering and insulting the 
socialist system centered on the popular masses in the DPRK and the independent and genuine life of its 
people.”); Id. (“The white paper in which they claimed ‘comprehensively surveyed the human rights 
situation in the north’ is nothing but a dirty document against the DPRK as it is peppered with all sorts of 
lies, deception, fabrication and mud-slinging and a profound confusing of right and wrong.”); Id. (“This is 
lashing the people of the DPRK into towering resentment as it is a politically-motivated unpardonable 
provocation against the inviolable system and dignity of the DPRK.”); Id. (“The puppet group is making 
desperate efforts to tarnish the international image of the DPRK winning victory after victory and calm 
down the people from all walks of life in south Korea calling for improved inter-Korean relations through 
the conspiratorial human rights racket.”); Harold Mandel, Kim Jong-un Appears Likely to Succeed His 
Father in North Korea, SUITE101, May 21, 2011, available at http://www.suite101.com/content/kim-
jong-un-appears-likely-to-succeed-his-father-in-north-korea-a372155 (last visited Sept. 17, 2011) (“North 
Korea . . . insist[s] that these reports of human rights abuses in North Korea are simply not true.”). 
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claims is inarguably unsuccessful. 
In such a debate, a neutral third party, who does not possess actual information 
regarding the human rights situation in North Korea, may not only believe that North 
Korea’s arguments are true but may also believe that the liberal democratic camp’s 
demand for an improvement of North Korea’s human rights practices are merely 
politically-motivated lies.  
Along with the absence of thorough analysis and logical rebuttal of the core 
implementation mechanism, the other problem is the ineffective opposition structure 
caused by the fundamental difference in argumentation method.  As reviewed earlier, 
North Korea’s theoretical approach to defend its protection of human rights stands in 
stark contrast to the factual approach taken by members of the liberal democratic camp.  
However, the fundamental difference in the method of argumentation between the two 
parties means that there are few points of direct collision within their arguments.  In 
other words, North Korea continues to focus on its core implementation mechanism of 
the Fundamental Rights Articles, insisting that it protects the human rights of its people 
through it, while, on the other hand, the three countries repeatedly concentrate on the 
testimony of North Korean defectors, maintaining their contention that North Korea 
violates the fundamental rights of its people.  These two opposing sides do not actually 
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collide but run parallel, and are left without the real opportunity to challenge each 
other’s arguments as to the fundamental difference between their methodologies.  
 
<Diagram 2> The Ineffective Opposition Structure of the DPRK’s Theoretical 
Approach Versus the LDC’s Factual Approach 
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III. The Development of a New Refuting Theory and Its Mechanism Model 
against North Korea’s Theory of the Core Implementation Mechanism 
A more effective way to deal with the liberal democratic camp’s accusations is to 
form a theoretical opposition approach to match the theoretical approach of North Korea.  
To that end, this dissertation proposes the theoretical approach of “the new refuting 
theory and its mechanism model.”
63
  
Since the heart of North Korea’s theoretical approach is the core implementation 
mechanism of the Fundamental Rights Articles of its Constitution, the most effective 
way to combat North Korea’s theoretical argumentation methodology is to refute that 
methodology by demonstrating the impossibility of performance of this core 
implementation mechanism model through the refuting theory.  In addition, if we can 
develop the new refuting theory and its mechanism model to prove it successfully, it 
means that we can also demonstrate the falsity of North Korea’s arguments in the DPRK 
Official Reports concerning its human rights protection and adherence to international 
human rights treaties. 
Moreover, carefully considering that the two problems arising from the liberal 
democratic camp’s factual approach are “the absence of thorough analysis and logical 
                                            
63
 See infra Chapter One.III.B; see also infra <Diagram 3>. 
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rebuttal of the core implementation mechanism”
64
 and “the ineffective opposition 
structure caused by the fundamental difference in the method of argumentation,”
65
 the 
new refuting theory and its mechanism model of this dissertation against North Korea’s 
theory of the core implementation mechanism would have the advantage of solving the 
two above-mentioned problems simultaneously.  
In result, I conclude that the development of the new refuting theory and its 
theoretical mechanism model, which can be supported by the contents and arguments of 
the U.S., U.K., and South Korea in the LDC Annual Reports, is the most effective way 
to rebuff North Korea’s arguments in the DPRK Official Reports in defense of its 
human rights practices.  
 
A. The Prototype for the Development of the New Refuting Theory and Its 
Mechanism Model 
In that case, where can we find the prototype for the development of the new 
refuting theory and mechanism model, which retains objectivity, logicality, and 
neutrality, and is also harmonious with the contents and arguments of the fact-based 
LDC Annual Reports? 
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 See supra Chapter One.II.  
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 See supra id. 
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The following statements sourced from reliable studies on human rights 
conditions in North Korea fulfill these standards considerably; although they are not 
detailed or systematic, they provide a prototype after which an effective refutation 
theory and mechanism model can be modeled: 
• “The [North Korean] constitution [of 2009] provides for ‘freedom of religious belief’ 
[in the first part of Article 68]; however, reports indicated that in practice the 
government severely restricted religious freedom . . . . The law also stipulates that 
religion ‘should not be used for purposes of dragging in foreign powers or 
endangering public security.’ [in the latter part of Article 68.] Genuine religious 
freedom did not exist.”
66
  
• “[D]espite the DPRK government’s assertion . . . that there are no limitations on 
religious practice, Article 68 [of the Constitution of 1998] also has provisions on 
drawing in foreign forces and harming the state or social order, provisions that 
could lead to potentially severe limitations that could easily result in the arbitrary 
application of the constitutional provision on ‘freedom of religious beliefs.’”
67
  
• “The fundamental reason for North Korea’s difficulty in guaranteeing the freedom 
                                            
66
 2009 U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 32. 
 
67
 DAVID HAWK, “THANK YOU FATHER KIM IL SUNG”: EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS OF SEVERE VIOLATIONS OF 
FREEDOM OF THOUGHT, CONSCIENCE, AND RELIGION IN NORTH KOREA 12 (2005); 2006 U.N. Human 
Rights Report, supra note 42, at 13. 
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of religion in accordance with the Socialist Constitution [of 1998] stems from its 
belief that religions are a means of foreign encroachment and would inflict harm 
on North Korea’s social disciplines.”
68
  
• “Legally speaking, North Korea is still capable of restricting religious freedom, 
because it continues to believe that foreign influences can use religion as a conduit 
to disrupt national and social order.”
69
   
• “Although the DPRK committed to protect religious freedom in its constitution and 
international human rights treaties, and claims to adhere to those commitments, 
there is little evidence that the freedom of . . . religion exists in North Korea.”
70
 
• “The [North Korean] constitution [of 1998] provides for freedom of speech and of 
the press [in Article 67]; however, the government prohibited the exercise of these 
rights in practice. Articles of the constitution that require citizens to follow 
‘socialist norms of life’ [(in Article 42)] and to obey a ‘collective spirit’ [(in Article 
63)] took precedence over individual political and civil liberties.”
71
  
• “Although the [North Korean] constitution [of 2009] theoretically guarantees 
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 2006 ROK HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 34, at 146.  
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 2010 ROK HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 34, at 325. 
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 2009 USCIRF HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 33, at 22. 
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 2006 U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 32. 
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freedom of speech [in Article 67], constitutional provisions calling for adherence to 
a ‘collective spirit’ [(in Article 63 and so forth)] restrict all reporting that is not 
sanctioned by the government in practice.”
72
  
• “Article 67 [of the North Korean Constitution of 1998] . . . provides for ‘freedom of 
speech, of the press, demonstration and association.’ However . . . these freedoms 
are overshadowed and . . . limited and circumscribed by other constitutional 
provisions, including that . . . ‘the State shall eliminate the way of life inherited 
from the outmoded society and establish a new socialist way of life [emphasizing 
collectivism
73
] in every sphere.’ [in Article 42.]”
74
  
• “Article 67 of the 1998 DPRK Constitution provides for ‘freedom of speech, of the 
press, demonstration and association.’ However, as is the case with ‘freedom of 
religious beliefs,’ these freedoms are overshadowed and heavily, if not entirely, 
limited and circumscribed by other constitutional provisions.”
75
 
• “As will be seen in the perceptions and experiences of the former North Koreans [i.e. 
North Korean defectors] interviewed for this report, the constitutional limitations 
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 FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 2010: NORTH KOREA (2010), available at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2010/north-korea (last visited May 1, 2012) 
[hereinafter 2010 FREEDOM HOUSE PRESS FREEDOM REPORT]. 
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 See infra Chapter Four.III.B; see also infra note 407 and accompanying text. 
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 HAWK, supra note 67, at 12; 2006 U.N. Human Rights Report, supra note 42, at 13.  
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 HAWK, supra note 67, at 26. 
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and restrictions [by the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Articles
76
] in fact completely 
override the ‘rights’ that are set forth in the [Fundamental Rights Articles of] 
DPRK constitution.”
77
  
 
B. The Key Factors, Logical Flow, and Theoretical Structure Extracted from the 
Prototype and Their Application for the Development of the New Refuting 
Theory and Its Mechanism Model  
A thorough analysis and reasonable expansion of the ideas from the above-
mentioned statements, from the U.S. Human Rights Reports, USCIRF Human Rights 
Reports, ROK Human Rights Reports, U.N. Human Rights Reports, Freedom House 
Press Freedom Reports, and other publications of USCIRF, enable us to acquire the vital 
clues, core premises, key factors, logical order and flow, and theoretical structure to 
establish the new refuting theory and to develop the corresponding mechanism model 
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 See infra Chapter One.III.B.1. 
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 HAWK, supra note 67, at 26. 
It is worthwhile noting that, according to USCIRF, the violations of fundamental rights are the practical 
results of the powerful influence of the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Articles over the country at large. 
The USCIRF Human Rights Report provides an important analysis, showing the relationship between the 
DPRK’s human rights violations in the refuting theory and the liberal democratic countries’ arguments in 
their annual reports, which are grounded in the testimony of North Korean refugees who experienced and 
witnessed first-hand the infringements of the fundamental rights in North Korean society as a whole. 
According to the analysis, the new refuting theory and mechanism model can work in harmony with the 
contents and arguments of the fact-based LDC Annual Reports, and vice versa. That is to say, this analysis 
demonstrates that the new refuting theory and its theoretical mechanism model can be supported by the 
contents and arguments of the U.S., U.K., and South Korea in the LDC Annual Reports, and vice versa. 
See infra Chapter One.III.B.4; see also infra Chapter Four.I.D; infra Chapter Four.II.D; infra Chapter 
Four.III.D; infra Chapter Five.I.D; infra Chapter Five.II.D; infra Chapter Five.III.D.  
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that will expose the falsity of North Korea’s arguments in the DPRK Official Reports 
and to prove the truth of the liberal democratic countries’ assertions in the LDC Annual 
Reports. 
 
1. The Fundamental Rights Articles and the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Articles 
within One Constitutional Boundary 
North Korea established its first Constitution on September 8, 1948.  As of 2012, 
it was amended and supplemented six times, in 1972, 1992, 1998, 2009, 2010, and 2012.  
The most recent amendments were on April 13, 2012. 
The North Korean Constitutions of 1998 and 2009, which are used not only in the 
above-mentioned statements but also in the DPRK Official Reports,
78
 incorporate two 
fundamentally distinct types of articles that have opposing viewpoints on human rights.  
One of the two distinct types of articles pertains to the Fundamental Rights Articles, 
                                            
78
 The above-mentioned credible research sources focus their key points around the Fundamental Rights 
Articles and the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Articles, based on the North Korean Constitutions of 1998 
and 2009. 
Meanwhile, North Korea made its Second ICCPR Implementation Report, Second ICESCR 
Implementation Report, Initial CEDAW Implementation Report, Combined CRC Implementation Report 
between the years of 2000 and 2007, and its National Report in 2009. Therefore, the contents of the 
Fundamental Rights Articles in its four Implementation Reports and one National Report are based on the 
North Korean Constitutions of 1998 and 2009, respectively. See supra Chapter One.I.A.  
One of the immediate objectives of the new refuting theory and its mechanism model is to demonstrate 
theoretically the impossibility of the performance of the core implementation mechanisms of the 
Fundamental Rights Articles of the Constitutions of 1998 and 2009 in the DPRK Official Reports by 
showing how the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Articles work against the Fundamental Rights Articles.  
Accordingly, to ensure the rationale and consistency of this dissertation, it is important to analyze the 
contents of the Fundamental Rights Articles and Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Articles of the North 
Korean Constitutions of 1998 and 2009, and to study the theoretical relationship between the two types of 
articles and their logical dynamics. 
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including those contained in the first part of Article 68 regarding the freedom of religion 
and Article 67 regarding the freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association.  As 
reviewed earlier, these articles are the core implementing mechanisms of the North 
Korean Constitution.  Thus, as is argued by North Korea in the DPRK Official Reports, 
the Fundamental Rights Articles are, in their very nature, supposed to protect the 
fundamental freedoms and guarantee the basic rights of the North Korean people.
79
 
Meanwhile, the full distrust in and strong hostility toward religion, and the 
emphasis of collectivism, among many other principles, are key doctrines of Juche 
ideology and Marxism-Leninism.
80
  Thus, the second distinct type of article is what I 
will call the “Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Articles,” including those found in the latter 
part of Article 68, showing a distrust in and hostility toward religion,
81
 Article 63 for 
the collectivist principle,
82
 and Article 42 for a new socialist way of life, which is the 
socialist lifestyle emphasizing collectivism.
83
  
The notable point is that Juche ideology and Marxism-Leninism are the two anti-
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fundamental rights and ruling ideologies controlling North Korea.
84
  Thus, from the 
logical and theoretical standpoint, it is natural for the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist 
Articles, which faithfully incorporate the core principles of the two anti-fundamental 
rights and ruling ideologies, to take the disposition of anti-fundamental rights articles 
and to position themselves as ruling articles.  Namely, the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist 
Articles are effectively the anti-fundamental rights and ruling articles from the logical 
and theoretical standpoint. 
 
2. Incapacitation Stage – Verifying the Falsity of North Korea’s Arguments  
The Fundamental Rights Articles and the anti-fundamental rights articles, in their 
very nature and workings, are bound to clash with each other in performing their 
function and role within one constitutional boundary.  That is to say, the clash in 
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 See infra Chapter Three; see also MICHAEL SETH, A HISTORY OF KOREA: FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE 
PRESENT 355 (2010) (“Perhaps no Communist regime ever emphasized ideology as much as North 
Korea.”); Charles Armstrong, The Role and Influence of Ideology, in NORTH KOREA IN TRANSITION: 
POLITICS, ECONOMY, AND SOCIETY 3, 6 (Kyung-Ae Park & Scott Snyder eds., 2012) (“Ideology has 
always played a key role in communist systems, and North Korea is no exception. Marxist-Leninist 
regimes all depended on ideology and information control when neither coercion nor material incentives 
were sufficient.”); NATASHA EZROW & ERICA FRANTZ, DICTATORS AND DICTATORSHIPS: UNDERSTANDING 
AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES AND THEIR LEADERS 4 (2011) (“The dictatorship of North Korea (a 
personalist/single-party regime) shares many characteristics with totalitarian regimes. Ideology plays a 
strong role in the North Korean regime. The state’s [official] ideology, Juche, serves to . . . subordinate 
the people under the will of the state(citation omitted).”); MARK O. DICKERSON ET AL., AN 
INTRODUCTION TO GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS: A CONCEPTUAL APPROACH 291 (8th ed. 2009) (“In 
totalitarian states [such as North Korea and so forth], political doctrine amounts to an official religion. 
[M]arxism–Leninism is taught in the schools and otherwise made the only publicly acceptable system of 
belief, while proponents of competing ideologies are subject to persecution.”); MARVIN PERRY ET AL., 
WESTERN CIVILIZATION: IDEAS, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 750 (Nancy Blaine et al. eds., 9th ed. 2009) (“It 
[the totalitarian dictatorship] strives to control the inner person: to shape thoughts, feelings, and attitude in 
accordance with the party ideology, which becomes an official creed. It . . . seeks to create a ‘new man,’ 
one who dedicates himself body and soul to the party and its ideology.”). See infra Chapter Four.II.B. 
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function and operation between the two types of articles is inevitable from a logical and 
theoretical standpoint. 
The issue of the functional clash is solved by the relationship of superiority and 
relative inferiority between the two types of articles.  The anti-fundamental rights and 
ruling articles have superiority over the Fundamental Rights Articles in their function 
and working.  Therefore, the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Articles incapacitate the 
Fundamental Rights Articles, which are the core implementation mechanisms of North 
Korean Constitution, at the time of this functional clash.  
For instance, the anti-fundamental rights and ruling article declaring the distrust 
in and hostility toward religion has precedence over the Fundamental Rights Article for 
religious freedom.  As a result, the latter part of Article 68 overpowers the first part of 
Article 68 in an inevitable clash of their functioning.  Similarly, the anti-fundamental 
rights and ruling articles stipulating collectivism are given precedence over the 
Fundamental Rights Article for freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association.  
Consequently, Articles 63 and 42 incapacitate Article 67 in the process of their own role 
and functional performance. 
The resulting weakening of the Fundamental Rights Articles lead to the 
theoretical impossibility of performing the core implementation mechanism model 
 34 
centered on the Fundamental Rights Articles of the North Korean Constitution in the 
DPRK Official Reports.  Consequently, all of the arguments of the North Korean 
government in defense of its human rights practices in its official reports, which are 
grounded in this theoretical approach, are totally unrealizable given its constitutional 
structure and mechanism.  That is to say, this impossibility of performance proves false 
any notion that North Korea guarantees the fundamental rights of its people or that it 
complies with the major international human rights treaties from a logical and 
theoretical standpoint.  I have identified this as the “Incapacitation Stage” of the new 
refuting theory.  
 
3. Human Rights Violation Stage – Verifying the Truth of the Liberal Democratic 
Countries’ Arguments 
After completely weakening the Fundamental Rights Articles, the Juchist and 
Marxist-Leninist Articles wield strong influence over the North Korean society at large 
without any difficulty or obstruction.  The practical results of this powerful leverage 
are manifested in the severe violations of fundamental rights and international human 
rights treaties in North Korea.
85
  In essence, since the sole function of the anti-
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fundamental rights and ruling articles is to carry out the anti-human rights doctrines of 
Juche ideology and Marxism-Leninism,
86
 there is no constitutional basis to secure the 
human rights of the North Korean people or to prevent the government from violating 
such protections prescribed by international human rights treaties.  
It necessarily follows, logically and theoretically, that the arguments of the U.S., 
South Korea, and the U.K. condemning the DPRK’s human rights violations in the LDC 
Annual Reports are proven true by the constitutional structure and mechanism of North 
Korea.  I have identified this stage of the new refuting theory as the “Human Rights 
Violation Stage.” 
 
4. The Relationship between the New Refuting Theory and the Annual Reports of 
the Liberal Democratic Countries 
As evidenced in the analysis of the USCIRF Human Rights Report, the DPRK’s 
human rights violations, caused by the powerful influence of the Juchist and Marxist-
Leninist Articles over North Korean society as a whole, as indicated in the new refuting 
theory and its mechanism model, are in accord with the testimony of North Korean 
refugees who experienced and witnessed first-hand the severe violations of fundamental 
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 See infra Chapter Three. 
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rights in their country.
87
  Thus, the DPRK’s human rights violations in the refuting 
theory coincide with the arguments of the liberal democratic camp in the LDC Annual 
Reports, which are based on this testimony.  
In this way, the arguments of the new refuting theory and its incapacitation 
mechanism model presented by this dissertation not only logically and theoretically 
support the testimony of North Korean refugees and the contentions of the liberal 
democratic countries in their regular reports, but they are, in turn, practically and 
factually supported by the testimony of North Korean escapees and the arguments of the 
liberal democratic camp. 
 
C. The Diagrammatization of the New Refuting Theory and Its Incapacitation 
Mechanism Model 
The following diagram incorporates all aspects of the newly developed refuting 
theory and its incapacitation mechanism, including the core premises, key factors, 
logical order and flow, and theoretical structure.  The diagram also incorporates the 
evidence for verifying the falsity of North Korea’s arguments in the DPRK Official 
Reports and for verifying the truth of the liberal democratic countries’ assertions in the 
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LDC Annual Reports.  Finally, the diagram shows the relationships between the points 
of contention of the new refuting theory, the testimony of North Korean defectors, and 
the arguments of the U.S., South Korea, and the U.K. in the LDC Annual Reports, 
which are grounded in this testimony.  
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<Diagram 3> The New Refuting Theory and Its Incapacitation Mechanism Model 
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IV. The Outline of the Study  
In Chapter Two, I will take the time to review the literature concerning human 
rights violations in North Korea.  In addition, this chapter will provide the background 
information that explains how a factual approach relying on refugee testimony became 
the mainstream method in the studies on North Korean human rights by the liberal 
democratic camp.  In Chapter Two, I will also examine the originality of the new 
refuting theory and its incapacitation mechanism model under the mainstream research 
conditions, and the significant and substantial scholarly contribution of this dissertation.  
In Chapter Three, I will provide a full definition of the terms “Juche ideology” 
and “Marxism-Leninism.”  I will focus particularly on the strict analysis of “Juche as 
the anti-human rights ideology,” “Juche as the official ruling ideology of North Korea,” 
“Marxism-Leninism as the anti-human rights ideology,” and “Marxism-Leninism as the 
unofficial ruling ideology of North Korea.” 
“Juche ideology and Marxism-Leninism as the two anti-fundamental rights and 
ruling ideologies controlling North Korea” is the major premise, as well as the starting 
point of the new refuting theory and its incapacitation mechanism model.  However, 
the North Korean government disagrees with the respective positions and characteristics 
of Juche ideology and Marxism-Leninism.  Therefore, before I begin in earnest to 
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demonstrate the impossibility of the performance of the core implementation 
mechanism model in the DPRK Official Reports through the new refuting theory and its 
mechanism model in Chapter Four and Chapter Five, it is essential to define each 
ideology and analyze their respective positions and characteristics thoroughly.  Doing 
so will help consolidate the new refuting theory and its incapacitation mechanism model 
and make them uncontroversial.  
In Chapter Four and Chapter Five, I will rebuff North Korea’s arguments in 
defense of its human rights practices in its official reports more specifically and more 
systematically through a thorough study of the new refuting theory and its 
incapacitation mechanism model.  I will address each of North Korea’s argument in 
turn, beginning with North Korea’s arguments about its protection of freedom of 
religion (Chapter Four.I.), the right to vote and to be elected (Chapter Four.II.), freedom 
of speech, press, assembly, and association (Chapter Four.III.), the right to an adequate 
standard of living (Chapter Five.I.), the right to health (Chapter Five.II.), and the right to 
education (Chapter Five.III.) in its official reports.  The resulting infringements of 
three representative civil and political rights will be addressed in Chapter Four, and 
three economic, social and cultural rights in Chapter Five. 
The contents and article numbers of the Fundamental Rights Articles and the 
 41 
Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Articles, which are the two central pillars of the new 
refuting theory and its incapacitation mechanism model in Chapter Four and Chapter 
Five, will be based on the official English translation of the North Korean Constitution 
of 2009 by the government in its official website, “Naenara [My Country]: Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea.”  Using this translation will guarantee the neutrality and 
objectivity of this study
88
 and obtainability of the related research materials.
89
 
This does not mean that the new refuting theory and its incapacitation mechanism 
model in Chapter Four and Chapter Five of this dissertation are out-of-date.  There is a 
practical indenticalness in the contents and the article numbers of all the Fundamental 
Rights Articles and the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Articles between North Korean 
Constitutions of 1998, 2009, 2010 and the one of 2012.
90
  Thus, the new refuting 
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 Neutrality and objectivity of this study: This refers to the necessity of using the official translation by 
the government. There are two types of English translations of the North Korean Constitutions. One is the 
official version of North Korean government, such as the one in its official website, “Naenara [My 
Country]: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” and the other type is of individual researchers or 
scholars outside of the government. See, e.g., CHONG BONG-UK, A HANDBOOK ON NORTH KOREA 165-190 
(Han Seung-jong & Kwak Seung-ji eds., 1998); see also NovexCn.com (International Legal Database), 
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structure of the new refuting theory and its incapacitation mechanism model is to refute the arguments of 
North Korea, which are based on the contents of the Fundamental Rights Articles of its Constitution, with 
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neutrality and objectivity of the research, as well as to prevent the dispute over the arbitrariness of the 
study of this dissertation, is to use “the official translations of North Korean government.” 
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Constitution of 2009. See infra app. at 328–367.  
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theory and its mechanism model based on the North Korean Constitution of 2009 is 
applicable to prove the falsity of North Korea’s arguments in defense of its human rights 
practices, which are grounded in its Fundamental Rights Articles of the Constitutions of 
2010 and 2012 as well as the ones from 1998 and 2009. 
Finally, in Chapter Six, I will draw a final conclusion on the issue raised in 
Chapter One of this dissertation, grounded in the conclusions drawn from the research 
on the incapacitation mechanism model of the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Articles 
against the core implementation mechanism model of the Fundamental Rights Articles, 
which have been addressed in Chapters Four and Five. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
“From the [North Korean] escapees, the world is finally hearing the truth, the 
stark realities facing the people of North Korea. We now know the truth about the 
dictatorship. We are hearing about the human rights abuses . . . .”  
– Mr. Seong[-]Min Kim, The President of Free North Korea Radio 
Testimony in the 109th Congress, 2nd Session, April 25, 2006 
 
I. The Existing Literature Relating to the Human Rights Situation in North 
Korea 
As reviewed, the U.S. Human Rights Reports, the USCIRF Human Rights 
Reports, the ROK Human Rights Reports, and the U.K. Human Rights Reports are the 
authoritative reports on North Korean human rights which contain exemplary studies on 
the human rights violations in the country.
91
 
The U.N. Human Rights Reports
92
 and the Annual Report on International 
Religious Freedom by the U.S. Department of State (“U.S. Religious Freedom 
Reports”)
93
 also provide very high-quality research on this subject. 
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In addition to these public-sector studies, NGOs have actively conducted research 
as well.  For instance, the Human Rights Watch World Report by Human Rights 
Watch,
94
 the Amnesty International Report by Amnesty International (AI) (“AI Human 
Rights Reports”),
95
 Freedom in the World by Freedom House,
96
 the White Paper on 
North Korean Human Rights Statistics by the Database Center for North Korean Human 
Rights (NKDB)
97
 add to the literature. 
These studies are not, of course, confined to regular or irregular reports.  A 
considerable number of reliable books on the human rights violations in North Korea 
                                                                                                                                
THE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, U.S. S. BY THE DEP’T OF STATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 102 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT OF 1998. (J. Comm. Print 2001) [hereinafter 2001 U.S. 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT]; see also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2010 REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (2010), available at 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010/148874.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2013) [hereinafter 2010 U.S. 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT].  
The U.S. Department of State publishes not only the U.S. Human Rights Report but also the U.S. 
Religious Freedom Report annually. I intentionally chose the “USCIRF Human Rights Report” rather 
than the “U.S. Religious Freedom Report” as one of the main, official sources showing the rebuttals of the 
liberal democratic countries against North Korea’s arguments in defense of its human rights practices to 
obtain a diversity of research sources. 
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REPORT]; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 2011: THE STATE OF THE 
WORLD’S HUMAN RIGHTS (2011) [hereinafter 2011 AI HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT]; AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 2012: THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S HUMAN RIGHTS 
(2012) [hereinafter 2012 AI HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT].  
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 See, e.g., FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2010: NORTH KOREA (2010), available at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2010/north-korea (last visited Oct. 7, 2012) 
[hereinafter 2010 FREEDOM HOUSE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT]. 
 
97
 See, e.g., YEO-SANG YOON ET AL., WHITE PAPER ON NORTH KOREAN HUMAN RIGHTS STATISTICS 2007 
(2008). 
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have been published.  Examples include, among many others, A Prison Without Bars: 
Refugee and Defector Testimonies of Severe Violations of Freedom of Religion or Belief 
in North Korea by the USCIRF,
98
 “Thank You Father Kim Il Sung”: Eyewitness 
Accounts of Severe Violations of Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion in 
North Korea by David Hawk,
99
 The Hidden Gulag: Exposing North Korea’s Prison 
Camps – Prisoners’ Testimonies and Satellite Photographs by the same author,
100
 The 
Hidden Gulag (Second Edition): The Lives and Voices of “Those Who are Sent to the 
Mountains” by the same author,
101
 Hunger and Human Rights: The Politics of Famine 
in North Korea by Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland,
102
 Witness to Transformation: 
Refugee Insights into North Korea by the same authors,
103
 Marked for Life: Songbun, 
North Korea’s Social Classification System by Robert Collins,
104
 Escape from Camp 14: 
One Man’s Remarkable Odyssey from North Korea to Freedom in the West by Blaine 
                                            
98
 USCIRF, A PRISON WITHOUT BARS: REFUGEE AND DEFECTOR TESTIMONIES OF SEVERE VIOLATIONS OF 
FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF IN NORTH KOREA (2008).  
 
99
 HAWK, supra note 67.   
 
100
 DAVID HAWK, THE HIDDEN GULAG: EXPOSING NORTH KOREA’S PRISON CAMPS – PRISONERS’ 
TESTIMONIES AND SATELLITE PHOTOGRAPHS (2003). 
 
101
 DAVID HAWK, THE HIDDEN GULAG (SECOND EDITION): THE LIVES AND VOICES OF “THOSE WHO ARE 
SENT TO THE MOUNTAINS” (2012).  
 
102
 STEPHAN HAGGARD & MARCUS NOLAND, HUNGER AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE POLITICS OF FAMINE IN 
NORTH KOREA (2006). 
 
103
 STEPHAN HAGGARD & MARCUS NOLAND, WITNESS TO TRANSFORMATION: REFUGEE INSIGHTS INTO 
NORTH KOREA (2011).   
 
104
 ROBERT COLLINS, MARKED FOR LIFE: SONGBUN, NORTH KOREA’S SOCIAL CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM 
(2012).  
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Harden,
105
 Escaping North Korea : Defiance and Hope in the World’s Most Repressive 
Country by Mike Kim,
106
 Nothing to Envy: Ordinary Lives in North Korea by Barbara 
Demick,
107
 Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim 
Dynasty by Bradley K. Martin,
108
 North of the DMZ: Essays on Daily Life in North 
Korea by Andrei Lankov,
109
 The Hidden People of North Korea: Everyday Life in the 
Hermit Kingdom by Ralph Hassig and Kongdan Oh,
110
 Political Prisoners’ Camps in 
North Korea: The Testimony of An Myong-chol, an Ex-Guard at a Political Prisoners’ 
Camp in North Korea by Kim Yong-sam,
111
 Political Prisoners’ Camps in North Korea: 
Replicas of Stalinist Gulags by the Institute for South-North Korea Studies
112
 and so 
forth. 
Furthermore, there are works written by North Korean defectors themselves.  To 
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 BLAINE HARDEN, ESCAPE FROM CAMP 14: ONE MAN’S REMARKABLE ODYSSEY FROM NORTH KOREA 
TO FREEDOM IN THE WEST (2012).  
 
106
 MIKE KIM, ESCAPING NORTH KOREA: DEFIANCE AND HOPE IN THE WORLD’S MOST REPRESSIVE 
COUNTRY (2008). 
 
107
 BARBARA DEMICK, NOTHING TO ENVY: ORDINARY LIVES IN NORTH KOREA (2009). 
 
108
 BRADLEY K. MARTIN, UNDER THE LOVING CARE OF THE FATHERLY LEADER: NORTH KOREA AND THE 
KIM DYNASTY (2010).  
 
109
 ANDREI LANKOV, NORTH OF THE DMZ: ESSAYS ON DAILY LIFE IN NORTH KOREA (2007). 
 
110
 RALPH HASSIG & KONGDAN OH, THE HIDDEN PEOPLE OF NORTH KOREA: EVERYDAY LIFE IN THE 
HERMIT KINGDOM (2009). 
 
111
 KIM YONG-SAM, POLITICAL PRISONERS’ CAMPS IN NORTH KOREA: THE TESTIMONY OF AN MYONG-
CHOL, AN EX-GUARD AT A POLITICAL PRISONERS’ CAMP IN NORTH KOREA (1995). 
 
112
 THE INSTITUTE FOR SOUTH-NORTH KOREA STUDIES, POLITICAL PRISONERS’ CAMPS IN NORTH KOREA: 
REPLICAS OF STALINIST GULAGS (1993). 
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cite a few examples, they are The Aquariums of Pyongyang: Ten Years in the North 
Korean Gulag by Chol-hwan Kang,
113
 This is Paradise!: My North Korean Childhood 
by Hyok Kang,
114
 Long Road Home: Testimony of a North Korean Camp Survivor by 
Yong Kim,
115
 Eyes of the Tailless Animals: Prison Memoirs of a North Korean Woman 
by Soon Ok Lee,
116
 and so forth. 
  
II. The Mainstream Use of the Factual Approach in the Studies on the 
Human Rights in North Korea  
A. Historical Background  
Unlike the vibrant research on North Korean human rights in the public and 
private sectors these days, which are based on the testimony of North Korean defectors, 
the interpretation of the information from the outside visitors to the country, and the 
assessment of the human rights there based on these sources, the research of the 1970’s, 
                                            
113
 CHOL-HWAN KANG & PIERRE RIGOULOT, THE AQUARIUMS OF PYONGYANG: TEN YEARS IN THE NORTH 
KOREAN GULAG (Yair Reiner trans., rev. ed. 2005). 
 
114
 HYOK KANG & PHILIPPE GRANGEREAU, THIS IS PARADISE!: MY NORTH KOREAN CHILDHOOD (Shaun 
Whiteside trans., 2005). 
 
115
 YONG KIM, LONG ROAD HOME: TESTIMONY OF A NORTH KOREAN CAMP SURVIVOR (Suk-Young Kim 
trans., 2009). 
 
116
 SOON OK LEE, EYES OF THE TAILLESS ANIMALS: PRISON MEMOIRS OF A NORTH KOREAN WOMAN 
(Bahn-Suk Lee & Jin Young Choi trans., 1999). 
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1980’s, and even the early 1990’s was more sparse.
117
  This was due to the serious lack 
of basic information and essential data for the studies.  The number of North Korean 
escapees to South Korea in the 1970’s and 1980’s totaled 31 and 64, respectively.
118
  
There was no other source of information on country conditions due to the thoroughly 
closed nature of the country.
119
  Considering that the major settlement of all North 
Korean escapees in the 1970’s and 1980’s was in South Korea, due to the sharp 
ideological conflict between South Korean democracy and North Korean communism 
under the cold war system,
120
 these small numbers were insufficient to permit the 
                                            
117
 See Scott Snyder & Kyung-Ae Park, Introduction, in NORTH KOREA IN TRANSITION: POLITICS, 
ECONOMY, AND SOCIETY at vii, xii (Kyung-Ae Park & Scott Snyder eds., 2012) (“For instance, almost no 
literature regarding North Korean human rights existed in the early 1990s as a result of the absence of 
credible eyewitness testimony. . . . However, the stream of literature now available provides chilling 
evidence of the dire consequences of the failures of the North Korean system . . . .(citation omitted)”). 
 
118
 See GABRIEL JONSSON, TOWARDS KOREAN RECONCILIATION: SOCIO-CULTURAL EXCHANGES AND 
COOPERATION 152 (2006) (“In the . . . 1970s, the numbers [of North Korean defectors to South Korea] 
were . . . 31 . . . .”); see also id. (“[O]nly 64 North Koreans had defected [to South Korea] during the 
1980s . . . .”); Peter Beck et al., Perilous Journeys: The Plight of North Koreans in China, in KOREA 
YEARBOOK 2007 (VOLUME 1): POLITICS, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 253, 257 (Rüdiger Frank et al. eds., 
2008) (“North Korea’s social controls and indoctrination have proved amazingly effective. Before 1990, 
there were only a handful of defections to South Korea and some clandestine cross-border remittances or 
trade with relatives in China. Little information flowed in or out of the country.”). 
 
119
 See supra Chapter One.I.B.  
 
120
 See HASSIG & OH, supra note 110, at 220 (“Before the 1990s, [North Korean] defectors were hailed in 
South Korea as yongsa (“national heroes”), and upon their arrival the government proudly presented them 
in press conferences during which they praised South Korea and criticized North Korea.”).  
Considering that “trophy refugees” are “the living symbol[s] of the rival ideology’s failures” and 
“dissidents who fled those countries the U.S. condemned as being repressive,” these North Korean 
refugees to South Korea in the 1970’s and 1980’s were literally “trophy refugees” in the viewpoint of the 
South Korean government, in a manner of speaking. See Joan Fitzpatrick, Flight From Asylum: Trends 
Toward Temporary “Refuge” and Local Responses to Forced Migrations, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 13, 28 (1994) 
(“[T]he collapse of communist regimes in the East removed the realpolitik rationale for a generous 
asylum policy. Little gain could be gleaned from the ‘trophy refugee,’ the living symbol of the rival 
ideology’s failures.”); see also Karen Musalo, Protecting Victims of Gendered Persecution: Fear of 
Floodgates or Call to (Principled) Action?, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 119, 130 (2007) (“These factors no 
longer exist; refugees come from countries all around the world, and few (perhaps with the exception of 
Cubans) fit the category of ‘trophy’ refugees - a term used to describe dissidents who fled those countries 
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liberal democratic countries to conduct active and objective research on the human 
rights violations in North Korea.
121
  This chronic situation was not improved in the 
early 1990’s.  The number of North Korean defectors to South Korea from 1990 until 
1993 was still only 34.
122
   
The limits of the research on North Korean human rights in the 1970’s, 1980’s, 
and the early 1990’s were actually revealed in various studies.  For example, even the 
U.S. Human Rights Reports, which is one of the pathfinders in public sectors on the 
studies of North Korean human rights, did not contain any information on the country at 
all before 1980.  It was the 1979 U.S. Human Rights Reports in 1980 that included a 
section on the country for the first time.
123
  However, the two main sources of relevant 
information for the section
124
 at that time were not North Korean defectors, but the U.S. 
                                                                                                                                
the U.S. condemned as being repressive.”). 
 
121
 See HASSIG & OH, supra note 110, at 219 (“Defectors are a valuable source of information about what 
is happening in North Korean society, although their testimony must be used judiciously. . . . However, 
when numerous defectors tell similar stories with different details, their testimony becomes quite 
credible.”). 
 
122
 See infra <Table 1>. 
 
123
 See Vernon Joseph Vavrina, Jr., Human Rights and American Foreign Policy: Violations of the 
Integrity of the Person, Selected Cases, 1969-1980., (Apr. 16, 1984) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Georgetown University), AAT 8505727 at 335 (“Older U.S. State Department Reports on Human Rights 
Practices contain no information at all on the DPRK. However, a report released in [] [1980] does include 
a section on North Korea.”).  
 
124
 See, e.g., 1979 U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 32, at 469 (“[T]he Pueblo crew in 1968 was 
beaten, starved, and otherwise abused.”); see also id. (“a. Torture[:] Ali Lameda’s report on his 
imprisonment explains that torture and beating were used on Korean prisoners during interrogation, 
although physical torture was not used on Ali Lameda and a fellow foreigner, Jacques Sedillot. Crew 
members of the Pueblo were beaten. Further information is unavailable.”); Id. (“b. Cruel, Inhumane, or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment[:] Lameda reports deprivation of food to force ‘confessions,’ as well 
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crew of the USS Pueblo
125
 and the Venezuelan poet Ali Lameda, who was employed by 
the North Korean government as a translator for Kim II Sung’s memoirs into Spanish 
and later detained for around 7 years (from September 1967 until May 1974) within the 
country.
126
 
The research conditions in the 1980’s and the early 1990’s were no different.  To 
cite some examples, the 1983 U.S. Human Rights Report states the following: 
The United States does not have diplomatic relations with the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea and thus does not have direct access to 
information on the situation in North Korea. Because of the closed nature of 
the society, there was little new information in 1983 on human rights 
practices in North Korea.
127
 
In addition, the 1991 U.S. Human Rights Report states that “The United States 
does not have diplomatic relations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. 
                                                                                                                                
as solitary confinement, continuous interrogation, enforced waking periods, poor or non-existent medical 
treatment, and deprivation of visits, parcels, correspondence, writing materials, newspapers, and clothing 
changes. Prisoners are reportedly regarded as persons without rights.”); Id. at 470 (“c. Arbitrary Arrest or 
Imprisonment[:] . . . . Lameda was reportedly told that his requests for a lawyer of his choice and an open 
trial were ‘bourgeois.’”); Id. (“d. Denial of Fair Public Trial[:] Lameda was twice denied public trial. 
After his first arrest he was imprisoned for a year without a hearing; after the second, he was put through 
a closed session without benefit of counsel of his choice or even knowledge of the charges.”); Id. (“e. 
Invasion of the Home[:] . . . . Lameda reported . . . that his residence was not respected and that listening 
devices were used against him.”). 
 
125
 “On 23 January 1968, while off Wonsan, North Korea, Pueblo was attacked by local forces and seized. 
One crewmember was killed in the assault and the other eighty-two men on board were taken prisoner. . . . 
After eleven months in captivity, often under inhumane conditions, Pueblo’s crew were repatriated on 23 
December 1968.” Dep’t of the Navy: Naval Historical Ctr., USS Pueblo, 
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/sh-usn/usnsh-p/ager2.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2012).  
 
126
 See MICHAEL BREEN, KIM JONG-IL: NORTH KOREA’S DEAR LEADER: WHO HE IS, WHAT HE WANTS, 
WHAT TO DO ABOUT HIM 110 (rev. ed. 2012) (“Ali Lameda, a Venezuelan poet . . . , worked in Pyongyang 
in 1966 as [a] copy editor[], improving the Spanish . . . translations, . . . of Kim Il-sung’s speeches and 
various publications. [He was][] arrested after criticizing the propaganda, accused of being [a] CIA 
sp[y][], and sentenced to 20-year prison terms. Lameda was freed in 1974, after the Romanian leader, 
Nicolae Ceausescu, personally intervened.”).  
 
127
 1983 U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 32, at 804. 
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North Korea does not allow representatives of foreign governments, journalists, or other 
invited visitors the freedom of movement that would enable them to assess human rights 
conditions there.”
128
 
The situation was the same for the Human Rights Reports of AI, which is one of 
the pioneers in the studies on North Korean human rights in private sectors.  The 
following statements in the 1977 AI Human Rights Report show the difficulties inherent 
in a research study on the human rights violations in North Korea at that time 
particularly well: 
Amnesty International has carefully monitored all available information 
from North Korea and can only report that it contains no detailed evidence 
whatsoever regarding arrests, trials and imprisonment in that country. 
Furthermore, there appears to be a complete censorship of news relating to 
human rights violations. Despite its efforts Amnesty International has not 
been able to trace any information, even positive, on the subject of such 
rights in North Korea.
129
 
The research conditions in the 1980’s and the early 1990’s were not any different 
from those in the 1970’s.  To cite some instances, the 1980 AI Human Rights Report 
states that “The [North Korean] government maintains severe restrictions on access to, 
                                            
128
 1991 U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 32, at 887.  
The 1985 U.S. Human Rights Report also makes a statement to the same effect as follows:  
The United States does not have diplomatic relations with the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea; even representatives of governments that do, as well as journalists and 
other occasional invited visitors to North Korea, are not permitted the freedom of 
movement that would enable them effectively to assess human rights conditions there. 
1985 U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 32, at 791. 
 
129
 1977 AI HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 95, at 192.  
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travel in, and dissemination of information in, the country.  It therefore continues to be 
very difficult to collect information on human rights concerns within Amnesty 
International’s mandate.”
130
  
In addition, the 1989 AI Human Rights Report reported that “As in previous years, 
authorities and media in the Democratic people’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) rarely 
provided information about arrests, political trials, imprisonment or the death penalty 
and assessment of human rights was extremely difficult.”
131
 
The 1993 AI Human Rights Report depicts the situation as follows:  
Information about human rights concerns was severely limited and difficult 
to verify. Human rights issues were rarely reported in the media, which is 
controlled by the government of President Kim Il Sung, and there was no 
independent group in the country monitoring and recording human rights 
problems. Access to the country remained restricted and Amnesty 
International received no reply to its request to visit the country during the 
year.
132
 
The dire economic circumstances of North Korea since the 1990s, and 
consequently the extremely worsened food situation since the mid-1990s brought on a 
noticeable increase in the number of North Korean refugees to China.
133
  The numbers 
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 1980 AI HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 95, at 207. 
 
131
 1989 AI HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 95, at 181. 
 
132
 1993 AI HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 95, at 180. 
 
133
 See Peter Beck et al., supra note 118, at 253 (“The economic collapse of the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (DPRK)—North Korea— and the famine in that country in the 1990s and subsequent 
food shortages have prompted scores of thousands to escape their country’s hardships and seek refuge in 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—China— and beyond . . . .”); see also MIKYOUNG KIM, 
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are estimated to be a minimum of 10,000 to a maximum of 300,000, though the exact 
figure is open to debate.
134
  Nevertheless, the increase in the number of North Korean 
refugees in China didn’t decisively contribute to the vitalization of studies on North 
Korean human rights, because interviewing the refugees for research purposes within 
Chinese territory was not easy, due to crackdowns by the Chinese government and the 
forcible repatriation of the refugees by the Chinese authorities and North Korean 
security agents.
135
  Thus, the researchers of the liberal democratic countries and human 
rights NGOs have had considerable difficulties undertaking and conducting the studies 
on the human rights situations in North Korea via information of North Korean 
                                                                                                                                
SECURITIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES IN EAST ASIA 45 (2012) (“China has been 
on the receiving end of a massive influx of Korean refugees since the mid-1990s. Pyongyang’s failure to 
feed its own people has driven a starving population in search of food across the dangerous 850-mile-long 
border between the two countries.(footnote omitted)”). 
 
134
 See KIM, supra note 133, at 45 (“The exact number of North Korean escapees in China is open to 
debate. The Chinese government’s conservative estimate is 10,000; Seoul’s calculation is between 10,000 
and 30,000; humanitarian organizations put the figure as high as 300,000.”). 
 
135
 See 148 CONG. REC. S6801 (daily ed. July 15, 2002) (statement of Sen. Sam Brownback) (“It is 
estimated . . . that up to 300,000 North Korean refugees in China are living a precarious and dangerous 
life, hiding by day, begging by night, in an effort to avoid being captured and repatriated back to North 
Korea by Chinese and North Korean agents brazenly operating inside China.”); see also id at S6802 
(“They [North Korean refugees in China] are hiding by day . . . trying to keep from being caught and sent 
back into North Korea, which is what China does. If they catch people from North Korea, they treat them 
as economic migrants and ship them back into starvation, refugee camps, persecution, and probably 
death.”); Peter Beck et al., supra note 118, at 275 (“On the basis of our interviews with aid workers, an 
estimated 150-300 North Koreans are repatriated from China every week.(citation omitted)”); Id. at 254 
(“In China, the border crossers live in hiding from crackdowns and forcible repatriations by China and 
neighbouring countries, vulnerable to abuse and exploitation. If repatriated to the North, they face harsh 
punishment, possibly execution.”); Yoonok Chang et al., Migration Experiences of North Korean 
Refugees: Survey Evidence from China, in KOREA YEARBOOK 2009 (VOLUME 3): POLITICS, ECONOMY 
AND SOCIETY 301, 301-302 (Rüdiger Frank et al. eds., 2009) (“The Chinese government has responded to 
this influx with intensified surveillance of the border and periodic crackdowns on the refugee community, 
while consistently refusing to grant North Korean refugees asylum or to establish a process through which 
their refugee status claims could be processed.”). 
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defectors in China.
136
  
On the other hand, at approximately the same time, the number of North Korean 
defectors into South Korea also increased.
137
  It was this massive surge of North 
Korean defectors in South Korea since the mid-1990s that made a large contribution 
toward the increase of active and objective studies on the human rights violations in 
North Korea. 
The majority of the North Korean refugees that have come into South Korea are 
refugees from China, who have managed to escape their homeland since the mid-
1990s,
138
 North Korean refugees from Thailand, who have escaped through China and 
Laos,
139
 North Koreans from Mongolia, who arrived there via China,
140
 and North 
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 See Yoonok Chang et al., supra note 135, at 304 (“Because of the tightened security situation in the 
border region, conducting such interviews has become much more difficult, if not altogether impossible, 
since the interview period.”); see also id. (“Because these refugees do not have legal status in China, in 
the cases where respondents were suspicious and refused to answer on paper, the responses were 
memorised by the interviewers to dissipate this anxiety.”); Peter Beck et al., supra note 118, at 261 
(“There is a consensus among missionaries, aid workers and [human rights] NGOs that Beijing has 
steadily increased the pressure on North Korean asylum seekers and those helping them.(citation omitted) 
It implemented a system of rewards for turning in North Koreans and fines for supporting them.”); Id. 
(“Since 2000, China has increasingly targeted the [human rights] NGOs and aid workers who help North 
Koreans.(citation omitted)”). 
 
137
 See infra <Table 1>; see also JONSSON, supra note 118, at 152 (“However, from then the figures [of 
North Korean defectors to South Korea] rose due to the North’s economic hardship and food shortage: . . . 
there were 487 defectors during the 1990s. The number of the defectors fleeing to the South during the 
years between 2000 and 2004, were 312, 583, 1,139, 1,281 and 1,894, respectively.(citation and footnote 
omitted)”); HASSIG & OH, supra note 110, at 219-220 (“In the 1990s, as economic conditions deteriorated 
in the North . . . defections increased to 533, the number rapidly rising at the end of that decade and into 
the 2000s: 71 in 1998, 148 in 1999, 312 in 2000, 583 in 2001, and 1,139 in 2002.”).  
 
138
 See Yoonok Chang et al., supra note 135, at 302 (“[W]e know from data collected by the government 
of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) that even those who succeed in getting out [of North Korea] have 
often spent substantial time in China, many having fled during the peak famine years of the mid-1990s.”). 
 
139
 See Voice of America, ‘North Korean Refugees Seek Freedom Via Thailand,’ VOICE OF AMERICA (Dec. 
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Koreans from Russia, who were mostly loggers in lumber camps in Siberia.
141
  Very 
few of the North Korean refugees have directly defected into South Korea by way of 
land and sea through the Korean Peninsula, and those who have done so have frequent 
brushes with death during their journey.
142
  
 
<Table 1> Number of North Koreans Entering South [Korea]
143
  
                                                                                                                                
28, 2011), http://www.voanews.com/content/north-korean-refugees-seek-freedom-via-thailand-
136370353/150081.html (“Since 2004 the number of North Koreans arriving in Thailand each year has 
risen from just a few dozen to more than 2,000. North Koreans fleeing oppression in their homeland 
secretly travel across China and Laos to reach Thailand - where authorities generally do not send them 
back home. Most refugees eventually end up in South Korea.”). 
 
140
 See James Brooke, ‘Refugee Plan For Mongolia Adds to Dispute On North Korea,’ N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 
28, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/28/world/refugee-plan-for-mongolia-adds-to-dispute-on-
north-korea.html?pagewanted=2&src=pm (“Since the late 1990’s, missionary groups have quietly 
brought hundreds of North Koreans to Mongolia . . . for eventual settlement in South Korea. . . . The 
prime minister said bona fide North Korean refugees who reached Mongolia were allowed to travel on to 
Seoul, the destination most North Koreans preferred . . . .”). 
 
141
 See Chung Min-uck, ‘Russia more flexible than China on N. Korean defectors,’ THE KOREA TIMES 
(Apr. 26, 2012), http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2012/04/116_109742.html (“Since the 
1950s, Pyongyang has sent loggers to eastern Siberia to earn hard currency. It is estimated that there are 
over 20,000 North Korean loggers working there. Suffering cold weather, exploitation and surveillance 
from state-owned North Korean entities, they have started to flee the working site in search of freedom.”); 
see also id. (“There have been numerous defection attempts by the loggers since being sent to work in 
Russia. Experts believe if the workers are returned to North Korea, they will face harsh punishment and 
possibly execution. Fortunately, they were granted refugee status in Russia by the United Nations.”); Id. 
(“‘Russia is relatively cooperative with the South Korean government in the North Korean defector issue,’ 
said a foreign ministry official on condition of anonymity. ‘In Russia, the process of sending them to 
South Korea is well institutionalized based on standards given by the United Nations. . . .’”); Kim Yoon-
mi, ‘Russia regards N.K. defectors as refugees, Korean envoy says,’ THE KOREA HERALD (Feb. 27, 2012), 
http://view.koreaherald.com/kh/view.php?ud=20120227000946&cpv=0 (“Russia has a stable protocol to 
help North Korean defectors head for South Korea with the support of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, said Wi Sung-lac, Korean ambassador to Russia.”); Id. (“‘Through 
consultations with the UNHCR, Russia established a ‘formula’ to take them to Seoul in humanitarian 
perspectives in 1993. They still use such methods (when dealing with North Koreans),’ he [the Korean 
ambassador to Russia] said.”).  
 
142
 See Choe Sang-Hun, ‘Four North Koreans Defect to South Korea [by Sea],’ N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 31, 
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/01/world/asia/01nkorea.html (“Escapes from North Korea 
through the heavily guarded land and sea borders between the two Koreas are uncommon. More than 
14,000 people from the hunger-stricken North have defected to South Korea since the end of the Korean 
War in 1953, but most of the defectors have gone through China.”). 
 
143
 Ministry of Unification (MOU), MOU Initiatives: Introduction to NK Refugee Issues, 
http://eng.unikorea.go.kr/CmsWeb/viewPage.req?idx=PG0000000536 (last visited Oct.14, 2012).  
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Unlike the process of interviewing the refugees in China, gathering information 
from the refugees in South Korea is relatively easy and safe.  Additionally, as of 
November 2011, there has been an overall trend of a clear and steady increase in the 
number of North Korean defectors in South Korea, while the number in China has 
passed its peak in 1998 and 1999 and has shown a continued decreasing trend since 
2000.
144
  Furthermore, although there are Korean refugees in Western nations,
145
 their 
numbers are not sufficient to secure reliable testimony for objective research on the 
                                            
144
 See KIM, supra note 133, at 45 (“According to Lee [Keum-Soon at KINU],(citation omitted) the 
number of those fleeing reached a peak in 1998–99. There has been a gradual decline since the year 2000, 
when the estimated number of escapees ranged from 75,000 to 125,000. By 2005 the number was down 
to between 30,000 and 50,000.”). 
 
145
 The U.S., U.K., Japan, Australia, Germany, Netherlands and so forth, have North Korean refugees as 
well. See 2012 AI HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 95, at 205 (“More than 23,500 North Koreans 
were granted nationality in South Korea; hundreds were in Japan. According to figures released in 2011 
by UNHCR, the UN refugee agency, there were 917 North Korean asylum-seekers in ‘refugee-like 
situations’ in 2010 in countries including Australia, Germany, Netherlands, UK and USA.”). 
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human rights situations in North Korea in comparison to that of South Korea.
146
   
The relative freedom of interviews for research purposes, the steady increase of 
North Korean defectors, and the sufficient number of refugees in South Korea for 
credible studies means that the South Korean government has ideal conditions for these 
studies on the human rights situation in North Korea through the serviceable, stable, and 
sufficient security of key sources.
147
  
 
B. The Good Effects and Adverse Effects  
These research environments first contributed to the vitalization of the studies on 
North Korean human rights in South Korea.  The primary example is the ROK Human 
Rights Reports.  KINU began in earnest to publish its annual ROK Human Rights 
Report starting from 1996 through the extensive personal interviews with North Korean 
escapees in South Korea.  The 2011 ROK Human Rights Report says as follows in this 
regard:  
                                            
146
 The number of refugees in these countries is a decided minority compared to that of South Korea, due 
to the overwhelming preference of North Korean defectors for South Korea over other liberal democratic 
countries. See Goedde, supra note 15, at 531 (“[N]orth Korean refugees steadily stream into South Korea 
with individual accounts about their hardships back home.(citation omitted)”); see also Yoonok Chang et 
al., supra note 135, at 302 (“Relatively few refugees want to remain in China: Most want to resettle 
permanently in South Korea . . . .”); Yoonok Chang et al., North Korean Refugees in China: Evidence 
from a Survey, in THE NORTH KOREAN REFUGEE CRISIS: HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 
14, 22 (Stephan Haggard & Marcus Noland eds., 2006) (“[T]he survey asked about the preferences of the 
refugees concerning their ultimate place of domicile; where would they like to live? . . . . As can be seen, 
very few express a preference for living in North Korea [1%]. South Korea [64%] is the favored 
destination, followed by the United States [19%].”). 
 
147
 See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 58 
[s]ince 1996 we have published this “White Paper on Human Rights in 
North Korea” every year in both Korean and English. In order that we may 
better grasp the North Korean realities on the ground, the contents of this 
White Paper are based on in-depth personal interviews with North Korean 
defectors in South Korea, with emphasis on recent arrivals . . . .
148
 
On the other hand, the research environments, which were beginning to be set up 
in South Korea since the mid-1990s, also made a contribution towards breeding more 
active and vibrant studies on the human rights violations in North Korea in liberal 
democratic countries other than South Korea, because it has facilitated the collaborative 
research between South Korea and other countries through the sharing of testimony, 
information, and data from North Korean defectors in South Korea.  These features are 
revealed particularly well in the relevant studies of the U.K. and U.S., which keep close 
ties with South Korea, on North Korean human rights infringements. 
For example, UKFCO clearly states that “Seoul is a major centre of information 
about human rights in the DPRK and activism on the issue.”
149
 in the 2010 U.K. 
Human Rights Report.  
Similar statements appear in the 2009 USCIRF Human Rights Report.
150
  
USCIRF has also cited the importance of refugee testimony in A Prison Without 
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 2011 ROK HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 34, at 9.  
 
149
 2010 U.K. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 35, at 181.  
 
150
 See, e.g., 2009 USCIRF HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 33, at 24 (“The most reliable information 
comes from North Korean groups in South Korea . . . .”). 
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Bars: Refugee and Defector Testimonies of Severe Violations of Freedom of Religion or 
Belief in North Korea: 
In addition to interviews with some 30 North Korean refugees now residing 
in South Korea, a number of interviews were conducted with former North 
Korean police and other security officials who had defected to South Korea. 
The former North Korean police agents provided valuable insight into the 
way in which religious freedom is actively repressed in the DPRK.
151
  
The same is true for the studies on the human rights violations in North Korea by 
individual researchers of the liberal democratic countries.  For instance, David Hawk, 
a leading expert on North Korean human rights and a prolific writer on the subject, says 
the following in the research methodology of his book, “Thank You Father Kim Il 
Sung”: Eyewitness Accounts of Severe Violations of Freedom of Thought, Conscience, 
and Religion in North Korea:  
Forty former North Koreans presently residing in South Korea were 
interviewed for this study on the basis of a detailed questionnaire prepared 
by David Hawk and reviewed by [the United States] Commission [on 
International Religious Freedom] staff. . . . The interviews were carried out 
over the period from November 2004 to April 2005. Each interview was 
conducted in person and usually lasted several hours.
152
   
In The Hidden Gulag: Exposing North Korea’s Prison Camps – Prisoners’ 
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 USCIRF, supra note 98, at 4. 
 
152
 HAWK, supra note 67, at 130.  
See USCIRF, supra note 98, at i5 (“That report [“Thank You Father Kim Il Sung”: Eyewitness Accounts 
of Severe Violations of Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion in North Korea], based on 
extensive interviews with North Korean refugees who fled through China to South Korea from 1999 – 
2003, was the first of its kind to draw on testimony from refugees to provide a much needed window on 
religious freedom conditions inside North Korea and the consequences for refugees who are forced to 
return.”).  
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Testimonies and Satellite Photographs, Mr. Hawk states:  
This report is based . . . on thirty in-depth interviews with former North 
Koreans who found asylum in South Korea. These interviews were 
conducted largely in Seoul in August 2002, November–December 2002, 
and February 2003. Most of the information in this report comes from 
former prisoners, who during their interviews described in detail the 
situations of their imprisonment, their living and work units, and their 
treatment and observations while imprisoned or detained. These prisoners’ 
accounts are corroborated and amplified by accounts from former prison 
guards . . . . The perspectives of the prison guards are further amplified by a 
former prison-system official “defector” . . . .
153
  
Finally, in The Hidden Gulag (Second Edition): The Lives and Voices of “Those 
Who are Sent to the Mountains,” Mr. Hawk states that “This report is based on more 
than sixty in-depth personal interviews with former prisoners in North Korea’s detention 
facilities who subsequently escaped to South Korea. This is in addition to interviews 
with several former guards at the camps who later defected to South Korea.(footnote 
omitted)”
154
 
The remarkable increase in the number of North Korean refugees since the mid-
1990s promoted and facilitated the studies on the human rights abuses in North Korea, 
not only by the U.S., South Korea, and the U.K., but also by individual researchers.  
These studies, and the publication of them, which were brought on by this increase, led 
the world to be more concerned about the miserable lives of the North Korean people.  
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 HAWK, supra note 100, at 14. 
 
154
 HAWK, supra note 101, at 13. 
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But at the same time, it has also produced adverse effects by causing human rights 
observers and scholars to neglect and ignore the research method of theoretical 
approaches in the field of the research on this subject, in favor of the absolute 
mainstream use of factual approaches. 
 
III. The Originality and the Scholarly Contributions of This Dissertation 
The very first theoretical studies on the incapacitation mechanism of the Juchist 
and Marxist-Leninist Articles appeared in the U.S. Human Rights Reports.  For 
example, the 1979 U.S. Human Rights Report argues that “The latest constitution, 
promulgated in 1972, purports to guarantee a wide range of rights, including . . . 
freedom of the press, religion . . . and association . . . . Other articles of that constitution 
eliminate or render meaningless the guarantee of those rights.”
155
 
Additionally, the same report maintains that “The North Korean constitution [of 
1972] states that all citizens have freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, and 
demonstration [in the Article 53].  In practice, however, those rights are nullified by 
other articles of the constitution which require citizens strictly to obey the ‘socialist 
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 1979 U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 32, at 467.  
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norms of life’ and to obey a ‘collective spirit.’”
156
  
Fully considering that even AI Reports, which have the longest history in North 
Korean human rights studies along with U.S. Human Rights Reports, have had to rely 
on only the assessment of the human rights in North Korea based on the analyses of the 
testimony of North Korean defectors and the interpretation of the information from the 
outside visitors to the country until just recently, the U.S. State Department’s attempt to 
study the human rights violations in North Korea through both the theoretical 
approaches as well as the factual approaches in the late 1970’s was really an epoch-
making event at that time.  Unfortunately, the incapacitation mechanism model in the 
U.S. Human Rights Report has not been developed any further since 1979.  The same 
or similar short expressions as the abovementioned ones from the 1979 U.S. Human 
Rights Report have sometimes been quoted and used in applications in other U.S. 
Human Rights Reports, USCIRF Human Rights Reports, ROK Human Rights Reports, 
U.N. Human Rights Reports, Freedom House Press Freedom Reports, other 
publications of USCIRF, and so forth.
157
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 Id. at 471. 
 
157
 See supra Chapter One.III.A.  
In addition to these relatively well-known research sources, for example, the abovementioned short 
statements in the 1979 U.S. Human Rights Report were also used in applications in such book as North 
Korea: A Country Study:  
Although Article 53 of the [North Korean] constitution [of 1972] states that North Korean 
citizens have freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, and demonstration, such 
activities are permitted only in support of government and KWP [Korean Workers’ Party] 
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Although we should appreciate the value of these brief statements in these 
credible research sources as the prototypes for the development of the new refuting 
theory and its incapacitation mechanism model of this dissertation,
158
 these statements 
in major research sources are neither systematic nor sufficiently detailed to effectively 
and persuasively refute the core implementation mechanisms of the Fundamental Rights 
Articles of the North Korean Constitution and North Korea’s arguments in defense of its 
human rights practices based on them in the DPRK Official Reports. 
Additionally, they only deal with two Fundamental Rights Articles – freedom of 
religion, and freedom of speech and of the press, assembly and association.  Thus, they 
are also limited in research scope. 
Herein lie the originalities of this dissertation.  I developed and formulated my 
own systematic refuting theory and its mechanism model in detail to refute the 
assertions of North Korea in its official reports logically and objectively, under the 
current research conditions that include few preexisting studies and analysis on the 
human rights violations in North Korea through theoretical approaches and theoretical 
refutations.  In fact, no books, articles, journals, periodicals, or dissertations analyze 
                                                                                                                                
objectives. Other articles of the constitution require citizens to follow the socialist norms of 
life; for example, a collective spirit takes precedence over individual . . . liberties. 
Kim, supra note 46, at 194.  
 
158
 See supra Chapter One.III.B. 
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the core implementation mechanism models of the Fundamental Rights Articles of 
North Korean Constitution as in-depth as this dissertation.  No other studies explain 
the incapacitation mechanism models of the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Articles as 
systematically as well.  Additionally, no other research addresses the theoretical 
relationship between the two types of articles and their logical dynamics in the North 
Korean Constitution in minute detail as this dissertation.  
This dissertation covers a total of six major fundamental rights, which is enough 
to draw an objective conclusion on North Korea’s violations of domestic human rights 
and the international human rights treaties. 
In addition to these originalities, this dissertation makes a significant and 
substantial contribution to legal scholarship.  Intensive studies on North Korean human 
rights, based on theoretical approaches, are needed now more than ever, considering the 
latest situations regarding the intensified dispute between North Korea and the liberal 
democratic countries over its human rights violations, and the endemic problems 
inherent in the repeated opposition structure of theoretical approaches versus factual 
approaches with the lack of comprehensive analyses of and theoretical rebuttals against 
the core implementation mechanism of the North Korean Constitution’s Fundamental 
 65 
Rights Articles.
159
  Thus, this dissertation, which hones in on these specific subjects, 
can make a significant and substantial contribution to the interpretations of the North 
Korean Constitution and the fields of international human rights law, as well as research 
on law as ideology through these intensive studies under the abovementioned 
circumstances.  
Finally, in addition to the scholarly originality and contributions, this dissertation 
also makes realistic and practical contributions to North Korean human rights.  Human 
rights have a universal, priceless value.  Thus, the issue of North Korean human rights 
is very important and should not be ignored, since the situation in North Korea, in 
particular, is extremely grave.  In addition, human rights violations in this country are 
matters of the reality in our world today.  Millions of North Korean people are crying 
out under the indescribable oppression of the dictatorial government.  Nonetheless, 
North Korea has attempted to dilute these factors by suppressing facts and deceiving the 
world under the guise of claiming to provide human rights protections through the core 
implementation mechanism of the Fundamental Rights Articles of its Constitution.  
Thus, to establish and develop the new refuting theory and its incapacitation mechanism 
model of the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Articles is to let the world know about the 
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 See supra Chapter One.II. 
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realities of human rights under the brutal dictatorship of the country and to bolster the 
world’s appreciation of the sanctity of the human rights of the North Korean people in 
the real world.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
JUCHE IDEOLOGY AND MARXISM-LENINISM AS THE TWO ANTI-HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND RULING IDEOLOGIES CONTROLLING NORTH KOREA 
 
“Kim Jong-Un’s succession as North Korea’s supreme leader  
after the death of his father, Kim Jong-Il, in December 2011  
had little impact on the country’s dire human rights record.”  
– HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2013 (EVENTS OF 2012) (2013) 
 
I. Juche Ideology and Marxism-Leninism as the Anti-Human Rights 
Ideologies 
A. Marxism-Leninism as the Anti-Human Rights Ideology  
The term, Marxism-Leninism, was first used by Joseph Stalin, who ruled the 
Soviet Union from 1928 to 1953.
160
  Marxism-Leninism is a compound word of 
“Marxism” and “Leninism,” and refers to the theories of Karl Marx and Vladimir Ilyich 
Lenin, respectively.
161
  After the Russian Revolution, Lenin not only inherited, 
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 See DAVID E. INGERSOLL & RICHARD K. MATTHEWS, THE PHILOSOPHIC ROOTS OF MODERN IDEOLOGY: 
LIBERALISM, COMMUNISM, FASCISM 179 (1986) (“[I]t was Stalin who first used the term Marxism-
Leninism, rather than Marxism . . . .”). 
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 See CIRCA [CAMBRIDGE INT’L REFERENCE ON CURRENT AFFAIRS] RESEARCH & REFERENCE INFO., 
CASSELL DICTIONARY OF MODERN POLITICS 184 (Roger East & Tanya Joseph eds., 1994) (“The term 
[Marxism-Leninism] combines the words Marxism and Leninism to stress its lineage from the two 
greatest theorists of communism, Karl Marx and Vladimir Ilyich Lenin.”).   
The term, Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, is rarely used, because “[S]talin’s theoretical contributions to the 
development of Marxism-Leninism were rather meager . . . .” INGERSOLL & MATTHEWS, supra note 160, 
at 179. 
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defended, and developed Marx’s ideas but also converted his theories into a practical 
doctrine known as Marxism-Leninism.”
162
  
Marxism-Leninism is fundamentally based on the theory of dialectical 
materialism.
163
  A man is just flesh, according to the theory of Marx.
164
  Thus, 
Marxist-Leninist ideology rejects all religious truths and spiritual elements.
165
  
Regarding the concept of Godless materialism in Marxism-Leninism, Pope Pius XI 
criticizes that “‘[t]here’s no room for the idea of God; there is no difference between 
matter and spirit, between soul and body; there is neither survival of the soul after death 
nor any hope in a future life.’(citation omitted)”
166
 
Marxism-Leninism is also grounded in the theory of historical determinism, as 
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 See Marxists Internet Archive, Chinese Communism: Report [of Lin Piao] to the Ninth National 
Congress of the Communist Party of China [CPC] (Delivered on Apr. 1 and Adopted on Apr. 14, 1969), 
http://www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/cpc/9th_congress_report.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2013) 
[hereinafter Lin Piao’s Report to the 9th National Congress of the CPC] (“After the death of Marx and 
Engels, almost all the parties of the Second International betrayed Marxism, with the exception of the 
Bolshevik Party led by Lenin. Lenin inherited, defended and developed Marxism in the struggle against 
the revisionism of the Second International.”); see also GEORGE KURIAN, DICTIONARY OF WORLD 
POLITICS 213 (2002) (“After the Russian Revolution, V. I. Lenin transformed Marx’s theories into a 
practical creed known as Marxism-Leninism.”). 
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 See DAVID A. LAW, RUSSIAN CIVILIZATION 115 (1975) (“Dialectical materialism is the concept that 
matter is the substance of all reality and that dialectics is the process which brings about the changes in 
matter. This concept recognizes that all matter is in motion and that motion is caused by the opposing 
forces in matter.”). 
 
164
 See Yong-Choon Kim, Chuch’e Philosophy, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASIAN PHILOSOPHY 168, 169 
(Oliver Leaman ed., 2001) (“[M]arxist-Leninist philosophy . . . regarded life as a mere biological 
substance . . . .”).  
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 See MATTHEW ALLEN SHADLE, THE ORIGINS OF WAR: A CATHOLIC PERSPECTIVE 46 (2011) (“He [Marx] 
also claims to describe history by means of a scientific approach that not only does not rely on religious 
truths, but even denies the existence of spiritual realities.”).  
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 ALBERTO M. PIEDRA, NATURAL LAW: THE FOUNDATION OF AN ORDERLY ECONOMIC SYSTEM 91 (2004). 
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dialectical materialism is a type of historical determinism.
167
  The heart of the theory is 
that historical development is wholly decided by material conditions, and not by the free 
thoughts of men.
168
  Therefore, the idea of Marx and Lenin also denies the idea of 
man’s free will.
169
 
The key tenets of Marxism-Leninism are the distrust and hostility of religion;
170
 
the pursuit and consolidation of a totalitarian dictatorship;
171
 the pursuit and 
consolidation of collectivism;
172
 the pursuit and consolidation of a centrally planned 
economy;
173
 and the pursuit of the possession of strong military power against 
imperialism.
174
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 See NORMAN LEVINE, MARX’S DISCOURSE WITH HEGEL 312 (2012) (“Dialectical materialism was a 
form of historical determinism in which the controlling law devolved from the metaphysical principles of 
nature.”). 
 
168
 See ANNE FAIRCHILD POMEROY, MARX AND WHITEHEAD: PROCESS, DIALECTICS, AND THE CRITIQUE 
OF CAPITALISM 58 (2004) (“The most extreme position takes Marx’s ‘dialectical materialism’ or 
‘historical determinism’ to say that historical and/or dialectical development is strictly determined by the 
material conditions existing at any given time . . . .”); see also MICHAEL J. WHITE, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: 
AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 337 (2nd ed. 2012) (“Historical or dialectical materialism is a variety of 
determinism which, as understood by Marx, implies that social or political change is not really brought 
about by ‘ideas,’ that is, by various schemes for social or political reform.”). 
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 See GREG L. BAHNSEN, PUSHING THE ANTITHESIS: THE APOLOGETIC METHODOLOGY OF GREG L. 
BAHNSEN 84 (2007) (“[T]here are two basic types of Atomism: deterministic and non-deterministic. 
Deterministic atomism denies free will, as in . . . Marxism[-Leninism]. . . . Marxism[-Leninism] 
ultimately crushes free will through its concept of historical determinism which results in predictable (i.e., 
unavoidable) outcomes.”).  
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 See infra Chapter Four.I.B.  
 
171
 See infra Chapter Four.II.B.  
 
172
 See infra Chapter Four.III.B. 
 
173
 See infra Chapter Five.I.B. 
 
174
 See infra id.  
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These features create an anti-human rights ideology for dictatorial powers, which 
violates human dignity, cheapens human values, and destroys the people’s hope in life. 
 
B. Juche Ideology as the Anti-Human Rights Ideology 
Juche ideology was created by Kim Il-Sung, who is the founding father of the 
DPRK, and it was inherited and further developed by his son and successor, Kim Jong-
Il.  Juche ideology, which is sometimes called Kimilsungism,
175
 is translated as “self-
reliance” or “master of one’s self.”
176
   
The key tenets of Juche ideology are, very much like Marxism-Leninism, the 
distrust and hostility of religion;
177
 the pursuit and consolidation of a totalitarian 
dictatorship;
178
 the pursuit and consolidation of collectivism;
179
 the pursuit and 
consolidation of a centrally planned economy;
180
 and the pursuit of the Songun 
(military-first) policy for the possession of strong military power against U.S. 
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 See CHONG, supra note 88, at 97 (“Kim Jong-il, in a thesis presented in March 1982 and entitled ‘On 
the Juche Idea,’ said that Juche was formally designated to be called Kimilsungism. North Korean 
ideologists have since used the two words – Juche Idea and Kimilsungism – to refer to the same 
concept.”).  
 
176
 See SETH, supra note 84, at 355 (“Juche can be translated as ‘self-reliance.’”); see also FORD & KWON, 
supra note 55, at 55 (“The word Ju-che is a combination of two Korean letters (Ju – master and Che – 
oneself), thus literally meaning ‘master of one’s self.’”). 
 
177
 See infra Chapter Four.I.B.  
 
178
 See infra Chapter Four.II.B.  
 
179
 See infra Chapter Four.III.B. 
 
180
 See infra Chapter Five.I.B. 
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imperialism.
181
  
The notable point is that the key principles of Juche ideology are similar to those 
of Marxism-Leninism.  This is because Kim Il-Sung adopted the key principles of 
Juche ideology in imitation of those of Marxism-Leninism.  The North Korean 
government admitted this fact openly for two decades, stating that “[t]he Juche idea . . . 
[is] a creative application of [the universal principles of] Marxism-Leninism to the 
conditions of our country.”
182
 in its Constitution of 1972.  The two doctrines are not 
identical.  Rather, Kim Il-Sung chose specific principles that were necessary to 
maintain and strengthen his one-man dictatorship.  Kim Jong-Il then developed the 
ideology of his father and interpreted it under the same standards.  While most of the 
key creeds of Marxism-Leninism were extremely useful for the dictatorship of both the 
senior Kim and the junior Kim, the Marxist-Leninist principle of proletarian 
internationalism
183
 was an exception.  The essence of proletarian internationalism can 
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 See infra id.; see also infra note 517 and accompanying text.  
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 ADRIAN BUZO, THE GUERILLA DYNASTY: POLITICS AND LEADERSHIP IN NORTH KOREA 37 (1999); See 
T.B. MUKHERJEE, THE SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL IDEAS OF THE GREAT PRESIDENT KIM IL SUNG 
200 (1983) (“It is true that he [Kim Il-Sung] himself terms it [Juche idea] a creative application of the 
universal principles of Marxism-Leninism.”). 
 
183
 The Encyclopedia of Marxism states that “[Proletarian] Internationalism is the ethical value of the 
workers’ movement towards the interests of the working class of all countries over and above the interests 
of the working class in any one country, and the practice of organising on an international basis. The term 
came into use in the 1850s . . . .” Marxists Internet Archive, Encyclopedia of Marxism: Internationalism, 
http://www.marxists.org/glossary/terms/i/n.htm#internationalism (last visited Sept. 29, 2012).  
Additionally, Lenin put forward an interpretation on proletarian internationalism as follows at the Second 
Comintern Congress:  
[P]roletarian internationalism demands, firstly, that the interests of the proletarian struggle 
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be summed up in the following short slogan from the Communist Manifesto by Karl 
Marx and Friedrich Engels: “Proletarians [Workers] of all countries, Unite!”
184
  Marx 
played a central role forming the First International
185
 in 1864 to spread his ideas and 
fulfill them across all Europe.  Lenin also organized the Third International
186
 in 1919 
to propagate Marxism-Leninism.  Kim Il-Sung knew the importance of this principle 
among Marxist-Leninist nations.  For this reason, he incorporated the principle into 
Article 16 of the North Korean Constitution of 1972, which provides that “The state [of 
DPRK], in accordance with the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian 
                                                                                                                                
in one country be subordinated to the interests of the proletarian struggle on a world scale, 
and, secondly, that a nation which is achieving victory over the bourgeoisie be able and 
willing to make the greatest national sacrifices for the sake of overthrowing international 
capital.(citation omitted) 
BERNARD S. MORRIS, AUTHORITY AND CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM: 1917-1967 at 40-41 
(2012).  
 
184
 See Marxists Internet Archive, Marx & Engels Internet Archive: Manifesto of the Communist Party 
(Chapter IV), http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/ch04.htm (last 
visited Jan. 20, 2013) (“The famous final phrase of the Manifesto, ‘Working Men of All Countries, 
Unite!,’ in the original German is: ‘Proletarier aller Länder, vereinigt euch!’ Thus, a more correct 
translation would be ‘Proletarians of all countries, Unite!’”). 
 
185
 See WALTER JOHN RAYMOND, DICTIONARY OF POLITICS: SELECTED AMERICAN AND FOREIGN 
POLITICAL AND LEGAL TERMS 85 (7th ed. 1992) (“Established in 1864, as the International Workingman’s 
Association by exiles from various countries (including Karl Marx, who was expelled from his native 
Germany) for the purpose of advancing the cause of the workers. After the defeat of the Paris Commune 
in 1871, the International was dissolved.”). 
 
186
 One reliable dictionary of politics defines the Third International, as follows: 
Established in 1919, in Moscow, Russia, as an agency of the Russian communists under the 
leadership of Vladimir I. Lenin. Its primary function was . . . to promote the cause of 
communism throughout the world. It was dissolved in 1943, by Josef Stalin as an act 
demonstrating good will towards the United States and her allies. The Internationals are 
also known as Cominterns [Communist Internationals]. 
Id.; See Marxists Internet Archive, Encyclopedia of Marxism: Communist International (Comintern), 
http://www.marxists.org/glossary/orgs/c/o.htm#communist-international (last visited Jan. 20, 2013) 
(“Communist International (Comintern)[:] Also called the Third International, created by the Bolsheviks 
in March 1919, setting up Communist Parties, affiliated to the International, in almost every country in 
the world. . . . The Communist International . . . was disbanded in 1943 by Stalin, as a gesture of 
conciliation with the Allied powers.”). 
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internationalism, unites with the socialist countries, unites with all peoples of the world 
opposed to imperialism, and actively supports and encourages their national-liberation 
and revolutionary struggles.”
187
  Nonetheless, Kim Il-Sung was more interested in the 
consolidation of his dictatorial power within the DPRK than he was in the unity and 
solidarity among the communist countries.  Therefore, he adopted nationalism as one 
of the principles of his Juche ideology to consolidate and keep his dictatorial power.
188
  
Kim Il-Sung was well aware of the features of nationalism that excites more patriotic 
                                            
187
 Foreign Languages Publishing House [of DPRK], Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea, in THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD 227, 234 (Foreign Languages 
Publishing House [of DPRK] trans., William B. Simons ed., 1980). 
 
188
 There is an argument that Kim Il-Sung’s adoption of nationalism rather than proletarian 
internationalism as one of the creeds of his Juche ideology resulted from the political dynamics of North 
Korea between China and Soviet Union in the1950s and 1960s:   
Kim Il-Sung’s choice of nationalism instead of [proletarian] internationalism as one of the 
tenets of his Juche ideology was just the result of North Korea’s neutrality in Sino-Soviet 
border conflict in 1950s and 1960s as well as the part of a political and ideological effort to 
stand in the right middle of both China and Soviet Union during the periods.  
IN K. HWANG, THE NEUTRALIZED UNIFICATION OF KOREA IN PERSPECTIVE 98 (1980). 
However, the argument does not withstand to reason. First of all, the analysis of fact relevance, which is 
the major premise of this argument, was incorrect. North Korea did not, in fact, remain neutral in the 
Sino-Soviet border dispute. Kim Il-Sung took the side of China in the border conflict unconditionally 
after 1962. The situation among the three countries at the time is well described in one of the books of 
Professor Andrei Lankov at Kookmin University in Seoul, South Korea:  
At first the North Korean press did not mention the Soviet-Chinese conflict, and Korean 
delegations of all levels continued to visit both Moscow and Peking. In July 1961, in 
Peking, Kim Il Sung and Zhou En-lai signed a treaty of friendship, co-operation and mutual 
assistance, which is still in force today, and this strengthened the alliance between the two 
countries. A week earlier a similar treaty was signed with the Soviet Union and both treaties 
went into effect simultaneously.(citation omitted)  
After 1962, however, the DPRK began its drift toward Peking. The North Korean media 
ceased to cite Soviet examples. In 1962–4, following the 22nd Congress of the Soviet 
Communist Party, where open criticism was directed against Chinese leaders, the 
rapprochement between the DPRK and China accelerated. For a few years North Korea 
almost unconditionally supported the Chinese position on all important issues. . . . During 
these years Nodong sinmun, an official daily newspaper, often published articles in support 
of the Chinese position on various issues.  
ANDREI LANKOV, FROM STALIN TO KIM IL SUNG: THE FORMATION OF NORTH KOREA, 1945-1960 at 64-65 
(2002).  
Secondly, it is difficult to find any reasonable causal relationship between North Korea’s efforts for 
neutrality and Kim Il-Sung’s adoption of nationalism instead of proletarian internationalism as one of the 
principles of Juche ideology, even if we suppose that the country observed neutrality in the border conflict. 
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feelings from the people than does internationalism, so it would contribute much more 
to the political stability in North Korea than the Marxist-Leninist principle of 
internationalism and strengthen domestic solidarity. 
However, though there is no denying that the emphasis of proletarian 
internationalism is at least a superficial difference between the two ideologies, it is 
difficult to say that it is substantial enough to mark Juche ideology and Marxism-
Leninism as radically different.  With this in mind, we need to look at the fact that 
nationalism as a principle of Juche ideology is not pure nationalism.  Kim Il-Sung 
regarded both the internationalism of Marx and Lenin and the nationalism of Juche 
ideology as important, so he attempted to reconcile the two concepts.
189
  According to 
him, “‘He who does not love his own country cannot be loyal to internationalism, and 
he who is unfaithful to internationalism cannot be faithful to his own country and people. 
A true patriot is precisely an internationalist and vice versa.’(citation omitted)”
190
  
Additionally, he stressed that “The Juche idea we advocate does not conflict with 
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 See KONGDAN OH & RALPH C. HASSIG, NORTH KOREA THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 17-18 (2000) 
(“As a practicing communist, Kim [Il Sung] attempts to reconcile nationalism [of Juche ideology] with 
communist internationalism [of Marxism-Leninism]: ‘internationalism and patriotism [nationalism] are 
inseparably linked with each other. . . . Loving Korea is just as good as loving the Soviet Union.’(citation 
omitted) His rationale for this assertion is that by strengthening the revolution in Korea, the international 
communist revolution is strengthened.(footnote omitted)”). 
 
190
 Hongkoo Han, Colonial Origins of Juche: The Minsaengdan Incident of the 1930s and the Birth of 
North Korea-China Relationship, in ORIGINS OF NORTH KOREA’S JUCHE: COLONIALISM, WAR, AND 
DEVELOPMENT 33, 57 (Jae-Jung Suh ed., 2012). 
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internationalism [of Marxism-Leninism].”
191
  Consequently, the nationalism of Juche 
ideology became a peculiar mixture of Juche nationalism and the internationalism of 
Marxism-Leninism.  The end product is a North Korean style of Marxism-Leninism, 
tailored for the dictatorship of the Kim family.
192
  
In spite of this fact, and the absence of differences in the key principles of Juche 
ideology and Marxism-Leninism, North Korea began to intensively propagandize the 
superiority of Juche ideology over Marxism-Leninism starting from the early 1990s, in 
the aftermath of successive collapses of the Soviet Union and her satellite countries in 
Eastern Europe before and after 1990.
193
  North Korea generally presents two grounds 
in its argument for the superiority of Juche ideology.  One is that Juche ideology, 
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 KIM IL SUNG, KIM IL SUNG: SELECTED WORKS (VOLUME V) 122 (Foreign Languages Publishing 
House [of DPRK] trans., 1972). 
 
192
 See Chongko Choi, Korea, North, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD CONSTITUTIONS 488, 489 (Gerhard 
Robbers ed., 2007) (“The name for communism as practiced in North Korea is juche, Kim Il Sung’s 
interpretation of Marxism-Leninism that emphasizes nationalism . . . .”); see also FRENCH, supra note 41, 
at 32 (“Essentially, Juche is based upon the classic works of Marxism from Marx and Engels through 
Lenin . . . .”).    
One reliable encyclopedic dictionary of Asian philosophy also supports the analysis that Juche ideology is 
essentially the North Korean style of Marxism-Leninism:   
In North Korea the long-time ruler, Kim Il-sung, through the assistance of scholars under 
his rule, developed the so-called chuch’e philosophy, which means the philosophy of self-
identity or philosophy of subject. It was intended to be the unique philosophy of Korean 
communism, and it has also been called Kim Il-sung’s philosophy. In reality, it is a 
reformulation of Marxism[-Leninism] or dialectical materialism with a vision of a classless 
society. Because of the iron rule of Kim Il-sung and then of his son, Kim Chong-il, there 
has been no freedom of alternative views in philosophy or religion in North Korea. 
Kim, supra note 164, at 168. 
 
193
 See infra Chapter Three.II.B. 
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unlike Marxism-Leninism, admits to the free will of humans.
194
  The creator of the 
Juche, Kim Il-Sung, actually states the following concerning his idea:  
[t]he idea [of Juche] . . . [means] that the masters of the revolution and 
construction are the masses of the people and that they are also a motive 
force of the revolution and construction. In other words, it is an idea that 
one is responsible for one’s own destiny and that one has also the capacity 
for hewing out one’s own destiny.(citation omitted).
195
   
However, Juche ideology is essentially grounded in historical determinism, which 
denies man’s free will, just like Marxism-Leninism.
196
  Additionally, Juche ideology 
embraces collectivism, which centers on the denial of the free will of the individual as 
its key principle.  Thus, this assertion of North Korea, which is based on Kim Il-Sung’s 
statement that his ideology respects the free will of humans, is not only a logical 
contradiction but also very specious propaganda.  
The contention that the people are the masters of revolution and history is 
specifically called “the philosophical theory of Juche.”  However, Juche ideology also 
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 One reliable encyclopedic dictionary of Asian philosophy introduces this ground for its argument, 
suggested by North Korea, on the superiority of Juche ideology to Marxism-Leninism: 
Pak Sung-dok, who is the president of the Institute of the Study of Chuch’e Ideology [ISCI] 
and the leading thinker of chuch’e philosophy in North Korea, claims that chuch’e ideology 
is superior to Marxism-Leninism. . . . Pak quotes the teaching of Kim Il-sung, which is as 
follows: ‘The human being is the master of his own destiny; this is the heart of chuch’e 
ideology and the essence of the revolutionary ideology’(citation omitted). . . . . In the 
chuch’e worldview, man is the subject and master, who determines the destiny of himself 
and the world.  
Kim, supra note 164, at 168-169.   
 
195
 FORD & KWON, supra note 55, at 55. 
 
196
 See Kim, supra note 164, at 168 (“[I]t [Juche ideology] is a reformulation of Marxism[-Leninism] or 
dialectical materialism . . . .”); see also supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
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has an essential prerequisite for this philosophical theory, which is called “the 
Revolutionary View of the Leader.”  The fact that this argument of North Korea is 
unsubstantiated propaganda comes to be clearer when we review the core content of the 
condition precedent to the philosophical theory.  The key of the Revolutionary View of 
the Leader is that all North Korean people must be under the leadership of the Great 
Leader Kim Il-Sung, Dear Leader Kim Jong-Il, and Supreme Leader Kim Jong-Un, the 
son of Kim Jong-Il and the current dictator of the country, to be the masters of their own 
destiny.
197
  
This structure is very similar to that of Marx’s theory of historical materialism, 
which is the application of his theory of dialectical materialism to human history.
198
  
Judging from its appearance, Marx’s theory also seems to admit the free will of man, 
because he declares that “men make their own history.”  However, the essential 
prerequisite for the declaration is that material things
199
 are the driving force of human 
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 Dr. Ilpyong J. Kim, who is an expert on the political system of North Korea, explains “the 
philosophical theory of Juche” and “the Revolutionary View of the Leader” as follows:  
The Juche ideology consists mainly of two parts – the philosophical theory, which 
maintains that the masses are the masters of history and revolution, and the guiding 
principle, or the “Revolutionary View of the Leader,” which asserts that “nonetheless, the 
masses are not able to take up spontaneously any revolutionary course unless they are 
organized into revolutionary forces and are led by the Suryong (leader).” 
ILPYONG J. KIM, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF NORTH KOREA 63 (2003). 
 
198
 See Marxists Internet Archive, Encyclopedia of Marxism: Historical Materialism, 
http://www.marxists.org/glossary/terms/h/i.htm#historical-materialism (last visited Sept. 29, 2012) (“This 
concept [of Historical Materialism] is founded on Dialectical Materialism applied to history. Another 
name for the ‘materialist conception of history’ formulated by Marx and Engels . . . .”). 
 
199
 See KWASI WIREDU, PHILOSOPHY AND AN AFRICAN CULTURE 84 (1980) (“‘Material’ in dialectical 
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history.
200
  As what Karl Marx really wanted to emphasize through his theory of 
historical materialism was not man’s free will but instead the material, what Kim Il-
Sung really wanted to stress through his theory of Juche ideology was not the free will 
of man but his absolute leadership.  The concept of an individual’s free will in Juche 
ideology is just a skillful ploy to drum up a sense of absolute loyalty to the three 
Leaders into the mass of people, without breeding any antipathy.  After all, like 
Marxism-Leninism, Juche ideology is no more than an anti-human rights ideology, 
which denies free will, despite North Korea’s intensive propaganda that Juche ideology 
is superior to Marxism-Leninism because it respects the free will of man.  
The other ground for North Korea’s argument on the supremacy of Juche 
ideology over Marxism-Leninism is that Juche ideology, unlike Marxism-Leninism, 
admits to the existence of spiritual realities such as the immortality of the soul and 
eternal life after death.
201
  However, Juche ideology is fundamentally based on 
                                                                                                                                
materialism refers to matter in a neutral technical sense in which the material is simply that which has 
mass and position and is in motion. ‘Material’ in historical materialism refers to material things in an 
economic sense.”). 
 
200
 See LAW, supra note 163, at 115 (“Marx recognized matter rather than ideas as the substance of reality. 
He did not believe as Hegel that ideas determine the course of history. He contended that the opposition 
between material things and the forces of matter determine the course of history.”); see also Max Eastman, 
Against the Marxian Dialectic, in MARXISM: THE INNER DIALOGUES 177, 182 (Michael Curtis ed., 2nd ed. 
1997) (“[T]he general course of history is determined not by the nature of man, but by the nature of things. 
Says Marx: Man makes his own history, but he does not make it out of conditions chosen by himself, but 
out of such things as he finds at hand. . . .”).  
 
201
 See Kim, supra note 164, at 169 (“Another important difference, according to Pak [Sung-dok, who is 
the president of the ISCI in North Korea], between chuch’e philosophy and Marxism-Leninism is the 
view of life. He claims that viewing life . . . as a mere material entity is wrong, and even Marxist-Leninist 
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dialectical materialism, which rejects all religious truths and spiritual realities, just like 
Marxism-Leninism.
202
  Additionally, Juche ideology, as its core principle, is embedded 
with distrust and hostility for religion, which generally presupposes spiritual realities.  
Thus, North Korea’s assertion that its ideology admits to spiritual realities is not only a 
logical contradiction but also very specious propaganda.  
The fact that North Korea’s argument is but an unsubstantial propaganda ploy 
becomes clearer when we review Juche’s theory of the Immortal Socio-Political Body.  
The theory actually talks about spiritual realities and promises eternal life after death to 
the North Korean people.
203
  However, the theory of Juche also has, as an essential 
prerequisite for this eternal life, the requirement of absolute loyalty to the three Leaders 
and the KWP.
204
  As shown in this condition precedent, what Kim Il-Sung really 
                                                                                                                                
philosophy which regarded life as a mere biological substance, has a limitation.”).  
 
202
 See supra note 196 and accompanying text. 
 
203
 DON BAKER, KOREAN SPIRITUALITY 147 (Henry Rosemont, Jr. ed., 2008) (“[I]t [Juche] offers a 
solution to a problem all human beings face in their existence as separate and distinct individuals. It 
promises believers that . . . they can overcome death and gain immortality.”); see also id. at 151 (“Juche 
believers expect that their faith will be rewarded with immortality, as religious believers do.”); HY-SANG 
LEE, NORTH KOREA: A STRANGE SOCIALIST FORTRESS 146 (2001) (“The physical life of an individual 
person is limited, but the life of the masses united as an independent social-political organism is 
immortal. . . .”).  
 
204
 See JASPER BECKER, ROGUE REGIME: KIM JONG IL AND THE LOOMING THREAT OF NORTH KOREA 71 
(2005) (“The core of this theory [of the Immortal Socio-Political Body] holds that ‘the Suryong (or 
Leader) is the supreme brain of a living body, the Party is the nerve of that living body, and the masses are 
only endowed with [the eternal] life [after death] when they offer their absolute loyalty.’”); see also id. 
(“The Theory [of the Immortal Socio-Political Body] states that ‘without the Suryong [leader], which is 
the brain, and the Party, which is the nerve, the masses will remain dead bodies because they are no more 
than arms and legs.’”); BAKER, supra note 203, at 147 (“Juche says that because Juche will last until the 
end of time, all those who hold fast to Juche philosophy and unite within a Juche-based organization 
under the guidance of a leader who embodies Juche will enjoy an eternal sociopolitical life after their 
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wanted to stress through the theory of his Juche ideology was not eternal life after death 
but the absolute loyalty of the North Korean people.  This concept of eternal life and 
immortality of the people in Juche ideology is therefore just a ploy to hammer in a sense 
of absolute loyalty to the three Leaders into the masses.  After all, like Marxism-
Leninism, Juche ideology is no more than an anti-human rights ideology, which denies 
all spiritual elements, despite North Korea’s intensive propaganda that Juche ideology is 
superior to Marxism-Leninism because it admits to spiritual realities. 
 
II. Juche Ideology and Marxism-Leninism as the Ruling Ideologies 
Controlling North Korea 
A. Juche Ideology as the Official Ruling Ideology of North Korea 
Juche is the official ruling ideology, stipulated in the North Korean Constitution.  
Article 3 of the Constitution clearly declares, “The Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea is guided in its activities by the Juche idea and the Songun [military-first] idea, a 
world outlook centred on people, a revolutionary ideology for achieving the 
                                                                                                                                
body has died.”); Id. at 149 (“[N]orth Koreans, and all humanity, are urged to unite in ironclad unity 
around Kim Jong Il’s leadership. Only by doing so can they create the eternal sociopolitical 
community . . . .”); LEE, supra note 203, at 146 (“A person can acquire immortality only as a member of 
the immortal social-political organism: By uniting around the leader organizationally and ideologically, 
under the guidance of the party, the masses form a social-political organism, which has immortal vitality 
as an independent being.”). 
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independence of the masses of the people.”
205
  
It is true that the same article of the North Korean Constitution also proclaims a 
military-first policy, which puts the North Korean People’s Army first in resource 
distribution and state affairs.  However, Juche ideology, which was derived from 
Marxism-Leninism, already contains a military-first policy within itself and the latter is 
purely based on the former.
206
  Additionally, this military-first policy is merely a 
governmental policy rather than systematized ideology like Juche or Marxism-Leninism, 
in spite of its official title in Article 3 of the Constitution.  Therefore, it is more 
reasonable to say that Juche is the only official ruling ideology of North Korea.  
 
B. Marxism-Leninism as the Unofficial Ruling Ideology of North Korea 
The powerful influence of Marxism-Leninism in North Korea has a long history.  
The country was founded upon the key principles of orthodox Marxism-Leninism and 
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 Naenara [My Country]: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Constitution: Chapter I Politics, 
http://naenara.com.kp/en/great/constitution.php?2 (last visited May 3, 2012) [hereinafter North Korean 
Constitution Chapter I].  
This is Article 3 of the North Korean Constitutions of 2009, 2010, and 2012. The contents of Article 3 of 
the North Korean Constitutions of 1992 and 1998 are the same except “the Songun idea [the idea of 
‘military-first’].” Article 3 of the Constitutions of 1992 and 1998 do not contain this concept. See infra 
app. at 321–322.  
 
206
 See infra Chapter Five.I.B.4; see also Ilpyong J. Kim, Kim Jong Il’s Military-First Politics, in NORTH 
KOREA: THE POLITICS OF REGIME SURVIVAL 59, 62 (Young Whan Kihl & Hong Nack Kim eds., 2006) 
(“[K]im Jong Il’s military-first politics is based on his father’s ruling ideology of juche . . . .”); MARCUS 
NOLAND, KOREA AFTER KIM JONG-IL 8 (2004) (“‘[M]ilitary-first’ ideology, which is portrayed as 
emanating from juche thought . . . .”); Suk Hi Kim, Will North Korea Be Able to Overcome the Third 
Wave of Its Collapse?, in THE SURVIVAL OF NORTH KOREA: ESSAYS ON STRATEGY, ECONOMICS AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 28, 34 (Suk Hi Kim et al. eds., 2011) (“Songun (military-first) policy is a 
North Korean adaptation of Juche to the present domestic and world political situation . . . .”).  
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the sole official guiding philosophy of the state was originally Marxism-Leninism.
207
  
From the beginning, Marxism-Leninism had a near absolute influence over the political, 
economic, social, and military systems of North Korea.  Additionally, all North Korean 
people received thorough education on Marxist-Leninist theory.  Kim Il-Sung 
emphasized that “The tendencies of slighting the . . . ideological work of the Party or 
neglecting the studies of Marxist-Leninist theory must be criticized severely from the 
standpoint of Party principles.”
208
  He also stressed that “What our Party must study, 
study and study is not the Bible nor any religious dogma, but precisely this Marxist-
Leninist theory.”
209
 
However, no article of the first Constitution of North Korea, which was 
established in 1948, directly mentions the status of Marxism-Leninism, not to mention 
the key principles of it.
210
  It was Article 4 of the North Korean Constitution of 1972 
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 See SETH, supra note 84, at 355 (“Originally the state was founded on the principles of orthodox 
Marxism-Leninism. Marxism-Leninism provided Kim Il Sung and the other North Korean leaders with a 
vocabulary . . . for achieving the goal of establishing a strong independent Korea.”); see also FRENCH, 
supra note 41, at 31 (“Upon the foundation of the DPRK, the guiding political philosophy was largely 
Marxist-Leninist . . . .”); Sung Chul Yang, Understanding the North Korean Political Framework, in 
UNDERSTANDING KOREAN POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION 269, 286 (Soong Hoom Kil & Chung-In Moon 
eds., 2001) (“[M]arxism-Leninism has been its ‘official’ ideology; the WPK [Workers’ Party of Korea] 
has been its ‘official’ party since 1948; and the party, state, and military organization have been running 
largely in accordance with the principles of democratic centralism and of proletarian dictatorship.”). 
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 KIM IL SUNG, KIM IL SUNG: SELECTED WORKS (VOLUME I) 254 (Foreign Languages Publishing House 
[of DPRK] trans., 1971). 
 
209
 Id. at 179. 
 
210
 Sung-Chul Yang, a chair-professor at Korea University in Seoul, South Korea, assures us that this was 
a temporary political camouflage of the North Korean government. See Yang, supra note 207, at 286 
(“Nonendorsement of the basic principles and doctrines of communism [Marxism-Leninism] in the 
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that recognized the domestic standing of Marxism-Leninism officially for the first time 
in the constitutional history of the country.  The article provided that “The Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea is guided in its activity by the Chuch’e [Juche] idea of the 
Workers’ Party of Korea, a creative application of [the universal truth of] Marxism-
Leninism to the conditions of our country.”
211
  As shown in the article, Marxism-
Leninism was officially recognized not only as the universal truth but also as the 
fundamental source of Juche ideology and one of the two ruling ideologies of North 
Korea.  Concerning Article 4, Dr. Sung-Chul Yang, who is an authority on the political 
thought of North Korea and the former Ambassador of South Korea to the U.S., noted 
that “North Korea still proclaims Marxism-Leninism as its official [ruling] ideology and 
the Juche idea as its creative application.”
212
  Nevertheless, the word “Marxism-
Leninism” was unexpectedly purged from Article 3 of the North Korean Constitution of 
1992 through constitutional amendments.  Additionally, North Korea’s intensive 
propaganda proclaiming that Juche would replace Marxism-Leninism as the sole official 
                                                                                                                                
original constitution was only a temporary political camouflage.”).  
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 Foreign Languages Publishing House [of DPRK], supra note 187, at 232; See KIM, IL-SŎNG, JUCHE! 
THE SPEECHES AND WRITINGS OF KIM IL SUNG 157 (Li Yuk-Sa ed., 1972) (“Only by firmly establishing 
Juche can each country . . . creatively apply the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism . . . to suit its 
historical conditions and national peculiarities . . . .”).  
 
212
 SUNG CHUL YANG, THE NORTH AND SOUTH KOREAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
166 (1994).  
He seems not to have reflected the amendments of North Korean Constitution of 1992 in the book, even 
though it was published in 1994. He published the revised edition of the book in 1999. 
 84 
ruling ideology began in earnest right after this abrupt change in the most official 
document of the country.  Furthermore, some scholars of the liberal democratic 
countries, who paid attention exclusively to the propaganda of the North Korean 
government without the multilateral review of and full consideration for the background 
of the deletion of the term from the Constitution, have accepted the argument of the 
country at face value, and continue to make the same claims as that of North Korea.
213
  
However, from a common-sense point of view, it doesn’t quite make sense that 
Marxism-Leninism, which has exercised great influence over every part of the country 
for nearly half a century since the foundation of the DPRK, would lose all its domestic 
leverage and position just by the deletion of the term from the North Korean 
Constitution in 1992.  All the political, economic, social, and military systems, which 
were derived from and based on the key principles of Marxism-Leninism and Juche 
ideology, are still operating in North Korea.
214
  In a way, the whole country can be said 
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 See, e.g., HASSIG & OH, supra note 110, at 174 (“As North Korea’s national ideology, Juche 
eventually supplanted Marxism-Leninism, mention of which was dropped from . . . the 1992 revision of 
the state constitution.”). 
Dr. Young Whan Kihl, who is a professor emeritus of political science at Iowa State University, also made 
the statement to the same effect with that of Dr. Hassig and Dr. Oh:  
Initially North Korea had adopted Marxism-Leninism as its ruling philosophy when it 
proclaimed the establishment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) on 
September 7, 1948. Marxism-Leninism was subsequently replaced by the so-called juche 
ideology, which it alleged was a creative application of Marxism-Leninism to suit the local 
condition that prevailed in North Korea. A constitutional revision in 1992 deleted reference 
to Marxism-Leninism. 
Young Whan Kihl, Staying Power of the Socialist “Hermit Kingdom”, in NORTH KOREA: THE POLITICS 
OF REGIME SURVIVAL 3, 8 (Young Whan Kihl & Hong Nack Kim eds., 2006). 
 
214
 See infra Chapter Four.I.D; see also infra Chapter Four.II.D; infra Chapter Four.III.D; infra Chapter 
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to be still under the influence of the Marxist-Leninist ideology.  This is because Juche 
ideology, which has been intensively propagandized as the only official ruling ideology 
of the country since the early 1990s, is the North Korean approach to Marxism-
Leninism and all the key principles of Juche ideology were made just in imitation of 
those of Marxism-Leninism.
215
 
To conclude, the expurgation of Marxism-Leninism from the Constitution of 1992 
was North Korea’s crafty strategy to stop its public image from plummeting in the eyes 
of the international society, especially in the face of the collapse of Marxist-Leninist 
systems.  The end of Marxism-Leninism in Central and Eastern Europe and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union demonstrated the inefficacy of the theories of Marx and 
Lenin.  Thus, North Korea did not have any reason to continue to proclaim Marxism-
Leninism as one of its official ruling ideologies and the essential source of Juche 
ideology in its Constitution from the political viewpoint of loss and gain, even though 
all the national systems in effect were still grounded in the Marxist-Leninist principles.  
If North Korea persisted in proclaiming the failed ideology as one of its official ruling 
ideologies in its most formal document open to the world, it was certain that the 
disgraceful reputation of a failed Marxist-Leninist state would also be placed upon 
                                                                                                                                
Five.I.D; infra Chapter Five.II.D; infra Chapter Five.III.D.  
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 See supra Chapter Three.I.B. 
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North Korea.  Additionally, if the country insisted on the declaration that “[t]he 
Chuch’e [Juche] idea of the Workers’ Party of Korea . . . [is] a creative application of 
[the universal truth of] Marxism-Leninism . . . .”
216
 in its Constitution, it would mean 
that the country was admitting that Juche ideology, which is essentially based on 
Marxism-Leninism, also follows suit as a failure.  Even so, true abandonment of 
Marxism-Leninism was not an option for Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-Il, because that 
would mean the renunciation of the national systems supporting their dictatorships, and 
furthermore, the renunciation of their dictatorships.
217
  Thus, the most effective 
countermeasure to deal with these delicate situations would be to proclaim to the world 
North Korea’s severance of ideological ties with Marxism-Leninism, at least 
superficially, through the complete deletion of the word, “Marxism-Leninism,” from its 
Constitution.
218
  Dr. Ilpyong J. Kim, professor emeritus of political science at the 
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 Foreign Languages Publishing House [of DPRK], supra note 187, at 232; See supra note 211 and 
accompanying text. 
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 Dr. Russell Ong at the University of Strathclyde in U.K. talks about this situation of the dictatorial 
regime of North Korea, which is grounded in the key principles of Marxism-Leninism, as follows: 
In reality, the ossification of the North Korean regime can be traced back to the nature of 
the system Kim Il-Sung created. Since 1953, Kim’s [dictatorial] regime and his successor’s 
have been characterized by inseparability in the state’s political, economic and foreign 
policies. Preservation of the Marxist-Leninist regime in North Korea generally requires 
adherence to established dogma in all areas of policies and fundamental changes such as 
the complete abandonment of socialism [Marxism-Leninism] are likely to undermine the 
stability of the [dictatorial] regime itself.  
RUSSELL ONG, CHINA’S SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 55 (2002). 
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 Article 10 of the North Korean Constitution of 1972 used the term “dictatorship of the proletariat,” 
which is one of the core concepts of Marxism-Leninism, rather than “the dictatorship of the people’s 
democracy.” See infra app. at 317–318. According to one reliable source, “[f]ollowing the collapse of 
socialist bloc. [before and after 1990], Pyongyang replaced Proletarian Dictatorship [dictatorship of the 
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University of Connecticut, depicts these overall situations relating to North Korea’s 
expurgation of Marxism-Leninism from its Constitution of 1992 as follows: 
The DPRK constitution [of 1972] used to contain a phrase stipulating that 
juche, which is a creative application of [the universal truth of] Marxism-
Leninism, must be upheld as the guiding principle of North Korean 
ideology. However, the word Marxism-Leninism was deleted from the 
constitution of 1992 in the aftermath of the collapse of the communist bloc 
of nations in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union [before and after 
1990].
219
 
North Korea also prepared and developed the logic of propaganda showing its 
people why Marxism-Leninism can no longer be the essential source of Juche ideology 
                                                                                                                                
proletariat] with People’s Democratic Dictatorship [the dictatorship of the people’s democracy] in [Article 
12 of] the Socialist Constitution revised on April 1992.” CHONG, supra note 88, at 103. However, “the 
dictatorship of the people’s democracy” and “dictatorship of the proletariat” are equivalent in meaning, in 
spite of the difference in the wording of the terms. See FRANCIS J. KASE, PEOPLE’S DEMOCRACY; A 
CONTRIBUTION TO THE STUDY OF THE COMMUNIST THEORY OF STATE AND REVOLUTION 25 (1968) (“The 
decisive point in determining the essence of the state is not the mere form of the political organization, 
but its content which forms its flesh and blood. The content of the people’s democracy is the dictatorship 
of the proletariat (citation omitted).”); see also OTTO WILHELM KUUSINEN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF 
MARXISM-LENINISM: MANUAL 655 (Clemens Palme Dutt trans., Clemens Palme Dutt ed., 1961) (“That 
form was people’s democracy as a new form of democracy fulfilling the functions of proletarian 
dictatorship.”). Thus, we come to understand that “the dictatorship of the people’s democracy” is the 
camouflaged version to remove the Marxist-Leninist traces in the expression of “dictatorship of the 
proletariat,” which is a one-man dictatorship under the guise of the rule of proletariat (working class) over 
the so-called bourgeois exploiters. See infra Chapter Four.II.B; see also Alexander J. Groth, Dictatorship, 
in THE WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA (VOLUME 5) at 191, 191 (Robert J. Janus et al. eds., 2000) (“In spite 
of denying their citizens numerous basic freedoms, however, many dictatorships call themselves ‘people’s 
republics’ or ‘people’s democracies.’”); GRAYSON KIRK, WHAT IS COMMUNISM? A PICTURE SURVEY OF 
WORLD COMMUNISM 58 (Richard M. Ketchum ed., rev. ed. 1963) (“After the Bolsheviks under Lenin 
seized power [through the violent revolution in 1917], it became clear immediately that . . . the 
dictatorship of the proletariat was evolving into the dictatorship of the party and finally, of one man.”). 
That is to say, the replacement of the words in the North Korean Constitution of 1992 is another political 
camouflage of the government along with the deletion of the word, Marxism-Leninism, from the same 
Constitution. 
Finally, the deletion of the words, “[i]n accordance with the principles of Marxism-Leninism and 
proletarian internationalism,” from Article 17 of the North Korean Constitution of 1992 is also a political 
camouflage. Foreign Languages Publishing House [of DPRK], supra note 187, at 234. The article still 
stipulates the contents of “the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism” in 
minute detail, even though the article does not directly use the words anymore. See YANG, supra note 212, 
at 873 (“Article 17[:] . . . . The state actively supports and encourages the struggles of people in countries 
that unite with all the peoples of the world . . . .”).  
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 Kim, supra note 206, at 62. 
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and why Juche is the sole official ruling ideology of North Korea.  The logic of 
propaganda was simple: “Marxist-Leninist thought, which denies free will and spiritual 
realities, has a limitation.  Juche is the most advanced type of human thought which 
complemented these weak points of Marxism-Leninism.  Therefore, only Juche 
ideology, which was created by the Great Leader Kim Il-Sung, is qualified to be the 
ruling ideology of DPRK.”
220
  
Paul French, an expert on North Korean and Chinese matters, introduces the logic 
of propaganda of the North Korean government, which was started in earnest right after 
the deletion of Marxism-Leninism from its Constitution:  
Juche is described by Pyongyang as superior to all other systems of human 
thought, including Marxism[-Leninism], though it admits that its basis is 
Marxist-Leninist theory and that it was, at first, officially a ‘creative 
application of [the universal truth of] Marxism-Leninism,’ (citation omitted) 
even though now all references to Marx, Engels and Lenin have been 
expunged from official Juche texts.
221
  
However, as we reviewed earlier, Juche’s admission of the free will of man and 
spiritual realities are in name only and Juche ideology is just a poor imitation of 
Marxism-Leninism, which is an anti-human rights ideology for dictatorial powers.
222
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Thus, the logic of propaganda of the North Korean government is no more than political 
maneuvering to prevent domestic agitation and the ideological restlessness of the mass 
of its people that might have been instigated by expunging Marxism-Leninism, which 
was previously ingrained as the universal truth, the fundamental source of Juche, and 
one of the two ruling ideologies of the country.  
The eminent scholars and researchers of the liberal democratic countries who 
analyzed this political ploy and grasped the political maneuvering of the North Korean 
government actually do not hesitate to confidently declare that the country is still under 
the influence of Marxist-Leninist ideology even now, regardless of the deletion of 
references to Marxism-Leninism in the North Korean Constitution of 1992.  To cite a 
few examples, Professor Howard J. Wiarda at the University of Georgia states that “The 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the repudiation of Marxism-Leninism in Eastern Europe, 
and the abandonment of Marxism-Leninism on the part of many Third World states 
(Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, among others) have left the world with 
only four remaining Marxist-Leninist states: China, Cuba, North Korea, and 
Vietnam.”
223
  
In addition, Emeritus Professor Robin Okey at the University of Warwick, who is 
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a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society, emphasizes that “The events of autumn 1989 
introduced many distinctive factors into the communist end-game . . . . No doubt the 
chief reason some communists sought new paths in the late 1980s was that the 
communist utopia had failed. . . . Prosperity could not be planned in the absence of 
normally functioning markets and prices. . . . North Korea still survives as a Marxist-
Leninist state despite its atrocious [economic] record.”
224
 comparing North Korea’s 
situation to the collapse of Marxism-Leninism in Eastern Europe before and after 1990.  
Furthermore, Professor Leslie Holmes at the University of Melbourne enunciates 
that Marxism-Leninism is still one of the two ruling ideologies of North Korea, along 
with Juche ideology, explaining its relation to the nationalism of Juche ideology:  
One important element often found in the ‘practical’ ideology, but which in 
a real sense contradicts the ‘proletarian internationalism’ of classical 
Marxism[-Leninism], is official nationalism. A prime example of this can 
be found in North Korean ideology, which is described as ‘Marxism-
Leninism and Juche’; Juche is very much a nationalist ideology.
225
  
And aside from these in-depth analyses of renowned professors, Arch Puddington, 
who is the vice president of research at Freedom House, says with definite certainty that 
“[N]orth Korea . . . is a one party, Marxist-Leninist regime.”
226
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Additionally, Jasper Becker, who is the publisher of Asia Weekly and an expert on 
Chinese and North Korean matters, states that “[a] Marxist-Leninist state like North 
Korea is the product of a revolutionary ideology . . . .”
227
 
Furthermore, Dr. Nicholas Eberstadt, an expert of North and South Korean 
matters, does not hesitate to label North Korea as “Marxist-Leninist state,” stating that 
“Like other Marxist-Leninist states, North Korea’s leadership analyzes the struggle 
between ‘imperialist’ and ‘socialist’ camps in terms of the ‘correlation of forces.’”
228
 
Finally, one of the highest ranking North Korean defectors to South Korea clearly 
supports the analyses and opinions of these eminent scholars and researchers.  Mr. 
Duk-Hong Kim defected from North Korea along with Jang-Yeop Hwang, who is the 
architect of Juche ideology, in 1997, or about five years after the time of the official 
deletion of Marxism-Leninism from the North Korean Constitution.
229
  He specifically 
majored in political economy at Kim Il Sung University and worked at the KWP 
Institute for Juche Ideology after his graduation.  Thus, he was in a position to know 
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whether Marxism-Leninism was still exercising its powerful influence over North Korea 
despite the government’s expunging Marxism-Leninism.  According to an interview 
with Mr. Kim:  
[Question of reporter:] So you waited more than 40 years before defecting. 
Why did you take so long? 
[Answer of Duk-Hong Kim:] Before I left, I studied Marxism[-Leninism] 
and Communism. I realized that Kim Jong Il’s government is following 
Marxism[-Leninism] literally. At this time, I thought that someone should 
speak up about this, so I did.
230
  
Nonetheless, Marxism-Leninism has not been mentioned in the North Korean 
Constitution, which is the most formal document of the country, since 1992.  In 
addition, the North Korean government has declared Juche as its sole official ruling 
ideology since its Constitution of 1992.  It is hard to say that Marxism-Leninism is an 
additional official ruling ideology of North Korea under these circumstances.  So for 
the purposes of this thesis, I have identified Marxism-Leninism as the “unofficial” 
ruling ideology of North Korea.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 
 
“The [United Nations] Human Rights Council [remains] . . . [d]eeply concerned at the  
persisting deterioration in the human rights situation in the Democratic People’s  
Republic of Korea, at the continuing reports of systematic, widespread and grave 
violations of civil, political . . . rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of  
Korea . . . and urging the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of  
Korea to respect all human rights and fundamental freedoms fully . . . .” 
– The UNHRC Resolution (A/HRC/22/L.19),  
Adopted in the 22nd Session, March 21, 2013 
 
I. Freedom of Religion  
A. The Arguments of the North Korean Government and Its Main Grounds for 
the Arguments in the DPRK Official Reports  
The first part of Article 68 of the North Korean Constitution is the Fundamental 
Rights Article concerning the issue of religious freedom within the country.  It 
stipulates that “Citizens have freedom of religious belief. This right is granted through 
the approval of the construction of religious buildings and the holding of religious 
ceremonies.”
231
 
North Korea uses a theoretical approach, which focuses on the core 
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 Naenara [My Country]: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Constitution: Chapter V 
Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens, http://naenara.com.kp/en/great/constitution.php?6 (last 
visited May 3, 2012) [hereinafter North Korean Constitution Chapter V].  
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implementation mechanism of this Fundamental Rights Article, as the main grounds for 
its arguments in defense of its practices of religious freedom in the DPRK Official 
Reports.  That is to say, the country introduces the first part of Article 68 of its 
Constitution as the guaranteed mechanism for the domestic protection of the religious 
freedom of its people, as well as the core implementer for the articles on this freedom in 
the international human rights treaties to which it has acceded in the reports. 
 
1. The Fundamental Rights Article as the Guaranteed Mechanism for the 
Domestic Protection of Freedom of Religion  
North Korea adverts to this mechanism in a series of its official reports.  Thus, in 
paragraph 45 of the National Report, the North Korean government argues that 
“Citizens are guaranteed under [the first part of Article 68 of] the Constitution freedom 
of religious beliefs such as the right to practise religion of their own free choice, to set 
up religious buildings and facilities, to freely hold religious ceremonies openly or 
privately, individually or in community with others and to give religious education.”
232
  
Additionally, in paragraph 40 of the same report, the government states that “The DPRK 
legalized, as fundamental . . . rights, . . . the freedom of . . . religious beliefs [in the first 
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part of Article 68 of its Constitution] and is ensuring them in practice.”
233
   
In paragraph 7 of the Second ICCPR Implementation Report, the North Korean 
government states that “The Constitution . . . stipulates the basic rights of citizens 
including . . . the freedom of religious belief . . . .”
234
  In paragraph 111 of the same 
report, the country argues that “Article 68 of the Constitution states: ‘Citizens have 
freedom of religious belief. This right is ensured by the permission to build religious 
buildings and have the legal freedom to select any religious ceremonies.’ Thus people 
have the legal freedom to select any religious belief, to build religious facilities . . . .”
235
 
     Similarly, in paragraph 76 of the Initial CEDAW Implementation Report, the 
North Korean government states that “The Constitution . . . provides that women are 
guaranteed, enjoy and exercise on an equal footing with men such basic rights as . . . the 
freedom of religious beliefs (article 68) . . . .”
236
  
     Finally, in paragraph 58 of the Combined CRC Implementation Report, the North 
Korean government states that “The Constitution stipulates the fundamental rights . . . 
of citizens; [c]itizens are guaranteed . . . freedom of religious beliefs (art. 68) . . . .”
237
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Additionally, in paragraph 76 of the same report, the government contends that 
“[c]itizens have freedom of religious beliefs (art. 68) . . . .”
238
 
 
2. The Fundamental Rights Article as the Core Implementer for the Articles on 
Religious Freedom in the International Human Rights Treaties  
Once again, North Korea presents the Fundamental Rights Article to argue its 
adherence to international human rights treaties in various reports.  
Article 18, paragraph 1 of ICCPR stipulates that “Everyone shall have the right to 
freedom of . . . religion. This right shall include freedom to have . . . a religion or belief 
of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in 
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and 
teaching.”
239
  Paragraph 2 of the same article of the Covenant provides that “No one 
shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a 
religion or belief of his choice.”
240
  Regarding the freedom of religion in the Covenant, 
North Korea states, in paragraph 111 of the Second ICCPR Implementation Report, that 
the first part of Article 68 of its Constitution is the core mechanism to carry out Article 
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18 of the ICCPR:  
Article 18. Freedom of Religious Belief 
111. [The first part of] Article 68 of the Constitution states: “Citizens have 
freedom of religious belief. This right is ensured by the permission to build 
religious buildings and have the legal freedom to select any religious 
ceremonies.” Thus people have the legal freedom to select any religious 
belief, to build religious facilities or structures, to have or refuse to have 
religious ceremonies individually or collectively in an open or closed way, 
to organize religious bodies and have activities, to teach religion, etc.
241
 
Article 14, paragraph 1 of CRC stipulates that “States Parties shall respect the 
right of the child to freedom of . . . religion.”
242
  In paragraph 90 of the Combined 
CRC Implementation Report, North Korea provides the first part of Article 68 of its 
Constitution as the key implementer to carry out Article 14 of the CRC as follows: 
D. Freedom of . . . religion (art. 14) 
90. As was stated in paragraphs 79 and 80 of the initial report and 
paragraphs 61 and 96 of the second periodic report, the Government 
guarantees the freedom of citizens to religious belief in accordance with 
[the first part of] article 68 of the Constitution. Christian churches, Catholic 
churches and Buddhist temples are regularly performing religious 
ceremonies and other activities. No child is deprived of the right to 
religious belief.
243
  
 
3. The Diagrammatization of the Core Implementation Mechanism Model 
The core implementation mechanism model of the first part of Article 68, which 
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shows both North Korea’s arguments in defense of its practices of religious freedom and 
the main grounds for its arguments in the DPRK Official Reports, is diagrammatized 
below:  
 
<Diagram 4> The Core Implementation Mechanism Model of the Fundamental Rights 
Article in the DPRK Official Reports 
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B. The Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Article and the Influence of Juche Ideology 
and Marxism-Leninism on the Article  
The latter part of Article 68 of the North Korean Constitution is the Juchist and 
Marxist-Leninist Article concerning the issue of religious freedom in the country.  It 
provides that “Religion must not be used as a pretext for drawing in foreign forces or for 
harming the State or social order.”
244
 
The North Korean government gives its official interpretation of the latter part of 
Article 68 as follows: 
Article 68, paragraph 2, of the Constitution states: “Religion must not be 
used as a pretext for drawing in foreign forces or for harming the State and 
social order.” Foreign forces in this provision means the foreign aggressive 
forces that invade other countries to violate their sovereignty. The Korean 
people still remember those who under the cloak of religion infiltrated the 
country to engage in acts of espionage, subversion, sabotage and 
ideological disruption, causing serious harm to their independent 
development.
245
  
This deep distrust and strong refusal of religion, which is demonstrated in the 
Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Article, is one of the key tenets of Juche Ideology and 
Marxism-Leninism, the two anti-human rights and ruling ideologies controlling North 
Korea.  
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1. The Anti-Religious Nature of Marxism-Leninism and Its Influence on the 
Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Article  
The deep distrust in and the strong hostility against religion permeating the latter 
part of Article 68 are exactly in line with the attitudes of Marx and Lenin on religion.  
According to Marx, religion is nothing other than a product of evil and a social evil that 
should be redressed.
246
 
Marx continues to make disparaging remarks about religion in A Contribution to 
the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right:   
The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is the 
demand for their real happiness. To call on them to give up their illusions 
about their condition is to call on them to give up a condition that requires 
illusions. The criticism of religion is, therefore, in embryo, the criticism of 
that vale of tears of which religion is the halo.”
247
  
According to Marx, religion is the biggest obstacle to true happiness.  For this reason, 
Marx maintains that religion should be abolished.  
Finally, when it comes to Marx’s distrust and hatred of religion, we cannot forget 
his statement that religion is the opium of the people.  He emphasizes that “Religion is 
the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless 
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conditions. It is the opium of the people.”
248
 in the same essay.  This metaphor 
involving “the opium of the people” can be interpreted in several ways.  
One of the points Marx wanted to stress through this figure of speech is that 
religion, as a social evil, is highly addictive as well as contagious as opium is to the 
person who immerses himself in it.  Thus, to Marx, religion is a potential risk factor, 
which can thrust the whole of society into chaos. 
Furthermore, Marx’s analogy seems to denigrate religion as a temporary balm.  
Opium has a well-known ability to temporarily ease the pain and suffering of human 
beings.  It seems as if Marx wanted to stress through the metaphor that religion is a 
fictional product, which was created by humans for its own convenience.
249
  Professor 
Gerald A. Cohen, formerly of Oxford University, states “Marx’s awareness that 
religion’s source is deep in human need is evident in his statement that it is the opium of 
the people.”
250
  I take this interpretation made by Professor Cohen to mean that 
religion is fabricated by man to temporarily forget its misery, hopelessness, solitude, and 
the like.  Professor Joseph M. Bochenski, former professor at the University of 
Fribourg, Switzerland, compares this purpose of “human-made religion” to a “sedative” 
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and “tranquiliser” in his article, Marxism-Leninism and Religion: “When Marx said that 
‘Religion is the opiate of the people’ he seems to have meant that it is a type of sedative, 
tranquiliser, made practically necessary by the hopelessness of life.(footnote 
omitted)”
251
  We can also link religion as a “human need” with the approach of 
Professor Emeritus Bruce Mazlish at Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  He writes 
in one of his books, The meaning of Karl Marx, that “What Marx has in mind is the 
Feuerbachian idea that man, rather than being created in the image of God, creates God 
in his own image, i.e., out of real, earthly needs and desires.”
252
  
All things considered, Marx’s metaphor regarding “religion as the opium of the 
people” can be interpreted comprehensively to mean that the very core of religion is just 
the pretense of a God created by human need to temporarily tranquilize various mental 
anguishes, alleviate emotional injuries, lighten the burdens of life, and mitigate 
loneliness.  Therefore, to Marx, a religion is not the fundamental solution to the 
problem of human agony and fears but merely an unrealistic superstition, a symbol of 
deception, an object of distrust, and spiritual slavery to harm the social order.
253
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Meanwhile, the religious values of Lenin, who is the successor of Marx’s theory, 
are demonstrated clearly in this statement in his essay, The Attitude of the Workers’ 
Party to Religion:   
We must combat religion. This is the A B C of Marxism. The Marxist must 
be an enemy of religion. . . . The philosophic basis of Marxism is dialectic 
materialism. This dialectic materialism fully accepts the historical traditions 
of the Materialism of the eighteenth century in France and of Feuerbach in 
Germany – which is absolutely atheistic, and definitely hostile to all 
religion. . . . Our program necessarily includes the propaganda of 
atheism.
254
  
Lenin also does not hesitate to liken religion to contagion in his letter to Maxim 
Gorki in 1913:  
Every religious idea, every idea of God, even flirting with the idea of God, 
is unutterable vileness . . . of the most dangerous kind, ‘contagion’ of the 
most abominable kind. Millions of sins, filthy deeds, acts of violence and 
physical contagions . . . are far less dangerous than the subtle, spiritual idea 
of God decked out in the smartest ‘ideological’ costumes . . . .
255
 
Marx and Lenin’s distorted views of religion, full of distrust and hostility, were 
faithfully reflected in their theory and have become one of the core principles of 
Marxism-Leninism.
256
  Additionally, this anti-religious tenet of the unofficial ruling 
ideology of North Korea was publicly legislated in the latter part of Article 68, which is 
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the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Article on religious freedom.  
 
2. The Anti-Religious Nature of Juche Ideology and Its Influence on the Juchist 
and Marxist-Leninist Article 
Kim Il-Sung’s view of religion was greatly influenced by those of Marx and 
Lenin.  Thus, his attitude towards religion was also full of profound distrust and hatred.  
We can deduce this through his official statements concerning religion.  For example, 
he states the following: 
Religion is a superstition. All the religions, be they Christianity or 
Buddhism, belong in essence to the same superstition. Historically, religion 
has always been the tool of the ruling class who want to deceive, suppress 
and exploit the working class for the benefit of their interests. In the modern 
age, the imperialists have been using religion as an ideological tool to 
invade the underdeveloped countries.(citation omitted)
257
  
In addition to this remark, his other statement, as follows, also reveals his 
religious values well:  
Those elements who have sneaked into the Democratic Party and are now 
perpetrating reactionary acts are in general of the following categories: 
First, they are the pro-American elements who, influenced by U.S. 
propaganda in the past, worship the United States and harbour illusions 
about it. The United States had sent to our country missionaries under the 
mantle of religion long ago to build churches in many places and 
disseminate Christianity and ideas of U.S. worship, and made preparations 
over tens of years to dominate Korea some day. This was an insidious trick 
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of the United States to feign sympathy with the Koreans and establish its 
influence in Korea under the cloak of religion. . . . Yet, some of the pastors 
and church elders, taken in by such religious propaganda, are trying to sell 
out our country for dollars, worshipping the United States like a God.
258
  
Furthermore, he emphasizes the following:  
(We) cannot carry such religiously active people along our march toward a 
communist society. Therefore, we tried and executed all religious leaders 
higher than deacon in the Protestant and Catholic churches. Among other 
religiously active people, those deemed malignant were all put to trial. 
Among ordinary religious believers, those who recanted were given jobs 
while those who did not were held at concentration camps.(citation 
omitted)
259
 
As every sentence in his statements reveals, Kim Il-Sung regards religion as a 
fictional product created by the imperialists for their ideological invasion.  In addition, 
to the creator of Juche, religion is not only an excuse for drawing in foreign powers but 
also a social evil to disrupt North Korean society.  
Kim Il-Sung’s distorted views of religion, full of distrust and hatred, were 
faithfully reflected in his theory and have become one of the key principles of Juche 
ideology.  Additionally, this anti-religious tenet of the official ruling ideology of North 
Korea was publicly legislated in the latter part of Article 68, which is the Juchist and 
Marxist-Leninist Article on religious freedom.  
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C. The New Refuting Theory and Its Incapacitation Mechanism Model  
The North Korean Constitution contains two fundamentally distinct types of 
articles that have opposing viewpoints on religious freedom.  One is the first part of 
Article 68, which is the Fundamental Rights Article, and the other is the latter part of 
Article 68, which is the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Article.  
As reviewed earlier, the first part of Article 68 serves as the core implementing 
mechanism of the North Korean Constitution for its freedom of religion.
260
  Thus, as is 
argued by North Korea in the DPRK Official Reports, the Fundamental Rights Article is, 
in its very nature, supposed to protect this fundamental freedom of the North Korean 
people.  
On the other hand, the full distrust in and strong hostility toward religion is a key 
tenet of Juche ideology and Marxism-Leninism.
261
  Thus, from the logical and 
theoretical standpoint, it is natural for the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Article, which 
faithfully incorporates the core principle of the two anti-fundamental rights and ruling 
ideologies controlling North Korea, to take the disposition of an anti-fundamental rights 
article in order to suppress religious freedom, and to position itself as the ruling article.  
Namely, the latter part of Article 68 is not only the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Article, 
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but also works as the anti-fundamental rights and ruling article from the logical and 
theoretical standpoint.  
We reviewed that the clash in function and role between the guarantee of religious 
freedom and the distrust in and hostility toward religion is inevitable from a logical and 
theoretical standpoint.
262
  Similarly, these two extremes both in their very nature and 
workings, as demonstrated by the first part of Article 68 and the latter part of Article 68, 
are bound to clash with each other in performing their function and role within one 
constitutional boundary.  
The issue of the functional clash is solved by the relationship of superiority and 
relative inferiority between the two types of articles.  The latter part of Article 68, 
which is the anti-fundamental rights and ruling article declaring the distrust in and 
hostility toward religion, has superiority over the first part of Article 68, which is the 
Fundamental Rights Article for freedom of religion, in their function and operation.  
As a result, the latter part of Article 68, which is also the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist 
Article, incapacitates the Fundamental Rights Article, which is the core implementation 
mechanism of the North Korean Constitution, at the time of this functional clash.  
The resulting weakening of the Fundamental Rights Article leads to the 
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theoretical impossibility of performing the core implementation mechanism model 
centered on the first part of Article 68 in the DPRK Official Reports.  Consequently, all 
of the arguments of the North Korean government in defense of its practices of religious 
freedom in its official reports, which are grounded in this theoretical approach, are 
totally unrealizable given its constitutional structure and mechanism.  That is to say, 
this impossibility of performance proves false in the Incapacitation Stage any notion 
that North Korea guarantees the religious freedom of its people or that it complies with 
the articles on this freedom in the international human rights treaties from a logical and 
theoretical standpoint.  
After completely weakening the Fundamental Rights Article, the Juchist and 
Marxist-Leninist Article wields strong influence over the North Korean society at large 
without any difficulty or obstruction.  The practical results of this powerful leverage 
are manifested in the severe violations of fundamental rights and international human 
rights treaties in North Korea.
263
  In essence, since the sole function of the anti-
fundamental rights and ruling article is to carry out the anti-religious doctrines of Juche 
ideology and Marxism-Leninism, there is no constitutional basis to secure the religious 
freedom of the North Korean people or to prevent the government from violating such 
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protections prescribed by international human rights treaties. 
It necessarily follows, logically and theoretically, that the arguments of the U.S., 
South Korea, and the U.K. condemning the DPRK’s violations of religious freedom in 
the LDC Annual Reports
264
 are proven true by the constitutional structure and 
mechanism of North Korea in the Human Rights Violation Stage. 
The following diagram incorporates all aspects of the newly developed refuting 
theory and its incapacitation mechanism model of the latter part of Article 68, including 
the core premises, key factors, logical order and flow, and theoretical structure.  The 
diagram also incorporates the evidence for verifying the falsity of North Korea’s 
arguments in the DPRK Official Reports and for verifying the truth of the liberal 
democratic countries’ assertions in the LDC Annual Reports.  Finally, the diagram 
shows the relationships between the points of contention of the new refuting theory, the 
testimony of North Korean defectors, and the arguments of the U.S., South Korea, and 
the U.K. in the LDC Annual Reports, which are grounded in this testimony.
265
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<Diagram 5> The New Refuting Theory and Its Incapacitation Mechanism Model  
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D. The Major Contents of the LDC Annual Reports 
As evidenced in the analysis of the USCIRF Human Rights Report, the DPRK’s 
violations of religious freedom, caused by the powerful influence of the Juchist and 
Marxist-Leninist Article over North Korean society as a whole, as indicated in the new 
refuting theory, are in accord with the testimony of North Korean refugees who 
experienced and witnessed first-hand the severe violations of this freedom in their 
country.
266
  Thus, the DPRK’s violations of religious freedom in the refuting theory 
coincide with the arguments of the U.S., South Korea, and the U.K. in the LDC Annual 
Reports, which are based on this testimony. 
In this way, the arguments of the new refuting theory and its incapacitation 
mechanism model presented by this dissertation not only logically and theoretically 
support the testimony of North Korean refugees and the contentions of the liberal 
democratic countries attacking North Korea’s violation of religious freedom in the LDC 
Annual Reports, but they are, in turn, practically and factually supported by the 
testimony of North Korean escapees and the arguments of the liberal democratic camp.   
The major contents of the testimony of North Korean defectors, and the 
arguments and analyses of the U.S., South Korea, and the U.K., which are based on this 
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testimony, in the LDC Annual Reports are as follows:  
 
1. U.S. Human Rights Report 
The 2009 U.S. Human Rights Report discloses that “The government repressed 
and persecuted unauthorized religious groups. Defectors reported that persons engaged 
in religious proselytizing, persons with ties to overseas religious groups, and repatriated 
persons who contacted foreigners while outside the country were arrested and subjected 
to harsh punishment.”
267
  The report cites a 2007 Asia News report that “[t]he army 
[had] published and distributed a pamphlet to soldiers warning them [] [of] the dangers 
of Christianity and urging vigilance against its spread within the armed forces.”
268
  
Furthermore, the report also cited an Associated Press account of a public execution of a 
woman and imprisonment of her family for distributing the Bible.
269
 
The section of the 2010 U.S. Human Rights Report dealing with religious 
freedom in North Korea refers the reader to the DPRK section of the 2010 U.S. 
Religious Freedom Report for all information regarding this subject.
270
  According to 
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the 2010 U.S. Religious Freedom Report, “[d]efectors[] and refugees have reported the 
government executed opponents of the regime in recent years. Executed individuals 
reportedly included some targeted due to their religious activities such as 
proselytism . . . . Others reportedly were punished for having contact with South 
Korean . . . religious groups, or missionaries while in China.”
271
  The report cites 
refugee testimony of “[t]he arrest and possible execution of underground Christian 
church members by the government.”
272
  Furthermore, the report states the following:  
The government deals harshly with all opponents, including those who 
engage in religious practices it deems unacceptable. . . . An estimated 
150,000 to 200,000 persons were believed to be held in political prison 
camps in remote areas, some for religious reasons. Prison conditions were 
harsh, and refugees and defectors who had been in prison stated that 
prisoners held on the basis of their religious beliefs were generally treated 
worse than other inmates.”
273
  
The 2010 U.S. Religious Freedom Report also claims that “[t]he government 
increased its investigation, repression, and persecution of unauthorized religious 
groups”
274
 and that “Former government security agents who defected to South Korea 
                                                                                                                                
International Religious Freedom Report at www.state.gov/j/drl/irf/rpt/.”).  
 
271
 2010 U.S. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT, supra note 93. 
 
272
 See id. (“Refugees and defectors continued to say they witnessed the arrest and possible execution of 
underground Christian church members by the government in prior years. Due to the country’s 
inaccessibility and the inability to gain timely information, the continuation of this activity during the 
reporting period remained difficult to verify.”). 
 
273
 Id.   
 
274
 See id. (“Defector reports indicated the government increased its investigation, repression, and 
persecution of unauthorized religious groups in recent years, but access to information on current 
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reported intensified police activity aimed at halting religious activity at the border.”
275
  
Furthermore, the report specifies the following: 
In 2006 the government reportedly sentenced Son Jong-nam to death for 
espionage; however NGOs claimed the sentence against Son was based on 
his contacts with Christian groups in China, his proselytizing activities . . . . 
In July 2010 Son’s brother [who has defected into South Korea] reported 
Son was tortured and died in prison in December 2008.
276
  
Not surprisingly, the 2009 U.S. Human Rights Report comes to the conclusion 
that “Genuine religious freedom did not exist [in North Korea].”
277
  
 
2. USCIRF Human Rights Report  
The 2009 USCIRF Human Rights Report states that “Former refugees and 
defectors have testified that the [religious] federations [for Buddhists, Chondokyists,
278
 
Protestants, and Catholics] are led by political operatives whose goals are to implement 
the government’s policy of control over religious activity, gain foreign humanitarian 
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assistance, and maintain religious sites as cultural centers.”
279
  The report also 
discloses that “Churches, temples, and pagodas built for the government-approved 
organizations are directly controlled and operated by the National Security Agency. 
Other public and private religious activity is prohibited and anyone discovered engaging 
in clandestine religious practice faces official discrimination, arrest, imprisonment, and 
possibly execution.”
280
  Furthermore, the report divulges the following: 
Imprisoning religious believers is reportedly quite common, according to 
refugee testimony, but neither the State Department nor any other official or 
non-governmental source has been able to document the number of 
religious prisoners. The most reliable information comes from North 
Korean groups in South Korea, who report that an estimated 6,000 
Christians are incarcerated in “Prison No. 15” in the northern part of the 
country.
281
  
In addition to the aforementioned, according to the 2009 USCIRF Human Rights 
Report, “[r]eligious prisoners are treated worse than other inmates. They are typically 
given the most dangerous tasks in the labor camps and are subject to constant abuse to 
force them to renounce their faith. When they refuse renunciation, they are often beaten 
and tortured.”
282
  The report states that “The latest series of interviews . . . confirmed 
that refugees who are forcibly repatriated from China are extremely vulnerable to ill 
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treatment in custody, hard labor, and imprisonment in North Korea’s infamous prison 
camps if they admit, or are suspected, to . . . have converted to Christianity, or had 
smuggled Bibles.”
283
  It also reveals that “[t]he government continues to offer rewards 
to its citizens for providing information that leads to the arrest of individuals suspected 
of involvement in . . . the distribution of Bibles or other religious literature.”
284
   
The 2010 USCIRF Human Rights Report concludes that “The Democratic 
People’s Republic of North Korea (DPRK or North Korea) is one of the world’s most 
repressive regimes. Severe religious freedom abuses occur regularly, including: 
surveillance, discrimination, and harassment of both authorized and unauthorized 
religious activity; the arrest, torture, and possible execution of those conducting 
clandestine religious activity . . . .”
285
  
 
3. ROK Human Rights Report  
The 2010 ROK Human Rights Report states that “Since the founding of the 
regime and pursuant to Kim Il Sung’s statement that ‘Religion is the opiate of the 
masses,’ the DPRK has consistently persecuted religiously active people. It explains 
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religion as a tool for the ruling class to exploit the masses.”
286
  The report also 
indicates that “Many religiously active people in North Korea have been branded as 
disloyal and brutally tortured or executed for their beliefs.”
287
  The report informs us 
that “[a]ll defectors consistently testified that one would be certainly persecuted for 
practicing religion on a personal level.”
288
  For example, the report discloses a 
defector’s testimony that “[i]n 2005 a group [of] people were arrested for trying to 
smuggle [] religious literature and were [] executed [as a result]. . . .(citation 
omitted)”
289
 
The 2011 ROK Human Rights Report also reveals testimony from a defector that 
“[h]e/she personally witnessed a neighbor, who was a Buddhist, being forcibly 
banished.(citation omitted)”
290
  Another defector testified that “[h]e witnessed a person 
getting arrested for religious activities and [] [deported] to No. 17 Yodok Management 
Center [Yodok Concentration Camp].(citation omitted)”
291
  
According to the 2010 ROK Human Rights Report, “Most religiously active 
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people were categorized as antinational and counter revolutionary hostile elements and 
subjected to ruthless persecution. Christians in particular were purged because they 
were regarded as tools of imperialist aggression.”
292
  For instance, the report 
documents defector testimony that “[i]n 2001 a 55-year-old female Christian living in 
Kangso County, South Pyongan Province was arrested for having assembled others for 
religious purposes. She was put to death and others were locked up in correctional 
centers.(citation omitted)”
293
  The report quotes refugee testimony that “[w]hen he was 
at the Provincial Security Agency in 2006 a young man . . . was brought in for having 
spread Christianity. His elder brother had reported it. He heard that the young man was 
bound for a ‘management center.’(citation omitted)”
294
  The report claims that “Since 
1997, North Korean citizens have been receiving education designed to prevent the 
spread of Christianity. The education would emphasize the necessity of detecting the 
individuals engaged in spreading Christianity and how to identify them.(citation 
omitted)”
295
  
The 2010 ROK Human Rights Report states that “Since North Korea regards the 
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Bible as a tool of cultural and ideological intrusion, the authorities deal most strictly 
with anyone caught in possession of a Bible.(citation omitted)”
296
  For example, the 
same report specifically reveals that “Defector XXX testified that the authorities found 
copies of the Bible in four houses in his neighborhood, and all members of those 
households were sent off to jail.(citation omitted)”
297
  The report discloses that “In 
2004, a woman in her late 30s (husband Jo Sangsoon) living in Musan County was 
arrested for having read Christian literature. She was taken to the Security Agency in 
Rajin-Sunbong District, but no one knew what happened to her.(citation omitted)”
298
  
The report cites refugee testimony that “[w]hen he was working at the Onsung Security 
Agency, someone was caught bringing in copies of the Bible from China . . . . His 
grandmother, son, and daughter-in-law were detained for over 9 months. He heard that 
they would be transferred to a concentration camp.(citation omitted)”
299
  Finally, the 
2011 ROK Human Rights Report describes defector testimony that “[h]e . . . became a 
Christian in China through a Chinese pastor. He was arrested upon return to North 
Korea and was sentenced to serve in a correctional center for three years for having 
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brought a Bible into North Korea. . . .(citation omitted)”
300
 
The 2010 ROK Human Rights Report concludes that “Freedom of religion is 
indeed restricted in North Korea . . . . This reality is clearly demonstrated when we look 
at the punishments imposed on citizens who practiced religion and on those forcibly 
deported defectors [from China back to North Korea].”
301
   
 
4. U.K. Human Rights Report 
Much of the evidence for the 2006 U.K. Human Rights Report came from North 
Korean defectors, who reported serious religious persecution.
302
  
The report states that “Defectors report that Christians receive harsher treatment 
than other prisoners, suffering torture and execution as a direct consequence of their 
faith.”
303
 and that “[N]orth Koreans have no access to religious literature or other 
information.”
304
   
The 2009 U.K. Human Rights Report informs us that “Although there are 
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Anglican, Catholic and Russian Orthodox churches in Pyongyang, we believe these to 
be show churches, for the benefit of foreign visitors.”
305
  
The 2010 U.K. Human Rights Report states that “The state ignores the ‘freedom 
of religion’ provision in the constitution, and persecutes all illegally held religious 
services and bans missionary activities.”
306
  
The 2006 U.K. Human Rights Report concludes that “Although the constitution 
provides for freedom of religious belief, there is no genuine religious freedom [in the 
DPRK] . . . .”
307
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II. The Right to Vote and to Be Elected  
A. The Arguments of the North Korean Government and Its Main Grounds for 
the Arguments in the DPRK Official Reports  
At the core of the right of political participation is the right to vote and to be 
elected.
308
  Article 66 of the North Korean Constitution is the Fundamental Rights 
Article concerning the issue of the right to vote and to be elected within the country.  It 
stipulates as follows:  
All citizens who have reached the age of 17 have the right to elect and to be 
elected, irrespective of sex, race, occupation, length of residence, property 
status, education, party affiliation, political views or religious belief.  
Citizens serving in the armed forces also have the right to elect and to be 
elected. A person who has been disenfranchised by a Court decision and a 
person legally certified insane do not have the right to elect or to be 
elected.
309
 
North Korea uses a theoretical approach, which focuses on the core 
implementation mechanism of this Fundamental Rights Article, as the main grounds for 
its arguments in defense of its practices of the right to vote and to be elected in the 
DPRK Official Reports.  That is to say, the country introduces Article 66 of its 
Constitution as the guaranteed mechanism for the domestic protection of the right to 
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vote and to be elected of its people, as well as the core implementer for the articles on 
this right in the international human rights treaties to which it has acceded in the reports. 
 
1. The Fundamental Rights Article as the Guaranteed Mechanism for the 
Domestic Protection of the Right to Vote and to Be Elected 
     North Korea adverts to this mechanism in a series of its official reports.  Thus, in 
paragraph 16 of the National Report, the North Korean government argues that “The 
Constitution comprehensively provides for the fundamental rights and freedoms in all 
fields of State and public activity such as the right to elect and to be elected . . . .”
310
  
Additionally, in paragraph 40 and 41 of the same report, the government states as 
follows:  
E. Right to participate in the . . . political life 
40. The DPRK legalized, as fundamental . . . rights, the right to elect and to 
be elected [in Article 66 of its Constitution] . . . . and is ensuring them in 
practice.  
41. [Article 66:] All citizens who have reached the age of 17 have the right 
to elect and to be elected, irrespective of sex, nationality, occupation, length 
of residence, property status, education, party affiliation, political views or 
religion.
311
  
In paragraph 7 of the Second ICCPR Implementation Report, the North Korean 
government states that “The Constitution . . . stipulates the basic rights of citizens 
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including . . . the right to vote and to be elected . . . .”
312
  In addition, in paragraph 156 
of the same report, the government argues that: 
All citizens enjoy the right to vote and to be elected. Article 66 of the 
Constitution stipulates: “All citizens who have reached the age of 17 have 
the right to elect and to be elected, irrespective of sex, race, occupation, 
length of residence, property status, education, party affiliation, political 
views or religion. Citizens serving in the armed forces also have the right to 
elect and to be elected.”
313
 
Similarly, in paragraph 76 of the Initial CEDAW Implementation Report, the 
North Korean government states that “The Constitution . . . provides that women are 
guaranteed, enjoy and exercise on an equal footing with men such basic rights as the 
right to vote and to be elected (Article 66) . . . .”
314
 
Finally, in paragraph 76 of the Combined CRC Implementation Report, the North 
Korean government states that “The Constitution stipulates that all citizens who have 
reached the age of 17 have the right to elect and to be elected, irrespective of sex, race, 
occupation, length of residence, property status, education, party affiliation, political 
views or religion (art. 66) . . . .”
315
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2. The Fundamental Rights Article as the Core Implementer for the Articles on 
the Right to Vote and to Be Elected in the International Human Rights 
Treaties 
Once again, North Korea presents the Fundamental Rights Article to argue its 
adherence to international human rights treaties in various reports.  
Article 25, paragraph (b) of ICCPR stipulates that “Every citizen shall have the 
right and the opportunity . . . without unreasonable restrictions: (b) To vote and to be 
elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and 
shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the 
electors.”
316
  Regarding the right to vote and be elected in the Covenant, North Korea 
offers, in paragraph 156 of the Second ICCPR Implementation Report, that Article 66 of 
its Constitution is the core mechanism to carry out Article 25 (b) of the ICCPR as 
follows: 
Article 25. Participation in Public Life  
. . . . 
Right to Vote and to be Elected 
156. All citizens enjoy the right to vote and to be elected. Article 66 of the 
Constitution stipulates: “All citizens who have reached the age of 17 have 
the right to elect and to be elected, irrespective of sex, race, occupation, 
length of residence, property status, education, party affiliation, political 
views or religion. Citizens serving in the armed forces also have the right to 
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elect and to be elected.
317
 
Paragraph (a) of Article 7 of CEDAW provides the following: 
Article 7[.] States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women in the political and public life of the country 
and, in particular, shall ensure to women, on equal terms with men, the right: 
(a) To vote in all elections and public referenda and to be eligible for 
election to all publicly elected bodies;
318
 
Regarding women’s right to vote and to be elected in the Convention, North Korea 
suggests, in paragraph 108 of the Initial CEDAW Implementation Report, that Article 
66 of its Constitution acts as the key implementer to carry out Article 7 (a) of the 
CEDAW as follows:  
Article 7. Political and Public Life  
A. Right to vote and to be elected  
108. Women are entitled to participate in the exercise of the State power 
according to their will through the Supreme People’s Assembly and the 
people’s assemblies at all levels. The Constitution provides . . . in the article 
66: “All the citizens who have reached the age of 17 have the right to elect 
and to be elected, irrespective of sex, race, occupation, length of residence, 
property status, education, party affiliation, political views or religion.”
319
 
Article 12, paragraph 1 of the CRC declares that “States Parties shall assure to the 
child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views 
freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in 
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 2000 Second ICCPR Implementation Report, supra note 7, at 37-38. 
 
318
 CEDAW, supra note 6, art. 7, ¶ (a). 
 
319
 2002 Initial CEDAW Implementation Report, supra note 9, at 16-17.  
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accordance with the age and maturity of the child.”
320
  In paragraph 75 of the 
Combined CRC Implementation Report, North Korea provides Article 66 of its 
Constitution as the core mechanism to carry out Article 12, paragraph 1 of the CRC: 
D. Respect for the views of the child (art. 12)  
75. The rights of the child to express his or her views freely and the 
requirement of the Convention [on the Rights of the Child] on ensuring 
respect for the views of the child are stated in [Article 66
321
 of] the 
Constitution . . . .
322
  
 
3. The Diagrammatization of the Core Implementation Mechanism Model 
The core implementation mechanism model of Article 66, which shows both 
North Korea’s arguments in defense of its practices of the right to vote and to be elected 
and the main grounds for its arguments in the DPRK Official Reports, is 
diagrammatized below: 
 
 
 
                                            
320
 CRC, supra note 5, art. 12, ¶ 1. 
 
321
 “The right to vote and to be elected” in Article 66 of the North Korean Constitution is suggested by 
the government as the representative fundamental right that carries out “the respect for the views of the 
child” in Article 12, paragraph 1 of the CRC not only in the 2007 Combined CRC Implementation Report 
but also in the 2003 Second CRC Implementation Report:  
D. Respect for the views of the child (art. 12) 
81. The right of the child to express his or her views freely and the provision for those 
views to be given due weight have been incorporated in legislation . . . . The 
Constitution . . . maintained the provision of the former Constitution that all citizens of 17 
or more years of age have the right to vote and to be elected. 
2003 Second CRC Implementation Report, supra note 245, at 21.  
 
322
 2007 Combined CRC Implementation Report, supra note 10, at 20. 
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<Diagram 6> The Core Implementation Mechanism Model of the Fundamental Rights 
Article in the DPRK Official Reports 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. The Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Article and the Influence of Juche Ideology 
and Marxism-Leninism on the Article  
Dictators always justify their dictatorships.  No dictators say that they are using 
their enormous dictatorial powers for themselves, even when they are trying to maintain 
and strengthen their one-man dictatorships by any means necessary.  They claim that 
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their dictatorships are wholly for the nation and its people.  The exercises of great 
power by the dictators to protect their vested interests are often propagandized as 
inevitable measures to protect the people’s democracies and sovereignty from impure 
enemies.  Their will to consolidate their dictatorial powers is also glamorized as 
patriotic decisions for the happiness of the masses and for the prosperities of their 
fatherland.  We see this in Article 12 of the North Korean Constitution, which is the 
Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Article concerning the issue of the right to vote and to be 
elected in the country.  It provides that “The State shall . . . strengthen the dictatorship 
of the people’s democracy so as to firmly defend the people’s power and socialist 
system against all subversive acts of hostile elements at home and abroad.”
323
  In spite 
of the specious use of the term “the people’s democracy,” the actual nature of the form 
of government described in the article is totalitarianism.
324
   
According to Dr. Francis Joseph Kase, who is an authority on communism and 
Marxist-Leninist theory, “[t]he people’s democracies are . . . totalitarian states in which 
a centralized and disciplined communist party, usually through a nominal coalition, 
holds a monopoly of political, economic and spiritual power to the exclusion of other 
                                            
323
 North Korean Constitution Chapter I, supra note 205.  
 
324
 See supra note 218 and accompanying text. 
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independent groupings.”
325
  “The protection of the people’s sovereignty and the 
defense of their superior political system” in the same article are specious excuses to 
strengthen the totalitarianism of the Kim family without breeding antipathy from the 
North Korean people.  Thus, Article 12 is not proclaiming the consolidation of the 
people’s democracy in its literal meaning, but the consolidation of totalitarianism in 
North Korea. 
From a slightly different angle, it can be also understood that Article 12 is 
proclaiming the consolidation of the dictatorship of the Kim family.  According to Dr. 
Paul Brooker at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand, “Totalitarianism is the 
most extreme way of dictatorship . . . .”
326
  In other words, totalitarianism can be seen 
as a form of dictatorship.  Dr. Alexander J. Groth, who is professor emeritus of 
political science at the University of California, Davis, clearly indicates that “In spite of 
denying their citizens numerous basic freedoms, however, many dictatorships call 
themselves ‘people’s republics’ or ‘people’s democracies.’”
327
  Furthermore, even the 
scholars in defense of the people’s democratic dictatorship admit that it is, in fact, a 
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 Groth, supra note 218, at 191. 
 131 
dictatorship as a form of government, although they package the necessity of the 
dictatorship with shallow excuses.  According to Professor Wei Hu and Professor Gang 
Lin at Shanghai Jiaotong University in China, “The premise of the people’s democratic 
dictatorship is that the party and state democratically represent and act on behalf of the 
people but possess and may use dictatorial powers against reactionary forces.”
328
  They 
also state:  
Such a form of democracy means to ensure democratic rights for people 
while exercising dictatorship in relationship to people’s internal enemies. 
Implicit in the concept of the people’s democratic dictatorship is the notion 
that dictatorial means are a necessary evil and that, without a dictatorship, 
the government may collapse and create a situation that is worse than the 
dictatorship.
329
 
This “dictatorship,” which Article 12 of the Constitution proclaims that the North 
Korean government will strengthen, is simply defined as “Rule by a single person, or 
several people (e[.]g[.] military dictatorship), unelected and authoritarian in 
character.”
330
  According to this clear definition, a dictatorship, and furthermore, 
totalitarianism is essentially incompatible with the right to vote and to be elected in 
Article 66 of the North Korean Constitution. 
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 TREVOR ANDERSON & UNA MCGOVERN, THE CHAMBERS ENCYCLOPEDIA 297 (Trevor Anderson & 
Una McGovern eds., 2001) (emphasis added); See Groth, supra note 218, at 191 (“Dictatorships . . . 
generally lack the approval of the people . . . .”). 
 132 
Meanwhile, according to Allan Todd and Sally Waller, who are prolific writers on 
world history and politics, “A totalitarian dictatorship is often defined as a system in 
which a dictator is able to impose their will on party, state and society – all of which are 
strictly disciplined.”
331
  In addition, one of the key characteristics of a totalitarian 
regime is “a sole unitary Party controlled by a sole leader.”
332
  Thus, all election 
candidates are nominated by the wishes and injunctions of a dictator or the party under 
his or her control in the political system of totalitarian dictatorship.
333
  All the people 
under a totalitarian regime, who are no better than servants, have no choice but to send 
the candidates appointed by a dictator their unconditional support as well.
334
  
Therefore, it is proven once again that the right to vote and to be elected cannot coexist 
with a political system that works to pursue and consolidate totalitarianism.  
The pursuit and consolidation of totalitarianism, which is demonstrated in the 
Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Article, is one of the key tenets of Juche Ideology and 
Marxism-Leninism, the two anti-human rights and ruling ideologies controlling North 
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Korea.  
 
1. Marxism-Leninism as a Totalitarian Ideology and Its Influence on the Juchist 
and Marxist-Leninist Article 
Marx and Lenin’s strong preference for totalitarianism was faithfully reflected in 
their theory; thus, the pursuit of totalitarianism has become one of the core principles of 
Marxism-Leninism. 
It is the common opinion of many scholars and researchers that Marxism-
Leninism is a totalitarian ideology.  To cite a few examples, Stephen J. Lee, an expert 
on European political history and a prolific writer on the subject, states that “It is usual 
to categorize three inter-war ideologies as potentially totalitarian: Marxism-Leninism, 
Nazism and Fascism. Of these, Marxism-Leninism was the most coherent, based on a 
systematic doctrine derived from the ideas of . . . Marx and Engels, as redefined by 
Lenin and Stalin.”
335
 
Dr. Joseph M. Bochenski, former Rector of the University of Fribourg, 
Switzerland, emphasizes that Marxism-Leninism is a totalitarian ideology for a 
totalitarian system stating the following:  
Marxism-Leninism enjoys in all Communist countries the status of state 
                                            
335
 STEPHEN J. LEE, EUROPEAN DICTATORSHIPS, 1918-1945 at 302 (2nd ed. 2000).  
 134 
doctrine. In most of them it is the only one which can be publicly expressed 
and taught . . . . If we look for analogies, the position of Marxism-Leninism 
is best compared to some great religions like Buddhism, Christianity, or 
Islam during certain periods of their histories. There is, however, one 
capital difference: the religions did not pretend, at least in principle, to rule 
everything in the life of the states they were dominating, while Marxism-
Leninism does make such a pretention. It is a totalitarian doctrine.
336
   
Professor Marc Garcelon at the University of Missouri-Kansas City calls 
Marxism-Leninism a totalistic theory and emphasizes the totalitarian ethos of the 
ideology.
337
   
Finally, Professor Andrzej Walicki, former professor at the University of Notre 
Dame, indicates that Marxism-Leninism as a totalitarian ideology is the full realization 
of the totalitarian potential of Marxism by incorporating the unabashedly totalitarian 
methods of Lenin.
338
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 Professor Andrzej Walicki states the following: 
Lenin, who remained to the end a communist revolutionary, subordinated everything to the 
ultimate goals of communism. Since his methods were unabashedly totalitarian, fully 
realizing the totalitarian potential of Marxist communism and adding to it the totalitarian 
zeal of older Babouvist origin, he deserves to be regarded as representing “totalitarian 
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This totalitarian tenet of the unofficial ruling ideology of North Korea was 
publicly legislated in Article 12, which is the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Article 
regarding the right of political participation.  
 
2. Juche Ideology as a Totalitarian Ideology and Its Influence on the Juchist and 
Marxist-Leninist Article 
Kim Il-Sung’s political system was greatly influenced by that of Marx and Lenin.  
Consequently, Kim’s strong preference for totalitarianism was faithfully reflected in his 
theory, and the pursuit of totalitarianism has become one of the core principles of Juche 
ideology.  
It is the common opinion of many scholars and researchers that Juche ideology is 
a totalitarian ideology.  To cite a few examples, Keith A. Leitich, a political analyst and 
an expert on East Asia, emphasizes that Juche is a totalitarian political system stating 
that “[J]uché provided a theoretical basis for North Korea’s closed-door policy. By 1965, 
Juché had become a comprehensive political theory. Eventually, Juché became a 
totalitarian political system that encompassed all aspects of daily life of North 
                                                                                                                                
communism.”  
ANDRZEJ WALICKI, MARXISM AND THE LEAP TO THE KINGDOM OF FREEDOM: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE 
COMMUNIST UTOPIA 425 (1995). 
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Korea.”
339
  
Thomas J. Belke, who is an author of a book on North Korea’s religion under its 
totalitarian system and culture, criticizes the totalitarian system pursued by Juche 
ideology using such an expression as “[t]he hellish juche totalitarian system . . . .”
340
 to 
describe it.  
Professor Peter J. Atkins at the University of Durham in the U.K. states that 
“Juche has sought not only to influence people’s behaviour through their environment 
but also to grasp their minds. . . . As a discourse, Juche is holistic, exclusive, hegemonic, 
and intellectually totalitarian. It brooks no plurality of action or intent, and seeks to 
eliminate even plurality of interpretation.”
341
  
Finally, Dr. Natasha Ezrow at the University of Essex in the U.K. and Professor 
Erica Frantz at Bridgewater State University in Massachusetts, who are experts on 
authoritarian regimes and authoritarian politics respectively, explain North Korea’s 
totalitarian system, which is based on the Juche ideology of Kim Il-Sung, as follows: 
The dictatorship of North Korea (a personalist/single-party regime) shares 
many characteristics with totalitarian regimes. Ideology plays a strong role 
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in the North Korean regime. The state’s [official] ideology, Juche, serves to 
atomize the public and subordinate the people under the will of the 
state(citation omitted). The regime’s first leader, Kim Il-sung, was credited 
with creating Juche, decreeing that the only way to understand the ideology 
was “to follow the party and the leader”(citation omitted).
342
 
This totalitarian tenet of the official ruling ideology of North Korea was publicly 
legislated in Article 12, which is the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Article on the right of 
political participation.  
 
C. The New Refuting Theory and Its Incapacitation Mechanism Model  
The North Korean Constitution contains two fundamentally distinct types of 
articles that have opposing viewpoints on the right to vote and to be elected.  One is 
Article 66, which is the Fundamental Rights Article, and the other is Article 12, which is 
the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Article.   
As reviewed earlier, Article 66 serves as the core implementing mechanism of the 
North Korean Constitution for its right to vote and to be elected.
343
  Thus, as is argued 
by North Korea in the DPRK Official Reports, the Fundamental Rights Article is, in its 
very nature, supposed to protect the right of political participation of the North Korean 
people.  
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On the other hand, the pursuit and consolidation of a totalitarian dictatorship is a 
key tenet of Juche ideology and Marxism-Leninism.
344
  Thus, from the logical and 
theoretical standpoint, it is natural for the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Article, which 
faithfully incorporates the core principle of the two anti-fundamental rights and ruling 
ideologies controlling North Korea, to take the disposition of an anti-fundamental rights 
article in order to pursue and consolidate a totalitarian dictatorship, and to position itself 
as the ruling article.  Namely, Article 12 is not only the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist 
Article, but also works as the anti-fundamental rights and ruling article from the logical 
and theoretical standpoint.  
We reviewed that the clash in function and role between the guarantee of the right 
of political participation and the pursuit of a totalitarian dictatorship is inevitable from a 
logical and theoretical standpoint.
345
  Similarly, these two extremes both in their very 
nature and workings, as demonstrated by Article 66 and Article 12, are bound to clash 
with each other in performing their function and role within one constitutional boundary. 
The issue of the functional clash is solved by the relationship of superiority and 
relative inferiority between the two types of articles.  Article 12, the anti-fundamental 
rights and ruling article for the consolidation of totalitarian dictatorship, has superiority 
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over Article 66, the Fundamental Rights Article for the right to vote and to be elected, in 
their function and operation.  As a result, Article 12, which is also the Juchist and 
Marxist-Leninist Article, incapacitates the Fundamental Rights Article, which is the core 
implementation mechanism of the North Korean Constitution, at the time of this 
functional clash.  
The resulting weakening of the Fundamental Rights Article leads to the 
theoretical impossibility of performing the core implementation mechanism model 
centered on Article 66 in the DPRK Official Reports.  Consequently, all of the 
arguments of the North Korean government in defense of its practices of the right to 
vote and to be elected in its official reports, which are grounded in this theoretical 
approach, are totally unrealizable given its constitutional structure and mechanism.  
That is to say, this impossibility of performance proves false in the Incapacitation Stage 
any notion that North Korea guarantees the right of political participation of its people 
or that it complies with the articles on this right in the international human rights treaties 
from a logical and theoretical standpoint.  
After completely weakening the Fundamental Rights Article, the Juchist and 
Marxist-Leninist Article wields strong influence over the North Korean society at large 
without any difficulty or obstruction.  The practical results of this powerful leverage 
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are manifested in the severe violations of fundamental rights and international human 
rights treaties in North Korea.
346
  In essence, since the sole function of the anti-
fundamental rights and ruling article is to carry out the totalitarian doctrines of Juche 
ideology and Marxism-Leninism, there is no constitutional basis to secure the right of 
political participation for the North Korean people or to prevent the government from 
violating such protections prescribed by international human rights treaties.  
It necessarily follows, logically and theoretically, that the arguments of the U.S., 
South Korea, and the U.K. condemning the DPRK’s violations of the right of political 
participation in the LDC Annual Reports
347
 are proven true by the constitutional 
structure and mechanism of North Korea in the Human Rights Violation Stage. 
The following diagram incorporates all aspects of the newly developed refuting 
theory and its incapacitation mechanism model of Article 12, including the core 
premises, key factors, logical order and flow, and theoretical structure.  The diagram 
also incorporates the evidence for verifying the falsity of North Korea’s arguments in 
the DPRK Official Reports and for verifying the truth of the liberal democratic 
countries’ assertions in the LDC Annual Reports.  Finally, the diagram shows the 
relationships between the points of contention of the new refuting theory, the testimony 
                                            
346
 See supra Chapter One.III.A; see also supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 
347
 See infra Chapter Four.II.D. 
 141 
of North Korean defectors, and the arguments of the U.S., South Korea, and the U.K. in 
the LDC Annual Reports, which are grounded in this testimony.
348
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<Diagram 7> The New Refuting Theory and Its Incapacitation Mechanism Model  
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D. The Major Contents of the LDC Annual Reports 
As evidenced in the analysis of the USCIRF Human Rights Report, the DPRK’s 
violations of the right of political participation, caused by the powerful influence of the 
Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Article over North Korean society as a whole, as indicated 
in the new refuting theory, are in accord with the testimony of North Korean refugees 
who experienced and witnessed first-hand the severe violations of this right in their 
country.
349
  Thus, the DPRK’s violations of the right of political participation in the 
refuting theory coincide with the arguments of the U.S., South Korea, and the U.K. in 
the LDC Annual Reports, which are based on this testimony.  
In this way, the arguments of the new refuting theory and its incapacitation 
mechanism model presented by this dissertation not only logically and theoretically 
support the testimony of North Korean refugees and the contentions of the liberal 
democratic countries attacking North Korea’s violation of the right of political 
participation in the LDC Annual Reports, but they are, in turn, practically and factually 
supported by the testimony of North Korean escapees and the arguments of the liberal 
democratic camp. 
The major contents of the testimony of North Korean defectors, and the 
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arguments and analyses of the U.S., South Korea, and the U.K., which are based on this 
testimony, in the LDC Annual Reports are as follows:  
 
1. U.S. Human Rights Report 
According to the 2008 U.S. Human Rights Report, “Elections of delegates to the 
provincial, municipal, and county people’s assemblies were held in July of 2007. The 
elections were not free and fair, . . . . The government openly monitored voting, 
resulting in nearly 100 percent participation and 100 percent approval.”
350
 
The 2012 U.S. Human Rights Report states that “The government held elections 
of local representatives to the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) in July 2011. The 
elections were neither free nor fair, and the outcome was virtually identical to prior 
elections.”
351
 
The 2010 U.S. Human Rights Report describes that “The Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) is a [totalitarian] dictatorship under the 
absolute rule of Kim Jong-il [at present, Kim Jong-Un], general secretary of the Korean 
Workers’ Party (KWP) and chairman of the National Defense Commission (NDC), the 
                                            
350
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‘highest office of state.’”
352
  The 2009 U.S. Human Rights Report also claims that 
“[c]itizens [] [are] subject to intensive political and ideological indoctrination, which [] 
[is] intended to ensure loyalty to the leadership and conformity to the state’s 
ideology . . . .
353
  Furthermore, the same report states that “The government [] [has in 
fact] criticized the concept of free elections and competition among political parties as 
an ‘artifact’ of ‘capitalist decay.’”
354
  Finally, the report concludes that “Citizens do not 
have the right to change their government peacefully. The KWP and the Korean 
People’s Army (KPA), with Kim Jong-il [Kim Jong-Un, at present] in control, 
dominated the political system.”
355
 
Contrary to North Korea’s argument in the Initial CEDAW Implementation 
Report,
356
 discrimination against women is a part of the country’s political system.  
According to the 2010 U.S. Human Rights Report, “Women constitute[] [only] 4.5 
percent of the membership of the Central Committee of the KWP [] [and hold] few key 
                                            
352
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KWP leadership positions.”
357
  
 
2. ROK Human Rights Report 
The 2004 ROK Human Rights Report indicates that “Elections in North Korea are 
not a political process in which a plurality of political forces freely compete on the basis 
of their ideals and policies . . . .”
358
  According to the 2010 ROK Human Rights Report, 
“[e]lections in North Korea are used, internally, to confirm the people’s confidence in 
the party and to justify the single party dictatorship, while externally they are used as a 
propaganda tool to demonstrate that democracy is being practiced.”
359
  Thus, voter 
turnout and approval ratings are very important factors in the elections of North Korea, 
which in a totalitarian state typically demands the masses’ enthusiastic and 
unconditional support.
360
  According to the 2011 ROK Human Rights Report, “On 
every election day, the North Korean authorities encourage sloganeering of exactly the 
same phrases as follows: . . . . ‘All voters! Let’s all participate in elections as one person 
and cast affirmative votes.’ ‘All voters! Let’s all participate in elections and cast 100 
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percent affirmative votes.’(citation omitted)”
361
  The report quotes refugee testimony 
that “[o]n election day, student marching bands take to the streets, playing drums and 
gongs to encourage voting and calling on citizens to cast affirmative votes for the local 
delegate for the Supreme People’s Assembly. . . .(citation omitted)”
362
 
Concerning voting participation, the 2010 ROK Human Rights Report discloses 
that “Whoever does not participate in the voting or refuses to vote is suspected of 
harboring political motives, and is treated with suspicion and discriminated against on a 
daily basis thereafter. The defectors who testified said for these reasons they always 
participated in voting.(citation omitted)”
363
  The report also reveals testimony from a 
defector that “[i]f a resident failed to vote, he would be suspected of having political 
motives for not doing so, and this fact remains on the person’s record for years, 
adversely affecting him . . . .(citation omitted)”
364
  Furthermore, the report divulges 
that “If anyone holding a citizenship card failed to vote, [he/]she would be criminally 
charged as a ‘reactionary.’ Officials would check each voter according to the voter roster, 
so no one would dare miss out on voting.(citation omitted)”
365
  Finally, the 2011 ROK 
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Human Rights Report states that “The ‘people’s unit’ leader would go around the 
households prodding everyone to vote. There is also a People’s Safety agent in charge of 
elections, so no one is excused from voting.(citation omitted)”
366
 
Concerning the masses’ support for the candidates nominated by the KWP, the 
2011 ROK Human Rights Report informs us that “North Koreans cast 100% affirmative 
votes for the party-nominated candidates. The voting procedure includes an obligatory 
practice of bowing to the Leader’s portrait before and after putting one’s ballot in.”
367
  
The 2004 ROK Human Rights Report also states that “In connection with elections, 
North Korea is encouraging voters to openly cast affirmative votes for the candidates 
appointed by the party, because elections are opportunities to express one’s absolute 
loyalty to the Republic and the Leader.”
368
  Furthermore, the 2010 ROK Human Rights 
Report explains that “North Korean authorities always insist that secret ballots are 
guaranteed in all elections. However, no one would cast his or her vote against the 
single candidate; indeed no one would even dream of doing such a thing.”
369
  
The 2011 ROK Human Rights Report discloses that “If anyone were to cast a 
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negative vote, it would be construed as a vote against Kim Jong-il [and Kim Jong-un,] 
and that person would be arrested shortly after the elections. Everybody knows this, so 
no one would even think about casting a negative vote.(citation omitted)”
370
  The 
report reveals a defector’s testimony of being told he was allowed to cast a negative 
vote, but due to the strict vigilance of the officials, no one would dare to do so.
371
  
Furthermore, the report explains that the fear of retaliatory penalties barred citizens 
from making such a choice.
372
  Finally, the 2010 ROK Human Rights Report divulges 
that “The elections are conducted under the strict surveillance of the State Security 
Agency, and the entire voting procedure consists of simply receiving a ballot and 
casting it in a “yes” or a “no” ballot box.(citation omitted)”
373
   
The 2011 ROK Human Rights Report comes to the conclusion as follows: 
Free expression of opinions by citizens is practically impossible in the 
candidate nominating process and when casting votes. Elections where 
various political forces freely contend on the basis of ideas and policies are 
not a part of the political process in North Korea. Rather, it is part of a 
political mobilization to reinforce the people with a sense of political 
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participation and provide a pro forma and post facto approval of the power 
structure and the method of elite recruitment designed by the KWP.(citation 
omitted)”
374
 
The 2004 ROK Human Rights Report also concludes that “Because candidates are 
appointed by the KWP Department of Organization and Guidance, there is no way that 
people can freely exercise the right to be elected [in North Korea].”
375
 
 
3. U.K. Human Rights Report  
The 2007 U.K. Human Rights Report states that “There is no mechanism to allow 
a change of leadership or government [in North Korea].”
376
  
According to the 2012 U.K. Human Rights Report, “Kim Jong Un was formally 
announced as Supreme Leader of the DPRK within days of his father dying on 17 
December 2011. This happened without any clear democratic process.”
377
  The 2011 
U.K. Human Rights Report also indicates that “On 18 December [2011], the DPRK 
regime announced that Kim Jong Un was the ‘great successor, an outstanding leader of 
our party, army and people.’ He took over as leader without any elections or reference to 
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public opinion.”
378
  Furthermore, the 2012 U.K. Human Rights Report states that the 
Supreme People’s Assembly—the only state entity that is elected—allows only one 
candidate in each consistency and does not elect members by secret ballot.
379
   
The 2008 U.K. Human Rights Report concludes that “There are no free and fair 
elections [in North Korea].”
380
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III. Freedom of Speech, Press, Assembly, and Association 
A. The Arguments of the North Korean Government and Its Main Grounds for 
the Arguments in the DPRK Official Reports 
Freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association are the segmentalized and 
detailed subtypes of the freedom of expression.
381
  Freedom of speech, press, assembly, 
and association not only are at the heart of the freedom of expression but also form its 
backbone. 
Article 67 of the North Korean Constitution is the Fundamental Rights Article 
concerning the issue of freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association within the 
country.  It stipulates that “Citizens are guaranteed freedom of speech, the press, 
assembly, demonstration and association. The State shall guarantee the conditions for 
the free activities of . . . social organizations.”
382
 
North Korea uses a theoretical approach, which focuses on the core 
implementation mechanism of this Fundamental Rights Article, as the main grounds for 
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its arguments in defense of its practices of freedom of speech, press, assembly, and 
association in the DPRK Official Reports.  That is to say, the country introduces 
Article 67 of its Constitution as the guaranteed mechanism for the domestic protection 
of the freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association of its people, as well as the 
core implementer for the articles on these freedoms in the international human rights 
treaties to which it has acceded in the reports.  
 
1. The Fundamental Rights Article as the Guaranteed Mechanism for the 
Domestic Protection of Freedom of Speech, Press, Assembly, and Association  
North Korea adverts to this mechanism in a series of its official reports.  Thus, in 
paragraph 16 of the National Report, the North Korean government argues that “The 
Constitution comprehensively provides for the fundamental rights and freedoms in all 
fields of State and public activity such as . . . the freedoms of speech, the press, 
assembly, demonstration and association . . . .”
383
  Additionally, in paragraph 40 of the 
same report, the government maintains that “The DPRK legalized, as fundamental . . . 
rights . . . the freedom of expression, assembly and association [in Article 67 of its 
                                            
383
 2009 National Report, supra note 11, at 4-5. 
 
 154 
Constitution] . . . and is ensuring them in practice.”
384
  Furthermore, in paragraph 42 of 
the report, North Korea asserts that “All citizens have freedom of opinion and 
expression. . . . All citizens can express their views and opinions through TVs and 
publications [under Article 67 of the Constitution]. They have the freedom of literary 
and creative activities by virtue of the Constitution . . . .”
385
  Finally, the country 
contends that “Citizens have freedoms of assembly and demonstration under [Article 67 
of] the Constitution.”
386
 and “Citizens have freedom of association by virtue of [Article 
67 of] the Constitution.”
387
 in paragraphs 43 and 44 of the National Report, respectively.  
Similarly, in paragraph 7 of the Second ICCPR Implementation Report, the North 
Korean government states that “The Constitution . . . stipulates the basic rights of 
citizens including . . . the freedom of speech, press, assembly, demonstration and 
association . . . .”
388
  In addition, in paragraph 117 of the same report, the government 
argues that “All the citizens have the freedom of opinion and expression. Article 67 of 
the Constitution . . . guarantees this. Article 67 of the Constitution provides: ‘Citizens 
are guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press[, assembly, demonstration and 
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association.] . . .[.]’ . . . .”
389
  Furthermore, in paragraph 125 of the report, North Korea 
maintains that “Under article 67 of the Constitution, citizens have the freedom of 
assembly and demonstration.”
390
  
In paragraph 31 of the Second ICESCR Implementation Report, the North Korean 
government asserts that “By article 67 of the Constitution, citizens are guaranteed 
freedom of assembly and demonstration.”
391
  
     These assurances are repeated, almost verbatim, in the Initial CEDAW 
Implementation Report and in the Combined CRC Implementation Report.  In 
paragraph 76 of the Initial CEDAW Implementation Report, the North Korean 
government states that “The Constitution . . . provides that women are guaranteed, enjoy 
and exercise on an equal footing with men such basic rights as . . . the freedom of 
speech, of the press, of assembly, demonstration and association (article 67) . . . .”
392
  
Similarly, in paragraph 58 of the Combined CRC Implementation Report, the North 
Korean government states that “The Constitution stipulates the fundamental rights . . . 
of citizens; [c]itizens are guaranteed freedom of speech, the press, assembly, 
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demonstration and association (art. 67) . . . .”
393
  Additionally, in paragraph 76 of the 
same report, the government emphasizes again that “[c]itizens are guaranteed freedom 
of speech, the press, assembly, demonstration and association (art. 67) . . . .”
394
 
 
2. The Fundamental Rights Article as the Core Implementer for the Articles on 
Freedom of Speech, Press, Assembly, and Association in the International 
Human Rights Treaties 
Once again, North Korea presents the Fundamental Rights Article to argue its 
adherence to international human rights treaties in various reports. 
Article 19, paragraph 1 of the ICCPR provides that “Everyone shall have the right 
to hold opinions without interference.”
395
  Article 19, paragraph 2 of the Covenant 
declares that “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall 
include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, 
regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through 
any other media of his choice.”
396
  Regarding the freedom of speech and of the press in 
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the Covenant, North Korea suggests, in paragraph 117 of the Second ICCPR 
Implementation Report, that Article 67 of its Constitution acts as the core mechanism to 
carry out Article 19, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the ICCPR: 
Article 19. Freedom of Speech and of the Press 
117. All the citizens have the freedom of opinion and expression. Article 67 
of the Constitution . . . guarantees this. Article 67 of the Constitution 
provides: “Citizens are guaranteed freedom of speech, of the 
press . . .[.]” . . . .
397
  
Article 21 of ICCPR stipulates that “The right of peaceful assembly shall be 
recognized. . . .”
398
  Regarding the freedom of assembly in the Covenant, North Korea 
offers, in paragraph 125 of the same Implementation Report, that Article 67 of its 
Constitution is the core implementer that carries out Article 21 of the ICCPR as follows:  
Article 21. Right to Peaceful Assembly  
125. Under article 67 of the Constitution, citizens have the freedom of 
assembly and demonstration. When somebody wants to organize an 
assembly or demonstration he or she should notify the people’s committee 
and the public security organ of the district concerned three days in 
advance . . . .
399
 
Article 22, paragraph 1 of the ICCPR prescribes that “Everyone shall have the 
right to freedom of association with others . . . .”
400
  Regarding the freedom of 
association in the Covenant, North Korea suggests, in paragraphs 127 and 128 of the 
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Implementation Report, that Article 67 of its Constitution acts as the key mechanism to 
carry out Article 22, paragraph 1 of the ICCPR as follows: 
Article 22. Freedom of Association 
127. Article 67 of the Constitution stipulates that citizens have freedom of 
association and that the state guarantees conditions for the free activity of 
democratic . . . public organizations. 
128. If somebody wants to organize a democratic public organization, he or 
she should have it registered in the Cabinet 30 days in advance. . . . These 
procedures are not aimed at the interference or restriction of free 
establishment of democratic public organizations but simply at the grasping 
of reality and rendering of necessary assistance by the state. There are tens 
of democratic public organizations [in North Korea] . . . .
401
  
Article 13, paragraph 1 of the CRC stipulates as follows:  
The child shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall 
include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all 
kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form 
of art, or through any other media of the child’s choice.
402
 
Regarding the freedom of expression in the Convention, North Korea suggests, in 
paragraph 88 of the Combined CRC Implementation Report, that Article 67 of its 
Constitution is the core mechanism that carries out Article 13, paragraph 1 of the CRC 
as follows:  
C. Freedom of expression (art. 13)  
88. Freedom of speech, press, and assembly . . . provided for in articles 
67 . . . of the Constitution constitute fundamental rights of all citizens 
including children. While taking legislative measures to ensure the freedom 
of expression, the Government directed due attention to providing 
conditions for children to express their views in families, at schools, and 
                                            
401
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through children’s unions and youth leagues . . . .
403
  
Article 15, paragraph 1 of the same Convention provides that “States Parties 
recognize the rights of the child to freedom of association and to freedom of peaceful 
assembly.”
404
  Regarding the freedom of assembly and association in the Convention, 
North Korean government suggests, in paragraph 91 of the same report, that Article 67 
of its Constitution acts as the key mechanism to carry out Article 15, paragraph 1 of 
CRC as follows:  
E. Freedom of association and of peaceful assembly (art. 15)  
91. Citizens are guaranteed freedom of speech, press, assembly, 
demonstration and association by virtue of article 67 of the Constitution. 
Children have their organizations, which are the children’s union that 
includes students from second grade of primary schools to those in the 
second to third grade of secondary schools, and the youth league that 
includes senior students of secondary schools and those in colleges and 
universities. There are children’s extra-curricular activity centres in such 
fields as science, art and sport in every province, city and county. They 
organize a series of meetings and demonstrations aimed at encouraging 
children to value justice and truth, and to shape a more brilliant future with 
high enthusiasm and a strong enterprising spirit. . . .
405
  
 
3. The Diagrammatization of the Core Implementation Mechanism Model 
The core implementation mechanism model of Article 67, which shows both 
North Korea’s arguments in defense of its practices of freedom of speech, press, 
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assembly, and association and the main grounds for its arguments in the DPRK Official 
Reports, is diagrammatized below: 
 
<Diagram 8> The Core Implementation Mechanism Model of the Fundamental Rights 
Article in the DPRK Official Reports 
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The North Korean Constitution has two Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Articles 
concerning the issue of freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association in the 
country.  One is Article 63, which provides that “In the Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea the rights and duties of citizens are based on the collectivist principle: ‘One for 
all and all for one.’”
406
  The other is Article 42 of the same Constitution, which 
stipulates that “The State shall eliminate the way of life inherited from the outmoded 
society and establish a new socialist way of life [emphasizing collectivism
407
] in every 
sphere.”
408
 
Collectivism as a political theory focuses on the priority of collective interests 
over individual rights.  That is to say, the core of the thought is that personal freedoms 
should always be limited and sacrificed for the socialist community.
409
  Thus, it is 
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inevitable for there to be conflicts between the freedom of speech, press, assembly, and 
association, which is one of the most representative individual freedoms in its nature, 
against the collectivism in North Korea, which is “[a] socialist country that emphasizes 
collective principles and thought over the individual.”
410
  
It becomes clearer when we review the core feature of collectivism: Collectivism 
coerces uniform thinking and conformism.
411
  Professor Han-Shik Park at the 
University of Georgia describes the North Korean collectivist system, which focuses on 
uniform thinking and conformism, as “a monolithic value system whereby diverse 
interpretations of any social phenomenon or political event are strictly prohibited.”
412
  
Furthermore, he emphasizes that the country has enunciated the highest level of 
rationalization for collectivism in the history of political theory.
413
 
Under this inviolable principle of collectivism in North Korea, to think and 
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express diverse views on ideologies, political systems and leaders, and social norms are 
against the uniform thinking and conformism of the monolithic value society.
414
  As a 
result, collectivism is essentially incompatible with freedom of speech, press, assembly, 
and association.  Collectivism is thus at odds with free expression and the exchange of 
a diversity of opinions and information through verbal and written language, mass 
media, publication, gathering, assembly, demonstration, and the like.
415
 
The pursuit and consolidation of collectivism, which is demonstrated in the 
Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Articles, is one of the key tenets of Juche Ideology and 
Marxism-Leninism, the two anti-human rights and ruling ideologies controlling North 
Korea.  
 
1. Marxism-Leninism as a Collectivist Ideology and Its Influence on the Juchist 
and Marxist-Leninist Articles 
It is agreed upon by many reputable sources that Marxism-Leninism is a 
representative collectivist ideology.  Professor Kamaludin Gadshiiev at the Institute of 
World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences in 
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Moscow clearly states that, “As is widely known, . . . collectivism is one of the 
fundamental principles of ‘Marxism-Leninism,’ a doctrine that rejects individualism of 
all forms. In this respect, Fascism is hardly different from ‘Marxism-Leninism.’ Both 
represent a radical turn from that philosophical and political individualism which is the 
heart of the liberal-democratic . . . attitude.”
416
  
Professor Jiyoung Song at Singapore Management University also emphasizes 
that collectivism is the core tenet of Marxism-Leninism stating that “The . . . Marxist[-
Leninist] feature in DPRK rights thinking is its prioritisation of collective interests over 
individual human rights.”
417
 
Professor Douglas C. Hodgson at the University of Western Australia Faculty of 
Law explains the collective principle of Marxism-Leninism as follows:  
Such enjoyment [of human rights] . . . is dependent on the individual’s 
human rights not being exercised in such a manner as to harm the socialist 
cause or undermine collective interests. . . . Marxism-Leninism thus accords 
priority to the development of the socialist order as a condition for the 
extension of human rights. Priority is accorded to the collective rights of the 
proletariat class and subsequently to the socialist community itself above 
the rights of the individual.(citation omitted).
418
  
Similarly, Otto Wilhelm Kuusinen, who was a powerful politician and theorist of 
the Soviet Union, and other authors describe the importance of collectivism and its high 
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status in Marxism-Leninism:    
The experience of public organisations in the socialist countries has already 
demonstrated that the most effective means of combating selfish 
individualism, which is the chief enemy of communist [Marxist-Leninist
419
] 
ethics, is to counter it by active collectivism. Collectivism most of all 
corresponds to the ideal of communism [Marxism-Leninism] because it 
regards service for the common good as the highest standard of 
behaviour.
420
 
Finally, Kim Jong-Il himself enunciates that “Collectivism, as an ideal of 
socialism, has developed continuously. The establishment of Marxism[-Leninism] was 
of great significance in the development of the concept of collectivism. . . .(citation 
omitted).”
421
  According to Kim, Marxism-Leninism is the driving force of the 
development of collectivism.  That is to say, his statements show that collectivism is so 
deeply entrenched in Marxism-Leninism as a core doctrine that they are indispensable 
to each other.  
This collectivist tenet of the unofficial ruling ideology of North Korea was 
publicly legislated in Article 63 and Article 42, which are the Juchist and Marxist-
Leninist Articles regarding freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association. 
                                            
419
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 KUUSINEN ET AL., supra note 218, at 832.  
This book, entitled Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism: Manual, was written and compiled by Otto 
Wilhelm Kuusinen and other renowned Soviet communist scholars, leading members of Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union, and Soviet officials.  
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2. Juche as a Collectivist Ideology and Its Influence on the Juchist and Marxist-
Leninist Articles  
Kim Il-Sung’s strong preference for collectivism was greatly influenced by those 
of Marx and Lenin.  Many scholars and researchers discuss Kim’s obsessive attitude 
toward collectivism.  To cite a few examples, Professor Emeritus Charles F. Andrain, a 
scholar of comparative politics at San Diego State University, states that “For President 
Kim II Sung, collectivism took precedence over individual interests. Like the typical 
ideological monist, he perceived the political system as one organic community in 
which collective agencies – the nation, party, state, people – dominate the individual 
parts.”
422
  
Professor Jiyoung Song at Singapore Management University reveals Kim’s 
strong preference for collectivism and deep dislike for individualism through the 
following statements: 
The DPRK’s preference for collectivism over individualism is clear in the 
definitions of individualism and collectivism. According to the North 
Korean Dictionary of the Works of Great Leader Kim Il Sung . . . : 
[“][i]ndividualism is the biggest obstacle for a collective lifestyle and is the 
fundamental reason for all the rotten philosophies such as liberalism, 
individual heroism, egoism, and ambition for individual fame and 
success.[”] As seen above, individualism is equated with . . . the biggest 
enemy of communist [socialist] lifestyle [emphasizing collectivism]. . . . On 
                                            
422
 CHARLES F. ANDRAIN, COMPARATIVE POLITICAL SYSTEMS: POLICY PERFORMANCE AND SOCIAL 
CHANGE 82 (1994). 
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the other hand: [“]Collectivism aims to prioritise collective interests over 
individual rights and to struggle for society, the People, the Party and 
revolution. In other words, collectivism is a revolutionary idea under the 
communist [Marxist-Leninist] principle ‘one for all, all for one’. . . .[”]
423
 
Furthermore, Professor Young-Chul Chung at Sogang University in Seoul, South 
Korea, shows Kim Il-Sung’s strong preference for collectivism and deep hostility 
towards individualism through the following depiction:  
In North Korea, individualism refers to more than the West’s liberal 
conception, which underlines the individual’s creativity and particularities. 
Individualism, seen as the foundation of capitalism, is used as the antinomy 
to collectivism, which provides the foundation for socialism. The chasm 
between these two modes is reflected in Kim Il Sung’s remark: “The 
process of constructing socialism, communism is the process of overcoming 
individualism and egoism and establishing collectivism.”(citation 
omitted)
424
 
Kim Il-Sung’s strong preference for collectivism was faithfully reflected in his 
Juche theory; thus, the pursuit of collectivism has become one of the core principles of 
Juche ideology.
425
  Additionally, this collectivist tenet of the official ruling ideology of 
North Korea was publicly legislated in Article 63 and Article 42, which are the Juchist 
                                            
423
 SONG, supra note 407, at 105-106.  
 
424
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Marxism-Leninism. That is to say, his statements show that collectivism is so deeply ingrained into Kim 
Il-Sung’s ideology as a key doctrine that they are indispensable to each other. 
 168 
and Marxist-Leninist Articles on freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association.  
 
C. The New Refuting Theory and Its Incapacitation Mechanism Model  
The North Korean Constitution contains two fundamentally distinct types of 
articles that have opposing viewpoints on the freedom of speech, press, assembly, and 
association.  One type is the Fundamental Rights Article, such as Article 67, and the 
other is the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Article, such as Article 63 and Article 42.  
As reviewed earlier, Article 67 serves as the core implementing mechanism of the 
North Korean Constitution for its freedom of speech, press, assembly, and 
association.
426
  Thus, as is argued by North Korea in the DPRK Official Reports, the 
Fundamental Rights Article is, in its very nature, supposed to protect these fundamental 
freedoms of the North Korean people.  
On the other hand, the pursuit and consolidation of collectivism is a key tenet of 
Juche ideology and Marxism-Leninism.
427
  Thus, from the logical and theoretical 
standpoint, it is natural for the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Articles, which faithfully 
incorporate the core principle of the two anti-fundamental rights and ruling ideologies 
controlling North Korea, to take the disposition of anti-fundamental rights articles in 
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 See supra Chapter Four.III.A. 
 
427
 See supra Chapter Four.III.B. 
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order to pursue and consolidate collectivism, and to position themselves as the ruling 
articles.  Namely, Article 63 and Article 42 are not only the Juchist and Marxist-
Leninist Articles, but also work as the anti-fundamental rights and ruling articles from 
the logical and theoretical standpoint. 
We reviewed that the clash in function and role between the guarantee of freedom 
of speech, press, assembly, and association and the pursuit of collectivism is inevitable 
from a logical and theoretical standpoint.
428
  Similarly, these two extremes both in their 
very nature and workings, as demonstrated by Article 67 and Articles 63 and 42, are 
bound to clash with each other in performing their function and role within one 
constitutional boundary.  
The issue of the functional clash is solved by the relationship of superiority and 
relative inferiority between the two types of articles.  Article 63 and Article 42, the 
anti-fundamental rights and ruling articles for the consolidation of collectivism, has 
superiority over Article 67, the Fundamental Rights Article for freedom of speech, press, 
assembly, and association, in their function and operation.  As a result, Article 63 and 
Article 42, which are also the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Articles, incapacitate the 
Fundamental Rights Article, which is the core implementation mechanism of the North 
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 See supra id.  
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Korean Constitution, at the time of this functional clash.  
The resulting weakening of the Fundamental Rights Article leads to the 
theoretical impossibility of performing the core implementation mechanism model 
centered on Article 67 in the DPRK Official Reports.  Consequently, all of the 
arguments of the North Korean government in defense of its practices of freedom of 
speech, press, assembly, and association in its official reports, which are grounded in 
this theoretical approach, are totally unrealizable given its constitutional structure and 
mechanism.  That is to say, this impossibility of performance proves false in the 
Incapacitation Stage any notion that North Korea guarantees the freedom of speech, 
press, assembly, and association of its people or that it complies with the articles on 
these freedoms in the international human rights treaties from a logical and theoretical 
standpoint. 
After completely weakening the Fundamental Rights Article, the Juchist and 
Marxist-Leninist Articles wield strong influence over the North Korean society at large 
without any difficulty or obstruction.  The practical results of this powerful leverage 
are manifested in the severe violations of fundamental rights and international human 
rights treaties in North Korea.
429
  In essence, since the sole function of the anti-
                                            
429
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fundamental rights and ruling articles is to carry out the collectivist doctrines of Juche 
ideology and Marxism-Leninism, there is no constitutional basis to secure the freedom 
of speech, press, assembly, and association for the North Korean people or to prevent 
the government from violating such protections prescribed by international human 
rights treaties. 
It necessarily follows, logically and theoretically, that the arguments of the U.S., 
South Korea, and the U.K. condemning the DPRK’s violations of freedom of speech, 
press, assembly, and association in the LDC Annual Reports
430
 are proven true by the 
constitutional structure and mechanism of North Korea in the Human Rights Violation 
Stage.  
The following diagram incorporates all aspects of the newly developed refuting 
theory and its incapacitation mechanism model of Article 63 and Article 42, including 
the core premises, key factors, logical order and flow, and theoretical structure.  The 
diagram also incorporates the evidence for verifying the falsity of North Korea’s 
arguments in the DPRK Official Reports and for verifying the truth of the liberal 
democratic countries’ assertions in the LDC Annual Reports.  Finally, the diagram 
shows the relationships between the points of contention of the new refuting theory, the 
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testimony of North Korean defectors, and the arguments of the U.S., South Korea, and 
the U.K. in the LDC Annual Reports, which are grounded in this testimony.
431
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 See infra id. 
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<Diagram 9> The New Refuting Theory and Its Incapacitation Mechanism Model  
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D. The Major Contents of the LDC Annual Reports  
As evidenced in the analysis of the USCIRF Human Rights Report, the DPRK’s 
violations of freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association, caused by the 
powerful influence of the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Articles over North Korean 
society as a whole, as indicated in the new refuting theory, are in accord with the 
testimony of North Korean refugees who experienced and witnessed first-hand the 
severe violations of these freedoms in their country.
432
  Thus, the DPRK’s violations of 
freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association in the refuting theory coincide with 
the arguments of the U.S., South Korea, and the U.K. in the LDC Annual Reports, 
which are based on this testimony.  
In this way, the arguments of the new refuting theory and its incapacitation 
mechanism model presented by this dissertation not only logically and theoretically 
support the testimony of North Korean refugees and the contentions of the liberal 
democratic countries attacking North Korea’s violation of freedom of speech, press, 
assembly, and association in the LDC Annual Reports, but they are, in turn, practically 
and factually supported by the testimony of North Korean escapees and the arguments 
of the liberal democratic camp. 
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The major contents of the testimony of North Korean defectors, and the 
arguments and analyses of the U.S., South Korea, and the U.K., which are based on this 
testimony, in the LDC Annual Reports are as follows: 
 
1. U.S. Human Rights Report  
According to the 2010 U.S. Human Rights Report, “There were numerous 
instances of persons being interrogated or arrested for saying anything that could be 
construed as negative towards the government.”
433
  The report also discloses that “The 
regime subjected its citizens to rigid controls. The government relied upon a massive, 
multilevel system of informants to identify critics and potential troublemakers. Entire 
communities sometimes were subjected to security checks.”
434
   
The 2010 U.S. Human Rights Report states that “The government sought to 
control virtually all information. There were no independent media. The government 
carefully managed visits by foreigners, especially journalists.”
435
  The report also 
reveals that “Domestic media censorship continued to be strictly enforced, and no 
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 2010 U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 32.  
 
434
 Id.  
 
435
 Id.; See id. (“During visits by foreign leaders, groups of foreign journalists were permitted to 
accompany official delegations and file reports. In all cases journalists were monitored strictly. Journalists 
generally were not allowed to talk to officials or to persons on the street.”); see also id. (“For all foreign 
visitors, including journalists, cell or satellite phones were held at the airport for the duration of the 
stay.”). 
 176 
deviation from the official government line was tolerated.”
436
 
The 2010 U.S. Human Rights Report states that “The government prohibited 
listening to foreign media broadcasts except by the political elite, and violators were 
subject to severe punishment.”
437
  The report also discloses that “Radios and television 
sets, unless altered, are set to receive only domestic programming; radios obtained from 
abroad had to be altered to operate in a similar manner. . . . The government continued 
to attempt to jam all foreign radio broadcasts.”
438
  Furthermore, the report explains that 
“Possessing ‘antistate’ material and listening to foreign broadcasts were crimes that 
could subject the transgressor to harsh punishments, including up to five years of labor 
reeducation.”
439
  Finally, the report divulges that “Internet access for citizens was 
limited to high-ranking officials and other designated elites, including select university 
students.”
440
 
Concerning the freedom of the assembly and association, the 2010 U.S. Human 
Rights Report reveals that “[t]he [North Korean] government . . . continued to prohibit 
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public meetings not previously authorized.”
441
  The report also divulges that “There 
were no known organizations other than those created by the government. Professional 
associations existed primarily to facilitate government monitoring and control over 
organization members.”
442
  
The report concludes that “Citizens were denied freedom of speech, press, 
assembly, and association, and the government attempted to control all information.”
443
 
  
2. USCIRF Human Rights Report  
The 2009 USCIRF Human Rights Report states that “The Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) continues to be one the world’s most 
repressive regimes, where dissent is not tolerated and few protections exist for 
fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, . . . .”
444
  
The 2010 USCIRF Human Rights Report also informs us that “The North Korean 
government continues to have a deplorable human rights . . . record. Dissent is not 
tolerated and few legal . . . protections exist for universally recognized rights. The 
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 2009 USCIRF HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 33, at 22; See 2012 AI HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, 
supra note 95, at 22 (“Few governments in the region were as brutal as the North Korean regime in 
repressing the voices of their own people . . . .”). 
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government controls most aspects of daily life . . . .”
445
  The 2009 USCIRF Human 
Rights Report discloses that “[t]he DPRK . . . tightly controls the flow of information in 
and out of the country.”
446
  Finally, the 2010 USCIRF Human Rights Report reports 
that “According to the State Department’s 2009 Report Advancing Freedom and 
Democracy, the United States seeks to continue to improve North Korean citizens’ 
access to outside sources of information and provide opportunities for exposure to the 
outside world, mainly by supporting radio broadcasts into the country.”
447
  
 
3. ROK Human Rights Report  
The 2011 ROK Human Rights Report states that “In North Korea, personal 
speech and expression is extremely limited.”
448
  According to the report, 
“[w]iretapping is enforced in an effort to cut off and control the flow of information.”
449
  
For example, the report discloses a defector’s testimony that “[h]e used to have a 
telephone in his home, but since the authorities routinely conducted wiretaps, he had to 
                                            
445
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exercise extreme caution when using the phone.(citation omitted)”
450
  The report also 
reveals testimony from another defector that “[p]eople would commonly use post office 
telephones. But since the authorities conducted wiretaps, there was no guarantee of 
privacy or confidentiality.(citation omitted)”
451
  Furthermore, the report describes 
defector testimony that “[i]n each district there is a telephone branch bureau. In each 
branch bureau there is a security agent’s room where they maintain wiretapping 
devices.(citation omitted)”
452
  Finally, the 2008 ROK Human Rights Report states that 
“Recently, North Korea has begun to enforce strict controls over telephone calls, 
especially direct lines. Long distance calls can only be made through switchboard 
operators. In military installations, no direct calls to the outside are allowed.(citation 
omitted)”
453
  
According to the 2011 ROK Human Rights Report, “The North Korean 
authorities control all means of communication in order to completely cut off the 
information inflow from external sources.”
454
  For instance, the 2006 ROK Human 
Rights Report discloses that “Pyongyang blocks the inflow of information [from 
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 180 
external sources]. All radio dials are fixed to the DPRK official broadcasting service 
channels and sealed. An official of the MPS [Ministry of People’s Security] visits each 
home every three months; if a seal is found broken the person involved is assumed to be 
guilty . . . .”
455
  The 2011 ROK Human Rights Report quotes refugee testimony that 
“[p]eople must register their radios, televisions, and tape recorders, and the frequencies 
must remain firmly fixed at all times.(citation omitted)”
456
 
The expression of opinion, delivery of information, and interchange of ideas 
through publications are also severely limited in North Korea.  According to the 2011 
ROK Human Rights Report, “[i]t is impossible to publish any criticism of Kim Il-sung, 
Kim Jong-il[, Kim Jong-un] or the Korean Workers’ Party.”
457
  The report also 
discloses that “[a]ll publications support the Juche ideology and the unitary ideological 
system of Kim Il-sung. Publications have promoted the establishment of the Kim Il-
sung/Kim Jong-il[/Kim Jong-un] hereditary succession and have fostered participation 
in the construction of the North Korean style life in the ‘our-style’ socialist 
economy.”
458
  Furthermore, the report reveals that “Literary works . . . , in particular, 
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are strictly controlled and supervised. All . . . publications are allowed only after they 
have obtained a seal of censorship issued under the control and supervision of the 
Ministry of Culture (a Cabinet ministry) and the Korean Workers’ Party.”
459
  
The 2011 ROK Human Rights Report quotes refugee testimony that “[i]t would 
be difficult for foreign ideas to penetrate society through books since the joint censor 
teams consisting of MPS, SSA [State Security Agency], and Party officials conduct 
censorship reviews of all books and printed matter three times a year.(citation 
omitted)”
460
  The report also states that “Publications are used . . . for ideological 
education, and the Party directly manages, censors, and controls all published 
materials.”
461
  Furthermore, the report explains that “Publications are an important 
means of connecting the Party and the masses and are a strong organizational weapon 
used to mobilize the laboring masses to work for the construction of politics, economics, 
and culture of the party.”
462
   
Meanwhile, the 2011 ROK Human Rights Report states that “Freedom of the 
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press is guaranteed in Article 67 of the Constitution but only under the guidance and 
control of the Party and the state. The North Korean press serves as the mouthpiece of 
the KWP.”
463
  The report also discloses that “The press is used as a tool to turn North 
Koreans into ‘good communists.’ Freedom of the press is only guaranteed to the extent 
that it helps the masses participate even more vigorously in the construction of 
socialism.”
464
  Furthermore, the report states that “[t]he North Korean press disregards 
the proper functions of the press, such as providing critical commentary and objective 
information to citizens. It instead focuses on the propaganda of Kim Il-sung based on 
Juche ideology and upon indoctrinating the population.”
465
  
According to the 2011 ROK Human Rights Report, “[t]he press in the DPRK is 
an advertiser, instigator, and organizer for the KWP, designed to help it achieve its goals 
and existing only as an educational tool.”
466
  The report also reveals that “Under no 
circumstances may the North Korean press engage in any type of criticism of the 
leadership or the instructions of the Great Leader Kim Il-sung[, Dear Leader Kim Jong-
Il, and Supreme Leader Kim Jong-Un].”
467
  Furthermore, the report divulges that 
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“Every single issue of a North Korean . . . broadcast service contains something that 
eulogizes Kim Il-sung and praises Kim Jong-il[, and Kim Jong-Un]. Reports on the [] 
[three] Kims occupy the front pages of newspapers, and their names are printed in 
special bold fonts.”
468
  Finally, the report states that “All news is written for the . . . 
purpose of embedding the supremacy of the North Korean system in the minds of the 
people. There are no critical reports . . . of sensitive issues regarding the system. 
However, news on negative aspects of the United States or South Korea is . . . reported 
in a straightforward manner.”
469
  
Concerning the freedom of assembly and association, the 2011 ROK Human 
Rights Report states that “[o]nly the assemblies and associations required by the Korean 
Workers’ Party are permitted.”
470
  The report also discloses that “[N]orth Korean 
citizens do not have any organizations or institutions that can protect their individual 
rights because the only permitted assemblies and associations are those formed in 
response to Party instructions.”
471
  Furthermore, the report reveals that “Independent 
agencies or associations are not allowed in North Korea, and all organizations and 
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associations are subject to absolute control by the authorities, including women’s 
organizations, labor unions, religious associations, and political parties.”
472
  Finally, 
the report explains that “Unauthorized assemblies and associations are regarded as 
collective disturbances that will cause social disorder.”
473
  
Regarding the purpose and function of social organizations in North Korea, the 
2011 ROK Human Rights Report states that “Social organizations in North Korea are 
not ‘interest groups’ or ‘activist groups’ as understood in the West. . . . [t]hey are 
‘satellite organizations’ of the Party that faithfully carry out the tenets of the Party.”
474
  
The report also divulges that “The main purpose of social organizations is to support the 
Party and to facilitate loyalty to Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il.”
475
  Furthermore, the 
report discloses that “These social organizations act as primary control mechanisms 
over the people and also serve as a means of mobilizing people for mass rallies and 
marches at national events (i.e., movements to accomplish the goals of authorities; 
movements to increase productivity . . . .).”
476
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4. U.K. Human Rights Report 
The 2012 U.K. Human Rights Report states that “Fundamental freedoms, 
including freedom of speech, remain severely curtailed [in North Korea].”
477
  
According to the 2010 U.K. Human Rights Report, “Access to information from outside 
the DPRK remains limited.”
478
  The 2007 U.K. Human Rights Report also states that 
“Foreign observers in Pyongyang have been able to directly confirm harsh restraints on 
freedom of information.”
479
  For instance, the 2008 U.K. Human Rights Report 
specifically discloses that “The state tightly controls all media. No foreign books or 
magazines are available for purchase; televisions and radios are pre-tuned so that they 
can only pick up approved domestic broadcasts; and access to the internet is only 
allowed to a select few.”
480
  The 2010 U.K. Human Rights Report also reveals that 
“The DPRK authorities enforce strict bans on listening to radio or watching TV 
programmes broadcast from outside the country. . . . These restrictions have been 
enforced more strictly in recent years . . . .”
481
  Furthermore, the 2012 U.K. Human 
Rights Report divulges that “The DPRK government maintains tight control over media, 
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and access to foreign broadcasting is strictly limited. Reports suggest that people found 
accessing foreign media without authorisation are subject to punishment, including 
imprisonment.”
482
  
Meanwhile, the 2012 U.K. Human Rights Report explains that “There is little 
evidence of freedom of . . . assembly; and the general population is required to attend 
political gatherings in support of the DPRK leadership at regular intervals.
483
  The 
2009 U.K. Human Rights Report also states that “[i]nformation from a variety of 
sources, much of it from defectors from the DPRK, paints a picture of serious and 
widespread abuse. This includes . . . severe restrictions on the freedom of speech, . . . 
assembly and information.”
484
  
The 2007 U.K. Human Rights Report concludes that “There is no freedom of 
[speech and] expression, [and the freedom of press,] assembly, association, . . . or 
information [in North Korea].”
485
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 
 
“The [United Nations] Human Rights Council [remains] . . . [d]eeply concerned at  
the persisting deterioration in the human rights situation in the Democratic  
People’s Republic of Korea, at the continuing reports of systematic,  
widespread and grave violations of . . . economic, social and cultural  
rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea . . . and urging  
the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to  
respect all human rights and fundamental freedoms fully . . . .” 
– The UNHRC Resolution (A/HRC/22/L.19),  
Adopted in the 22nd Session, March 21, 2013 
 
I. The Right to an Adequate Standard of Living 
A. The Arguments of the North Korean Government and Its Main Grounds for 
the Arguments in the DPRK Official Reports 
Article 25 of the North Korean Constitution is the Fundamental Rights Article 
concerning the issue of the right to an adequate standard of living within the country.  
It stipulates the following: 
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea regards the steady 
improvement of the material . . . standards of the people as the supreme 
principle of its activities. The increasing material wealth of society in our 
country, where taxes have been abolished, is used entirely to promote the 
well-being of the working people. The State shall provide all the working 
people with every condition for obtaining food, clothing and housing.
486
  
                                            
486
 Naenara [My Country]: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Constitution: Chapter II The 
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North Korea uses a theoretical approach, which focuses on the core 
implementation mechanism of this Fundamental Rights Article, as the main grounds for 
its arguments in defense of its practices of the right to an adequate standard of living in 
the DPRK Official Reports.  That is to say, the country introduces Article 25 of its 
Constitution as the guaranteed mechanism for the domestic protection of the right to an 
adequate standard of living of its people, as well as the core implementer for the articles 
on this right in the international human rights treaties to which it has acceded in the 
reports.  
 
1. The Fundamental Rights Article as the Guaranteed Mechanism for the 
Domestic Protection of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living 
North Korea adverts to this mechanism in a series of its official reports.  Thus, in 
paragraph 55 of the National Report, the North Korean government argues that “The 
Government takes it as the supreme principle of its activities to steadily raise the 
material . . . standards of people and is taking various legislative . . . measures 
[including Article 25 of its Constitution] to meet the demands of people for affluent life 
                                                                                                                                
Economy, http://naenara.com.kp/en/great/constitution.php?3 (last visited May 3, 2012) [hereinafter North 
Korean Constitution Chapter II]. 
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with decent food, clothing and housing.”
487
  Additionally, in paragraph 57 of the same 
report, the government maintains that “Citizens are provided with dwelling houses from 
the State free of charge and have the rights to the protection of their right to use [the 
houses] . . . , according to [the Article 25 of] the Constitution . . . .”
488
 
In paragraph 135(b) of the Second ICCPR Implementation Report, the North 
Korean government contends that “Popular policies have been adopted for the 
protection of family. The family is the unit in the realization of the popular policies of 
the state to provide all working people with every condition for obtaining food, clothing 
and housing under article 25 of the Constitution.”
489
 
Similarly, in paragraph 3 of the Second ICESCR Implementation Report, the 
North Korean government emphasizes that “Article 25 of the Constitution defines it as 
the obligation of the State to use the material wealth of society entirely for the 
promotion of the well-being of the working people and to provide all working people 
with every living condition.”
490
  In addition, in paragraph 50 of the same report, the 
government states that “The DPRK Government, regarding it as the supreme principle 
                                            
487
 2009 National Report, supra note 11, at 11. 
 
488
 Id.  
 
489
 2000 Second ICCPR Implementation Report, supra note 7, at 34.  
 
490
 2002 Second ICESCR Implementation Report, supra note 8, at 5. 
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of its activities to steadily improve the material and cultural life of people, has adopted 
various . . . legislative steps [including Article 25 of its Constitution] to meet the 
requirement of people for better food, clothing and housing.”
491
  Furthermore, in 
paragraph 14 of the report, the government argues that “Under article 25 of the 
Constitution, the State provides all working people with every condition for obtaining 
food, clothing and housing. That is why working people [in North Korea] have no need 
to hold more than one full-time job to secure an adequate standard of living for 
themselves and their families.”
492
  
In addition to the abovementioned reportings, in paragraph 41 of the Second 
ICESCR Implementation Report, North Korea maintains that “The State has enforced 
various policies for the protection of the family. The State provides all working people 
with every condition for obtaining food, clothing and housing under article 25 of the 
Constitution basically with the family as the unit.”
493
  Finally, in the same paragraph of 
the report, the country states that “[t]he State takes various practical measures to secure 
a stable life of the family, such as supply of dwelling house to working people free of 
                                            
491
 Id. at 19.  
 
492
 Id. at 9.  
 
493
 Id. at 15.  
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charge [under Article 25 of the Constitution] . . . .”
494
  
 
2. The Fundamental Rights Article as the Core Implementer for the Articles on 
the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living in the International Human 
Rights Treaties 
Once again, North Korea presents the Fundamental Rights Article to argue its 
adherence to international human rights treaties in various reports. 
Article 11, paragraph 1 of the ICESCR declares the following: 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone 
to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including 
adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of 
living conditions. The States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure 
the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the essential 
importance of international co-operation based on free consent.
495
 
Regarding the right to an adequate standard of living in the Covenant, North Korea 
offers, in paragraph 50 of the Second ICESCR Implementation Report, that Article 25 
of its Constitution acts as the core implementer that carries out Article 11 of the 
ICESCR as follows:  
VI. ARTICLE 11 - RIGHT TO AN ADEQUATE STANDARD OF 
LIVING 
A. Improvement of livelihood  
50. . . . . The Government assumes the entire responsibility of taking care of 
                                            
494
 Id.  
 
495
 ICESCR, supra note 4, art. 11, ¶ 1. 
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the material . . . life of working people under article 25, paragraph 3, of the 
Constitution: “The State shall provide all working people with every 
condition for obtaining food, clothing and housing.”
496
 
Article 3, paragraph 1 of CRC stipulates that “In all actions concerning children, 
whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, 
administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a 
primary consideration.”
497
  Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Convention provides that 
“States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as is necessary for 
his or her well-being, taking into account the rights and duties of his or her parents, 
legal guardians, or other individuals legally responsible for him or her, and, to this end, 
shall take all appropriate legislative and administrative measures.”
498
  In paragraphs 63 
and 64 of the Combined CRC Implementation Report, the North Korean government 
provides Article 25 of its Constitution, amongst others, as the core mechanism to carry 
out Article 3 of the CRC: 
B. Best interests of the child (art. 3)  
63. The Constitution . . . contain[s] the fundamental principles and 
requirements of article 3 of the Convention on giving primary consideration 
to the best interests of the children in all activities affecting them. 
64. The Constitution provides . . . that the State regards the steady 
improvement of the material and cultural standards of people as the 
supreme principle of its activities, the increasing material wealth of society 
                                            
496
 2002 Second ICESCR Implementation Report, supra note 8, at 19. 
 
497
 CRC, supra note 5, art. 3, ¶ 1. 
 
498
 CRC, supra note 5, art. 3, ¶ 2. 
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is used entirely to promote the well-being of the working people and the 
State shall provide all the working people with every condition for 
obtaining food, clothing and housing (art. 25).
499
 
 
3. The Diagrammatization of the Core Implementation Mechanism Model  
The core implementation mechanism model of Article 25, which shows both 
North Korea’s arguments in defense of its practices of the right to an adequate standard 
of living and the main grounds for its arguments in the DPRK Official Reports, is 
diagrammatized below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
499
 2007 Combined CRC Implementation Report, supra note 10, at 18. 
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<Diagram 10> The Core Implementation Mechanism Model of the Fundamental Rights 
Article in the DPRK Official Reports 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. The Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Articles and the Influence of Juche Ideology 
and Marxism-Leninism on the Articles 
The North Korean Constitution has two Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Articles 
 
Article 25 
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concerning the issue of the right to an adequate standard of living within the country.  
One is Article 34, which provides the following: 
The national economy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is a 
[centrally] planned economy. The State shall draw up and implement the 
plans for the development of the national economy in accordance with the 
laws of socialist economic development so that the balance between 
accumulation and consumption can be maintained correctly, economic 
construction accelerated, the people’s standard of living steadily raised and 
the nation’s defence capabilities strengthened. The State shall ensure a high 
rate of growth in production and a balanced development of the national 
economy by implementing unified and detailed planning.
500
  
The other is Article 3 of the same Constitution, which stipulates that “The 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is guided in its activities by . . . the Songun 
[military-first] idea . . . .”
501
  
“A centrally planned economy” in Article 34 and “a command economy” are 
terms which have the same meaning.
502
  A command or centrally planned economy can 
be defined as “An economic system in which all resources are government-owned and 
production is coordinated by the central plans of government.”
503
  On the other hand, a 
free-market economy, which is the opposite of a command economy, is “An economic 
                                            
500
 North Korean Constitution Chapter II, supra note 486. 
 
501
 North Korean Constitution Chapter I, supra note 205.  
 
502
 See ROBERT E. HALL & MARC LIEBERMAN, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS 42 (5th ed. 
2009) (“In a command economy, resources are allocated mostly by explicit instructions form some higher 
authority. Because the government must plan these instructions in advance, command economies are also 
called centrally planned economies.”).  
 
503
 WILLIAM A. MCEACHERN, CONTEMPORARY ECONOMICS 37 (Dave Shaut et al. eds., 2005). 
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system with no government involvement so that private firms account for all 
production.”
504
  
A market economy is an efficient system that can guarantee the right to an 
adequate standard of living.  It improves the economic power and financial capacities 
of a country, which is the major premise in securing and promoting the welfare of the 
people.
505
  In contrast, as many scholars point out, a centrally planned economy 
prescribed in Article 34 is an inefficient system for the protection of the right to an 
adequate standard of living, because it ultimately leads to public poverty and misery, 
                                            
504
 Id. at 35.  
As Dr. Ben S. Bernanke, who is former Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, and Professor of Economics Robert H. Frank at Cornell University pointed out astutely, there 
exist no pure free-market economies in the world today. Currently, most nations adopt “modified 
capitalist economies,” also called “mixed economies.” However, the essence of a free-market economy is 
that resources are distributed through the free decision making of individual in private market. Thus, as 
long as this function of the private market is guaranteed and operated, it still makes sense to call such 
economic systems free-market economies. Dr. Bernanke and Professor Frank explain in details about the 
issue of free-market economic system of today and its name as follows: 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century we are therefore left, for the most part, with 
the second major form of economic system, one in which production and distribution 
decisions are left to individuals interacting in private markets. In the so-called capitalist, or 
free-market, economies, people decide for themselves which careers to pursue and which 
products to produce or buy. In fact, there are no pure free-market economies today. Modern 
industrial countries are more properly described as “mixed economies,” meaning that 
goods and services are allocated by a combination of free markets, regulation, and other 
forms of collective control. Still, it makes sense to refer to such systems as free-market 
economies, because people are for the most part free to start businesses, to shut them down, 
or to sell them. And within broad limits, the distribution of goods and services is 
determined by individual preferences backed by individual purchasing power, which in 
most cases comes from the income people earn in the labor market. 
ROBERT H. FRANK & BEN S. BERNANKE, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 61-62 (3rd ed. 2007).  
 
505
 See RANDALL HOLCOMBE, ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS 119 (2007) (“There is no 
doubt that market economies provide the environment for . . . prosperity.”); see also MCEACHERN, supra 
note 503, at 35 (“A pure market economy offers resource owners the freedom and the incentive to get the 
most from their resources.”); FRANK & BERNANKE, supra note 504, at 62 (“In country after country, 
markets have replaced centralized control for the simple reason that they tend to assign production tasks 
and consumption benefits much more effectively.”). 
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and the collapse of the national economy.
506
 
Professor of Economics R. Glenn Hubbard at Columbia University and Professor 
of Economics Anthony Patrick O’Brien at Lehigh University explain this correlation 
between an economic system and the living standards of the people as follows:  
In countries such as Cuba and North Korea, the free market system has 
been rejected in favor of centrally planned economies with extensive 
government control over product and factor markets.
507
 Countries that 
come closest to the free-market benchmark have been more successful than 
countries with centrally planned economies in providing their people with 
rising living standards.
508
  
Professor of Economics William A. McEachern at the University of Connecticut 
also states the following:  
Consider countries that have been cut in two by political and economic 
ideology. In such cases, the economies began with similar resources and 
income levels right after the split. Over time the market-oriented economies 
produced a much higher standard of living than the centrally planned 
economies. . . . As another example, income per capita in market-oriented 
South Korea is about 12 times that of North Korea, perhaps the most 
                                            
506
 See BRIAN P. SIMPSON, MARKETS DON’T FAIL! 22 (2005) (“Socialism leads to misery and poverty. . . . 
Furthermore, socialism leads to poverty because it uses a system of central planning . . . .”); see also JOHN 
B. TAYLOR, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 513 (5th ed. 2007) (“It was the economic failure of central 
planning and strict state control that led to socialism’s demise. The failure of the centrally planned 
economy in East Germany in comparison with the success of the market economy in West Germany was 
as close as the real world ever gets to a controlled experiment.”); PETER W. SPERLICH, ROTTEN 
FOUNDATIONS: THE CONCEPTUAL BASIS OF THE MARXIST-LENINIST REGIMES OF EAST GERMANY AND 
OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE SOVIET BLOC 51 (2002) (“Marxist-Leninist policies have produced not only 
totalitarian politics but economic disasters – the persistent agricultural problems and chronic industrial 
backwardness of the USSR being the most obvious examples . . . .”). 
 
507
 See R. GLENN HUBBARD & ANTHONY P. O’BRIEN, ESSENTIALS OF ECONOMICS 50 (2nd ed. 2008) 
(“Product markets[:] Markets for goods–such as computers–and services–such as medical treatment.”); 
see also id. (“Factor markets[:] Markets for the factors of production, such as labor, capital, natural 
resources, and entrepreneurial ability.”). 
 
508
 Id. at 52; R. GLENN HUBBARD & ANTHONY P. O’BRIEN, MICROECONOMICS 52 (2nd ed. 2007). 
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centrally planned economy in the world.
509
 
As in the abovementioned instance, significant economic indices between South 
Korea and North Korea, which are countries that share much of the same factors in 
terms of culture, people, national character, climate, language, the time to adopt the 
economic system, and so forth, besides the economic system itself, are commonly 
quoted to vividly demonstrate beyond mere theoretical explanations how the differences 
between the economic systems affect the national economic prosperity and 
improvement in standards of living of the people.
510
  
 
<Table 2> Comparison of Economic Indices between ROK and DPRK
511
 
                                            
509
 MCEACHERN, supra note 503, at 39. 
 
510
 Professor of Economics Charles I. Jones at Stanford University states the following: 
For example, consider North and South Korea, East and West Germany, and Hong Kong 
and mainland China. Historically, each pair was once a single country (and, in the case of 
Germany, is today). The people in each region share similar cultures, and there are no 
obvious advantages in geography on one side or the other. Moreover, these neighbors had 
relatively similar incomes. At the end of various wars, though, the regions were separated 
into distinct countries with different governments and institutions. 
Over the course of just a few generations, enormous differences in income emerged 
between these siblings. North Korea is one of the poorest regions of the world today, while 
South Korea is one of the growth miracles. At the time of the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 
1989, standards of living in East and West Germany were substantially different. And even 
after rapid growth in China during the last two decades, per capita GDP in Hong Kong is 
estimated to be 8 times higher than in China.  
CHARLES I. JONES, MACROECONOMICS 85-86 (Jack Repcheck et al. eds., 2008); See CAMPBELL 
MCCONNELL ET AL., MACROECONOMICS 39 (18th ed. 2008) (“North Korea, under the influence of the 
Soviet Union, established a command economy that emphasized government ownership and central 
government planning [in 1948]. South Korea, protected by the United States, established a market 
economy based upon private ownership and the profit motive [in the same year].”).  
 
511
 THE ROK MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, DEFENSE WHITE PAPER 2008 at 317 (2008).  
Professor Kyung-Ae Park at the University of British Columbia explains the economic situation of North 
and South Korea during the 1980s and 1990s quoting the major economic indicators of the two countries 
at that time: 
The most dramatic losing battle [between North and South Korea] is in the economic arena. 
As was the case in the 1980s, North Korea’s [centrally planned] economy continues to sag 
in the 1990s. Since it recorded its first negative economic growth rate of minus 3.7 percent 
in 1990, it has exhibited negative growth for nine consecutive years. North Korea’s foreign 
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Classification 
ROK DPRK 
Comparison of 
ROK and DPRK 
2006 2007 2006 2007 2006 2007 
GNI ($ billions)  887.3 971.3 25.6 26.7 
34.7 
times 
36.4 
times 
GNI per capita 
($) 
18,372 20,045 1,108 1,152 
16.6 
times 
17.4 
times 
Economic growth 
rate (%) by GNI 
5.1 5.0 –1.1 –2.3 – – 
Total trade 
volume  
($ billions) 
634.85 728.33 3.0 2.94 
211.9 
times 
247.6 
times 
Total population 
(millions) 
48.30 48.46 23.08 23.20 
2.1 
times 
2.1 
times 
※ GNI (Gross National Income): International organizations such as the UN, IMF [International Monetary Fund], 
etc. and major advanced nations are using GNI instead of GNP [Gross National Product]. (GNI ≒ GNP [≒ 
GDP])
512
 
 
As Emeritus Professor Robin Okey at the University of Warwick stresses, it 
                                                                                                                                
debt was over $10 billion already in 1993, which was equivalent to 50.3% of its GNP. . . . 
In contrast, South Korea’s [free market-based] economic performance . . . had drawn world 
attention. According to a World Bank report, from 1985 through 1993, South Korea 
recorded the second highest GNP growth rate of 8.1%, after Thailand’s 8.4%, and its GNP 
in 1996 ranked 11th in the world.(citation omitted) Its GNP was 25 times higher than that 
of North Korea in 1997.(citation omitted) In short, South Korea’s success in economic . . . 
area[] stands in sharp contrast to North Korea’s decline, and this has been a great challenge 
to Pyongyang. 
Kyung-Ae Park, Sources of North Korea’s Foreign Policy Leverage toward the U.S.: The Case of the 
Nuclear Deal, in KOREA IN THE 21ST CENTURY 131, 144 (Seung-Ho Joo & Tae-Hwan Kwak eds., 2001). 
 
512
 See THE ECONOMIST, GUIDE TO ECONOMIC INDICATORS: MAKING SENSE OF ECONOMICS 29 (7th ed. 
2011) (“The difference between GDP [Gross Domestic Product] and GNI or GNP is usually relatively 
small, perhaps 1% of GDP . . . .”); see also Matthew Clarke, Gross National Product (GNP), in 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 300, 300 (Tim Forsyth ed., 2005) (“For net investing 
economies, GNP [GNI] is usually higher than GDP as overseas income is taken into account. The 
differences between GDP and GNP [GNI] however are generally not significant.”); N. GREGORY MANKIW, 
PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 513 (4th ed. 2007) (“For most countries, including the United States, domestic 
residents are responsible for most domestic production, so GDP and GNP [GNI] are quite close.”).  
GDP is “the market value of all final goods and services produced within a country in a given period of 
time.” Id. at 510. Additionally, GNP is “the total income earned by a nation’s permanent residents (called 
nationals). It differs from GDP by including income that our citizens earn abroad and excluding income 
that foreigners earn here.” Id. at 513.  
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demonstrates vividly that “Prosperity could not be planned in the absence of normally 
functioning markets and prices.”
513
  In addition, as Professor of Economics N. Gregory 
Mankiw at Harvard University emphasizes, it graphically shows that “[m]arket 
economies have proven remarkably successful in organizing economic activity in a way 
that promotes overall economic well-being.”
514
  Thus, almost all communist states 
except Cuba and North Korea, which suffered chronic public poverty and severe 
economic depression under the inefficient system of a centrally planned economy, have 
already chosen the transition from command economies to market economies.
515
  The 
entrenchment of market economies in communist countries, which took to command 
economies previously, is a long haul.  However, once the market economies start to 
settle down in the countries, they function as cornerstones for the development of the 
                                            
513
 OKEY, supra note 224, at 72.  
 
514
 N. GREGORY MANKIW, ESSENTIALS OF ECONOMICS 9 (3rd ed. 2004).  
 
515
 Professor of Economics Robert E. Hall at Stanford University and Professor of Economics Marc 
Lieberman at New York University explains the following: 
[c]ommand economies are disappearing fast. Until about 25 years ago, examples would 
have included the former Soviet Union, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, China, and 
many others, Beginning in the late 1980s, all of these nations began abandoning central 
planning, The only examples left today are Cuba and North Korea, and even these 
economies – though still dominated by central planning – occasionally take steps away 
from it.  
HALL & LIEBERMAN, supra note 502, at 42; ROBERT E. HALL & MARC LIEBERMAN, MICROECONOMICS: 
PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS 41 (4th ed. 2008).  
Dr. Bernanke and Professor Frank also states the following: 
[w]ith the fall of the Soviet Union and its satellite nations in the late 1980s, there are now 
only three communist economies left in the world: Cuba, North Korea, and China. The first 
two of these appear to be on their last legs, economically speaking, and China has by now 
largely abandoned any attempt to control production and distribution decisions from the 
center.  
FRANK & BERNANKE, supra note 504, at 61. 
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nations’ economies and the driving force to promote the welfare of the people.  
Professor of Economics John B. Taylor at Stanford University explains the following: 
The transition from the failed centrally planned economies to market 
economies did not go smoothly for many countries, especially Russia and 
other countries that belonged to the former Soviet Union. However, in 
recent times, many of these countries have seen higher rates of economic 
growth and reason for optimism about the future. Other centrally planned 
economies, like Poland, Hungary, and especially China, have made more 
successful transitions and made great progress in raising living standards 
over the past decade.
516
  
All in all, the collection of the abovementioned remarks and facts show that the 
pursuit of and the adherence to centrally planned economy are essentially incompatible 
with the guarantee of the right to an adequate standard of living.  The only economic 
system that brings improvement to standards of living into people’s lives is the market 
economy.  
Meanwhile, the pillar of the military-first policy in Article 3 of the North Korean 
Constitution is literally that the military must have top priority in the allocation of 
resources unconditionally.
517
  Thus, this key policy of North Korea takes for granted 
all civilian sacrifices, losses, and sufferings, which are caused by the unbalanced and 
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 TAYLOR, supra note 506, at 513.  
 
517
 See EDDIE BURDICK, THREE DAYS IN THE HERMIT KINGDOM: AN AMERICAN VISITS NORTH KOREA 188 
(2010) (“Most pundits agree that Songun means simply ‘military first.’ In essence, the Songun Policy 
dictates that priority in resource distribution is granted to the military.”); see also Suk Hi Kim, North 
Korea: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, in THE SURVIVAL OF NORTH KOREA: ESSAYS ON STRATEGY, 
ECONOMICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 11, 18 (Suk Hi Kim et al. eds., 2011) (“Sŏn’gun, often 
spelled Songun, is North Korea’s “military-first” policy, which prioritizes the [North] Korean People’s 
Army in the affairs of state and in the allocation of national resources.(citation omitted)”).  
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unreasonable distribution system of resources for the military-first policy.
518
  
As reviewed earlier, North Korea, under the centrally planned economy, is one of 
the world’s poorest countries.
519
  Nonetheless, North Korea has as many as 1.1 million 
in the North Korean People’s Army, which is the fifth largest standing armed forces in 
the world after China, the U.S., Russia, and India.
520
  Considering that North Korea’s 
population is only 22.7 million, it is the world’s highest standing army as a percentage 
of population.  The country also has one of the largest stock of chemical and biological 
weapons in the world, with its eight biochemical production facilities.
521
  Furthermore, 
                                            
518
 See DANIEL SCHWEKENDIEK, A SOCIOECONOMIC HISTORY OF NORTH KOREA 88 (2011) (“These 
measures culminated in 1994, when the DPRK announced its military-first policy (Songun) at the peak of 
the ravaging famine: all scarce resources, including food, are first to be distributed to the people’s army – 
regardless of whatever civilian losses may result.”); see also Suk Hi Kim, supra note 206, at 35 
(“[S]ongun is perceived as an aggressive policy that privileges the North Korean military at the expense 
of other sectors of society.”). 
 
519
 See supra Chapter Five.I.B; see also HOLCOMBE, supra note 505, at 119 (“North Korea, as of this 
writing, is still suffering under their centrally planned economy, and while North Korea is one of the 
poorest nations in the world, South Korea, with its market economy, is one of the more prosperous 
nations with one of the more rapidly growing economies.”).  
 
520
 See Terence Roehrig, North Korea, in DEFENSE AND SECURITY: A COMPENDIUM OF NATIONAL ARMED 
FORCES AND SECURITY POLICIES (VOLUME II: NEW ZEALAND – YUGOSLAVIA) at 525, 536 (Karl DeRouen, 
Jr. & Uk Heo eds., 2005) (“North Korea is often characterized as one of the most militarized countries in 
the world. [I]t has a standing armed force of almost 1.1 million active duty soldiers, making it fifth largest 
in the world behind China, the United States, Russia, and India.”); see also BARBARA A. WEIGHTMAN, 
DRAGONS AND TIGERS: A GEOGRAPHY OF SOUTH, EAST, AND SOUTHEAST ASIA 366 (3rd ed. 2010) (“North 
Korea, with its population of a mere 22.7 million, has the fifth largest standing army in the world after 
China, the United States, Russia, and India.”); Tomohiko Kawaguchi, One Year After the Kim-Kim Talks: 
North Korea and International Security, in GLOBALIZATION REDUX: NEW NAME, SAME GAME 133, 134 
(Tom Conner & Ikuko Torimoto eds., 2004) (“The North Korean People’s Army, which includes the army, 
navy, and air force, numbers over 1.2 million, making it the fifth largest active duty force in the world. 
Limited production of aircraft and artillery systems continues alongside the ongoing manufacture of 
missiles, submarines, and armored vehicles.”). 
 
521
 See WEIGHTMAN, supra note 520, at 366 (“[T]he DPRK has one of the world’s largest biological and 
chemical arsenals with enormous stocks of anthrax, cholera, and plague. It also has eight biochemical 
production facilities.”). 
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it owns a very large quantity of conventional weapons.
522
  Thus, North Korea spends 
an abnormally excessive ratio of defense expenditure to its GDP annually to maintain 
the abnormal scale of conventional forces and weapons in comparison to its economic 
power:  
 
<Table 3> North Korean Annual Military Expenditures (1991-2006)
523
 
(Figures in parentheses represent military expenditures officially announced by North Korea)      (Unit: $ billions) 
 
 
Year 
 
 
GNI (as 
announced 
by the Bank 
of Korea) 
Total Budget  
(as announced 
by North 
Korea) 
Military 
Expenditure 
Ratio (%) of 
Military 
Expenditure  
to GNI [GDP] 
Ratio (%) of 
Military 
Expenditure to 
Total Budget 
Exchange 
Rate (1 US 
dollar: North 
Korean won) 
1991 22.9 17.17 5.13 (2.08) 22.4 29.9 (12.1) 2.15 
1992 21.1 18.45 5.54 (2.10) 26.3 30 (11.4) 1.13 
1993 20.5 18.72 5.62 (2.15) 27.2 30 (11.4) 2.15 
1994 21.2 19.19 5.76 (2.19) 27.2 30 (11.5) 2.16 
1995 22.3 20.82 6.24 28 30 2.05 
1996 21.4 – 5.78 27 – 2.14 
1997 17.7 9.10 4.78 27 52 2.16 
1998 12.6 9.10 4.78 (1.33) 37.9 52 (14.6) 2.20 
1999 15.8 9.23 4.78 (1.35) 30 51 (14.6) 2.17 
2000 16.8 9.57 5.0 (1.37) 29.8 52 (14.3) 2.19 
2001 15.7 9.81 5.0 (1.41) 31.8 51 (14.4) 2.21 
2002 17.0 10.01 5.0 (1.49) 29.4 50 (14.9) 2.21 
2003 18.4 11.25 5.0 (1.77) 27.4 44.4 (15.6) 2.21 
2004  2.51 (0.39)  (15.6) 139.0 
2005  2.90 (0.46)  (15.9) 140.0 
2006  2.94 (0.47)  (15.9) 143.0 
※ The amount of military expenditures during the period [] [of] 1995 to 1997 represents estimated expenditures at 
the average ratio of 27% to GNI. 
※ For 2003, the exchange rate before Economic Improvement Measures on July 1, 2002 is applied. 
※ After 2004, the estimation of military expenditures in North Korea was restricted because of sharp increases of 
North Korea’s exchange rate. [Only] [][t]he amounts announced by North Korea were [] presented. 
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The fact that the ratio of North Korea’s defense expenditure to its GDP is 
abnormally high becomes clearer when we review the defense budget ratio to GDP of 
other major countries: 
 
<Table 4> Comparison of Military Expenditures of Major Countries
524
 
Nation 
GDP 
($ billions) 
Defense Budget 
($ billions) 
Defense Budget Ratio 
to GDP (%) 
ROK 649.5 15.7 2.4 
US 11,700.0 455.0 3.9 
Japan 4,660.0 45.1 1.0 
China 1,680.0 62.5 3.7 
Russia 1,400.0 61.9 4.4 
UK 2,130.0 49.6 2.3 
France 2,000.0 51.6 2.6 
Germany 2,670.0 37.7 1.4 
Israel 117.0 9.7 8.3 
Egypt 76.2 3.5 4.6 
Saudi Arabia 236.0 19.3 8.2 
Australia 598.0 14.3 2.4 
Turkey 297.0 10.1 3.4 
Malaysia 117.0 2.3 1.9 
Taiwan 304.0 7.5 2.5 
Thailand 161.0 1.9 1.2 
Singapore 105.0 5.0 4.8 
※ Source: The Military Balance 2005-2006 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Oct. 2005). The 
ROK data based on government statistics. (Exchange Rate: 1,200 won/$ applied)  
 
As shown in the tables, the defense budget ratio to GDP of North Korea is 
overwhelming compared to that of other major countries.  Professor Terence Roehrig, 
who is the Director of the Asia-Pacific Studies Group at the U.S. Naval War College, 
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gives his explanation about this overall situation as follows: 
Though estimates vary, North Korea devotes close to $5.2 billion for 
defense, placing it twenty-first in the world. Defense spending represents 34 
percent of GDP, the highest rate of any country in the world (CIA [Central 
Intelligence Agency] World Factbook: 2005). Most of the defense budget is 
devoted to maintaining a large conventional capability . . . .
525
  
Professor Tomohiko Kawaguchi at the College of International Relations of 
Nihon University in Japan also makes a statement to the same effect that “[N]orth Korea 
continues to invest 25 to 33 percent of its GNP [GDP] annually in the military (as 
compared to 3 percent in the U.S. and 1 percent in Japan). Clearly, military spending is 
the top priority of the North Korean economy.”
526
  
Thus, it is no wonder, then, that North Korea has a small budget and little 
resources for the welfare of the people under this Songun policy.  Additionally, it is not 
surprising that North Korea cannot even invest the minimum into its economic 
development, which is the key premise for the welfare of the people, because of the 
military-first policy.  For these reasons, the CIA emphasizes that “Large-scale 
military spending draws off resources needed for investment and civilian 
consumption.”
527
  Professor Kawaguchi also explains in detail about the overall 
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situation of the North Korean economy and the lives of North Korean people under the 
military-first policy:  
[t]he “military first” policy has ruined the North Korean economy. The 
figures speak for themselves. GNP declined by 55 percent from 1990 to 
1998, to the equivalent of approximately 12 billion U.S dollars; foreign 
debt is rapidly approaching the same figure; foreign trade is at only 10 
percent of GNP; per capita income is less than 600 U.S. dollars; many 
factories are being closed, with those remaining open operating at less than 
20 percent of capacity; daily grain rations for ordinary people vary between 
100 and 200 grams, which is the equivalent of one half to one bowl of rice; 
and estimates of the number of deaths from hunger and disease over the last 
five years range from several hundred thousand to three million – despite 
foreign aid equivalent to 1.6 billion U.S. dollars since 1995.
528
 
Ultimately, the series of the abovementioned facts and remarks show that the 
pursuit of the military-first policy for the possession of strong military power is 
essentially incompatible with the guarantee of the right to an adequate standard of living. 
The pursuit of a centrally planned economy and the military-first policy, which is 
demonstrated in the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Articles, is one of the key tenets of 
Juche Ideology and Marxism-Leninism, the two anti-human rights and ruling ideologies 
controlling North Korea.  
 
1. Marxism-Leninism for Centrally Planned Economy and Its Influence on the 
Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Article 
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A centrally planned economy was proposed by Karl Marx in the mid-nineteenth 
century.  Professor Emeritus Bradley R. Schiller at American University, who is a 
renowned economist, explains that “In the mid-nineteenth century, Karl Marx proposed 
a radical alternative: . . . . Marx’s writings (Das Kapital, 1867) encouraged communist 
revolutions and the development of central planning systems. The (people’s) 
government, not the market, assumed responsibility for deciding what goods were 
produced, at what prices they were sold, and even who got them.”
529
   
Professor Schiller also emphasizes the following: 
Marx argued that the government not only had to intervene but had to own 
all the means of production – the factories, the machinery, the land – in 
order to avoid savage inequalities. In Das Kapital (1867) and the 
revolutionary Communist Manifesto (1848), he laid the foundation for a 
communist state in which the government would be the master of economic 
outcomes.
530 
  
Like Marx, Lenin also preferred a centrally planned economy.  He inherited this 
economic theory of Marx faithfully and applied it to practice following the Russian 
Revolution of 1917.  Professor John B. Taylor explains these overall situations at the 
time in detail as follows: 
V. I. Lenin and the Bolshevik party (also known as the Communist party) 
gained control of the government of Russia in the October Revolution of 
1917. . . . Lenin and the Bolsheviks seized the opportunity, forcing through 
a completely new economic system. Most significantly, Lenin decreed that 
                                            
529
 BRADLEY R. SCHILLER, ESSENTIALS OF ECONOMICS 15 (7th ed. 2008).  
 
530
 BRADLEY R. SCHILLER, THE ECONOMY TODAY 13 (12th ed. 2010).  
 208 
private firms would be taken over by the government, a process called 
nationalization. The Bolsheviks immediately nationalized the banking 
system, and by mid-1918, a massive nationalization of large- and small-
scale industry was under way. . . . He [Lenin] argued that people like 
himself were needed to run the economy on behalf of the workers. He 
began controlling production from the center, appointing administrators to 
run each industry from offices in Moscow. In doing so, he laid the 
foundation of a command economy, in which government diktats, or 
commands, rather than prices and decentralized markets, would determine 
what was produced. In 1921, Gosplan, the state planning commission, was 
established. In 1922, the Communist party established the Soviet Union, 
incorporating Ukraine and other countries along with Russia into one large 
command economy.
531
  
Ultimately, the pursuit of a command economy has become one of the core 
principles of Marxism-Leninism.  Additionally, this key economic tenet of the 
unofficial ruling ideology of North Korea was publicly legislated in Article 34, which is 
one of the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Articles on the right to an adequate standard of 
living.  
 
2. Juche Ideology for Centrally Planned Economy and Its Influence on the 
Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Article 
Kim Il-Sung preferred the command economic system very much because the 
economic model of Marx and Lenin was a useful measure necessary to maintain and 
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strengthen his one-man dictatorship.
532
  The Marxist-Leninist economic system in 
North Korea not only enabled Kim Il-Sung to have monopolistic control over the whole 
national economy but also facilitated his powerful control over the people through the 
central food rationing system of North Korean government.
533
 
As reviewed earlier, it is true that the Marxist-Leninist economic system is an 
inefficient system, which ultimately leads to public poverty and misery.
534
  However, 
the welfare of the mass of people is just a subsidiary matter to such brutal dictators as 
Kim Il-Sung, Kim Jong-Il, and Kim Jong-Un, who always put maintaining their 
dictatorial powers as top priority above all else.
535
  Consequently, Kim Il-Sung’s strong 
preference for the economic model of Marx and Lenin was faithfully reflected in his 
theory, and the pursuit of a command economy has become one of the core principles of 
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Juche ideology.  
It is the common opinion of many scholars and researchers that the pursuit of a 
command economy is a core principle of Juche ideology.  To cite a few examples, 
Professor Youn-Suk Kim at Kean University in New Jersey, who is an expert on Asian 
economy, clearly states that “[t]he North possesses a unique type of command economy 
based on juche ideology, that is, a system of self-reliance.”
536
  
In addition, Keith A. Leitich, a political analyst and an expert on East Asia, 
explains that “Developing a hybrid economic model of Marxism-Leninism called Juché, 
Kim II Sung attempted to build an independent, self-reliant national economy through 
the establishment of an all-encompassing command economy, limiting economic 
relations with other countries while playing Cold War allies . . . .”
537
  
Furthermore, Dr. Samuel S. Kim, who is a senior research scholar at the East 
Asian Institute of Columbia University, describes North Korea’s command economic 
system based on Juche ideology using an expression such as “[J]uche as the official 
ideology and backbone of the command economy [of North Korea].”
538
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Finally, Paul French, an expert on North Korean and Chinese matters, emphasizes 
North Korea’s central planned economy based on Juche ideology in expressions such as 
“Central planning is enshrined in the overarching political value system – Juche.”
539
 
and “[t]he command economy and the havoc it has caused will last as long as Juche and 
its proponents remain the dominant force in [North Korean] society.”
540
 to depict it. 
This key economic tenet of the official ruling ideology of North Korea was 
publicly legislated in Article 34, which is one of the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist 
Articles on the right to an adequate standard of living. 
 
3. Marxism-Leninism for the Military-First Policy and Its Influence on the 
Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Article 
Lenin defines modern imperialism as follows:  
[m]odern imperialism [] [is] the monopoly stage of capitalism
541
 which . . . 
“converted this work of construction into an instrument for oppressing a 
thousand million people [in the colonies and semi-colonies], that is, more 
than half the population of the globe, which inhabits the subject countries, 
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as well as the wage slaves of capitalism in the lands of 
civilization.”(citation omitted)
542
  
Thus, from Marxism-Leninism’s point of view, the spread of the imperialist 
forces of the West should be blocked, and furthermore, be conquered at any cost.
543
  
Then there remains the issue of attaining this ultimate goal.  As Professor Emeritus of 
political science Peter W. Sperlich at the University of California, Berkeley pointed out 
well, “Typically, Marxism-Leninism is imposed and maintained by force. Without force 
it crumbles and melts away.”
544
  That is to say, force is the most essential factor of all 
Marxist-Leninist theories.  Thus, Marxism-Leninism seeks to find the solution in the 
possession of a strong military force to stop the proliferation of the so-called imperialist 
forces of the West.  According to a Marxist-Leninist thesis, “[s]o long as imperialism 
exists wars are inevitable.”
545
  In other words, an ever-present threat of war always 
resides in socialist countries as long as the imperialist states exist.  Furthermore, in the 
viewpoint of the Marxist-Leninist thesis, the socialist countries are encircled by 
imperialist countries, which are vigilantly awaiting an opportunity to invade the 
Marxist-Leninist countries.  For these reasons, the possession of strong military power 
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against Western imperialist forces is emphasized incessantly in Marxism-Leninism.  
According to Marxism-Leninism, even the time of peaceful coexistence through the 
diplomatic relations with imperialist states cannot be more than a so-called “breathing 
space for war,” which means the strategic time to prepare for the inevitable war between 
socialist and imperialist states and the final victory over imperialist powers.
546
  Dr. 
William E. Odom, who was a leading authority on the military affairs of the Soviet 
Union and a former Director of the National Security Agency (NSA) under President 
Ronald Reagan, explains the Marxist-Leninist emphasis on the possession of strong 
military power against imperialist forces: 
[M]arxism-Leninism is indeed a significant factor in any explanation of 
why the Soviet Union built such large military forces and why they devised 
the kinds of war plans they did.(footnote omitted) Based on a class analysis, 
the General Staff could easily identify the “threat” against which it had to 
plan for war. The “probable enemy” included all [imperialist] countries in 
which private ownership of the means of production existed. The number of 
such countries was quite large, forming a great encircling ring around the 
Soviet Union, its Warsaw Pact allies, and other socialist states. 
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Moreover, the Communist Party consistently emphasized such class 
analysis in its strategic guidance to the military, and its practical articulation 
was fairly consistent throughout Soviet history.
547
 
This key military tenet of the unofficial ruling ideology of North Korea was 
publicly legislated in Article 3, which is one of the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Articles 
on the right to an adequate standard of living. 
 
4. Juche Ideology for the Military-First Policy and Its Influence on the Juchist 
and Marxist-Leninist Article  
A powerful army under the monopolistic control of a dictator is essential to 
maintain and protect his dictatorship.
548
  Additionally, if the dictator can disguise the 
army’s original role of being the faithful guardian to his dictatorial government, and 
instead, through effective propaganda, instill into the minds of the people that the army 
is not in his service, but in fact the defender of citizens, fighting against impure exterior 
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enemies, he can successfully instigate integral unity through its propagandized role in 
protecting the people’s sovereignty.  By breeding gratitude and respect for it, the army 
within the control of the dictator becomes a very helpful means to strengthen his 
dictatorial power.  Thus, Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-Il devised the theory on the 
military-first policy of Juche ideology in imitation of the Marxist-Leninist theory on the 
imperialist forces of the West.  As a result, the pursuit of the military-first policy for 
the possession of strong military power against the imperialist forces has become one of 
the core principles of Juche ideology.
549
  For this reason, Paul French, the expert on 
North Korean matters, stresses that “In Juche thinking, as long as imperialist countries 
continue to exist so the military-first line will remain paramount.”
550
  
The imperialist power of the West, which has become the biggest threat to the 
national security of North Korea, is none other than the U.S. in the viewpoint of the 
military-first policy of Juche ideology.  Dr. Andrew C. Nahm, who is former professor 
emeritus and director of the Center for Korean Studies at Western Michigan University, 
states the following:  
While claiming several diplomatic victories over the United States, in 
September 1969 Chae Yun-Hyung, vice-chairman of the Central Committee 
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of North Korean Journalists Union, said at the International Organization of 
Journalists meeting held in P’yŏngyang that “U.S. imperialism is a main 
force of aggression and war, international gendarme, bulwark of modern 
colonialism, and the most barbarous and most shameless aggressor of 
modern times and chieftain of world imperialism. . . . No place on earth is 
safe from the tentacles of aggression stretched out by U.S. imperialism and 
no country is free from the menace of U.S. imperialist aggression.”(citation 
omitted)
551
 
In addition, Dr. Alexandre Mansourov, who is an expert on the Korean Peninsula 
and former Professor of Security Studies at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies 
in Honolulu, Hawaii, emphasizes the following:  
Below are some of the most representative examples of North Korean 
perceptions of Bush administration policy. First of all, revealing the mixed 
influence of classic Marxist-Leninist teachings on imperialism and current 
global balance-of-power assessments, the North Korean leaders believe that 
in the post-Cold War world, America’s ultimate goal is to remain the 
world’s “only superpower” and to establish a new international order that 
will ensure and support U.S. global hegemony.
552
  
Thus, these anti-imperialist views of the world held by the North Korean 
leadership class easily justify North Korea’s military adventurism, including its nuclear 
program through Juche’s military theory on U.S. imperialism, which was borrowed 
from the imperialism of Marxism-Leninism.
553
  Additionally, as long as the U.S. and 
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its allies exist, the leaders will neither weaken nor withdraw Juche’s pursuit of the 
military-first policy for the possession of powerful military force against U.S. 
imperialism.  
This key military tenet of the official ruling ideology of North Korea was publicly 
legislated in Article 3, which is one of the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Articles on the 
right to an adequate standard of living.  
 
C. The New Refuting Theory and Its Incapacitation Mechanism Model  
The North Korean Constitution contains two fundamentally distinct types of 
articles with opposing function and operation in terms of the guarantee of the right to an 
adequate standard of living.  One type is the Fundamental Rights Article, such as 
Article 25, and the other is the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Article, such as Article 34 
and Article 3.  
As reviewed earlier, Article 25 serves as the core implementing mechanism of the 
North Korean Constitution for its right to an adequate standard of living.
554
  Thus, as is 
argued by North Korea in the DPRK Official Reports, the Fundamental Rights Article is, 
in its very nature, supposed to protect this fundamental right of the North Korean people. 
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On the other hand, the pursuit of a centrally planned economy and the pursuit of 
the possession of strong military power against imperialism are key tenets of Juche 
ideology and Marxism-Leninism.
555
  Thus, from the logical and theoretical standpoint, 
it is natural for the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Articles, which faithfully incorporate 
the core principles of the two anti-fundamental rights and ruling ideologies controlling 
North Korea, to take the disposition of anti-fundamental rights articles in order to 
pursue and consolidate a command economy and the military-first policy, and to 
position themselves as the ruling articles.  Namely, Article 34 and Article 3 are not 
only the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Articles, but also work as the anti-fundamental 
rights and ruling articles from the logical and theoretical standpoint.  
We reviewed that the clash in function and role between the guarantee of the right 
to an adequate standard of living and the pursuit of a command economy and the 
military-first policy is inevitable from a logical and theoretical standpoint.
556
  Similarly, 
these two extremes, both in their very nature and workings, as demonstrated by Article 
25, Article 34 and Article 3, are bound to clash with each other in performing their 
function and role within one constitutional boundary.  
The issue of the functional clash is solved by the relationship of superiority and 
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relative inferiority between the two types of articles.  Article 34 and Article 3, the anti-
fundamental rights and ruling articles for the consolidation of a command economy and 
the military-first policy, has superiority over Article 25, the Fundamental Rights Article 
for the right to an adequate standard of living, in their function and operation.  As a 
result, Article 34 and Article 3, which are also the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Articles, 
incapacitate the Fundamental Rights Article, which is the core implementation 
mechanism of the North Korean Constitution, at the time of this functional clash.  
The resulting weakening of the Fundamental Rights Article leads to the 
theoretical impossibility of performing the core implementation mechanism model 
centered on Article 25 in the DPRK Official Reports.  Consequently, all of the 
arguments of the North Korean government in defense of its practices of the right to an 
adequate standard of living in its official reports, which are grounded in this theoretical 
approach, are totally unrealizable given its constitutional structure and mechanism.  
That is to say, this impossibility of performance proves false in the Incapacitation Stage 
any notion that North Korea guarantees the right to an adequate standard of living of its 
people or that it complies with the articles on this right in the international human rights 
treaties from a logical and theoretical standpoint. 
After completely weakening the Fundamental Rights Article, the Juchist and 
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Marxist-Leninist Articles wield strong influence over the North Korean society at large 
without any difficulty or obstruction.  The practical results of this powerful leverage 
are manifested in the severe violations of fundamental rights and international human 
rights treaties in North Korea.
557
  In essence, since the sole function of the anti-
fundamental rights and ruling articles is to carry out the economic and military doctrines 
of Juche ideology and Marxism-Leninism, there is no constitutional basis to secure the 
right to an adequate standard of living for the North Korean people or to prevent the 
government from violating such protections prescribed by international human rights 
treaties. 
It necessarily follows, logically and theoretically, that the arguments of the U.S., 
South Korea, and the U.K. condemning the DPRK’s violations of the right to an 
adequate standard of living in the LDC Annual Reports
558
 are proven true by the 
constitutional structure and mechanism of North Korea in the Human Rights Violation 
Stage.  
The following diagram incorporates all aspects of the newly developed refuting 
theory and its incapacitation mechanism model of Article 34 and Article 3, including the 
core premises, key factors, logical order and flow, and theoretical structure.  The 
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 See supra Chapter One.III.A; see also supra note 77 and accompanying text.  
 
558
 See infra Chapter Five.I.D.  
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diagram also incorporates the evidence for verifying the falsity of North Korea’s 
arguments in the DPRK Official Reports and for verifying the truth of the liberal 
democratic countries’ assertions in the LDC Annual Reports.  Finally, the diagram 
shows the relationships between the points of contention of the new refuting theory, the 
testimony of North Korean defectors, and the arguments of the U.S., South Korea, and 
the U.K. in the LDC Annual Reports, which are grounded in this testimony.
559
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 See infra id. 
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<Diagram 11> The New Refuting Theory and Its Incapacitation Mechanism Model  
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D. The Major Contents of the LDC Annual Reports  
As evidenced in the analysis of the USCIRF Human Rights Report, the DPRK’s 
violations of the right to an adequate standard of living, caused by the powerful 
influence of the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Articles over North Korean society as a 
whole, as indicated in the new refuting theory, are in accord with the testimony of North 
Korean refugees who experienced and witnessed first-hand the severe violations of this 
right in their country.
560
  Thus, the DPRK’s violations of the right to an adequate 
standard of living in the refuting theory coincide with the arguments of the U.S., South 
Korea, and the U.K. in the LDC Annual Reports, which are based on this testimony.  
In this way, the arguments of the new refuting theory and its incapacitation 
mechanism model presented by this dissertation not only logically and theoretically 
support the testimony of North Korean refugees and the contentions of the liberal 
democratic countries attacking North Korea’s violation of the right to an adequate 
standard of living in the LDC Annual Reports, but they are, in turn, practically and 
factually supported by the testimony of North Korean escapees and the arguments of the 
liberal democratic camp. 
The major contents of the testimony of North Korean defectors, and the 
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arguments and analyses of the U.S., South Korea, and the U.K., which are based on this 
testimony, in the LDC Annual Reports are as follows:  
 
1. U.S. Human Rights Report 
The 2004 U.S. Human Rights Report states that “The WFP [World Food 
Programme] fed 3.36 million children during the year.  A 2002 survey conducted by 
UNICEF [United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund], with the 
cooperation of the North Korean Government, found that 20% of the 6,000 children 
surveyed were underweight, while another 39% were stunted in growth.”
561
  This is in 
close agreement with estimates made by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) that 37% of children suffered from stunting, and 33% of the entire North Korean 
population were undernourished, which are figures stated in the 2010 U.S. Human 
Rights Report.
562
  
According to the 2000 U.S. Human Rights Report, the State controls all vital 
economic activity, and due to the outmoded equipment and plants and severe shortage 
                                            
561
 See 2004 U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 32 (“The WFP [World Food Programme] reported 
feeding 3.36 million children during the year. A nutrition survey carried out in 2002 by UNICEF [United 
Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund] and the WFP, in cooperation with the [North Korean] 
Government, found that in the sample of 6,000 children, 20 percent were underweight and 39 percent 
were stunted.”); see also supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
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 See 2010 U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 32 (“The UN Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) estimated that 7.8 million, or 33 percent of the population [of North Korea] was undernourished. 
FAO estimated 37 percent of children suffered from stunting.”). 
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of input materials, the industry operations continue to function at a very low capacity.
563
  
The 2004 U.S. Human Rights Report analyzes that “The country’s traditional highly 
centralized and tightly controlled economy has broken down under the stress of chronic 
shortages of food and fuel.”
564
  The 2004 Report states that “The massive proportion of 
the GDP that is allocated to military spending, estimated to be between 25% and 33%, 
has severely limited and skewed economic development.”
565
  The 2004 Report also 
states that North Korea’s limited ability to borrow funds commercially is attributed to its 
poor credit rating, due to defaults on foreign debts.
566
 
According to the 2000 U.S. Human Rights Report, “Famine has caused internal 
dislocation, widespread malnutrition, and approximately a million deaths from 
starvation . . . . [Harsh] [][e]conomic . . . conditions have caused thousands of persons to 
flee their homes.”
567
  The 2010 U.S. Human Rights Report discloses reports of farms 
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 See 2000 U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 32 (“The State directs all significant economic 
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 2004 U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 32. 
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product, has constrained and skewed economic development.”). 
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 2000 U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 32; See 2004 U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 
32 (“[H]arsh economic and political conditions [in North Korea] have caused tens of thousands of persons 
to flee the country.”); see also supra Chapter Two.II.A. 
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and factories that failed to compensate or feed their workers.
568
  The report also 
divulges that “The government strictly controlled permission to reside in, or even to 
enter, Pyongyang, where food supplies, housing, . . . and general living conditions were 
much better than in the rest of the country.”
569
  
 
2. USCIRF Human Rights Report 
The 2009 USCIRF Human Rights Report states that “Prolonged famine and food 
shortage in North Korea have created a cross-border refugee problem in northern China. 
Over the past decade, hundreds of thousands of refugees have fled across the border to 
China because of famine conditions . . . and many have sought refuge in South 
Korea.”
570
  The report also discloses the following: 
It is illegal to leave North Korea and those who do are punished, some 
severely. Due to the vast number of citizens seeking food in China, the 
government has been forced to ease its punishments, sentencing those 
repatriated to short period of detention or forced labor. However, over the 
past few years, refugees report that the government is returning to its 
harsher penalties for repatriated North Koreans, regardless of their reasons 
for fleeing.
571
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3. ROK Human Rights Report 
The 2008 ROK Human Rights Report states the following: 
The North Korean grain shortage had begun from the late 1980s. In 1987, 
North Korea for the first time reduced by 10 percent the national grain 
rations, which it had maintained for over 20 years. Then, in 1991 North 
Korea launched the so-called “two meals a day” campaign. Then in 1992 
North Korea decided to reduce all grain rations by 10 percent again, except 
for the soldiers and workers at heavy-duty work places.(citation omitted)
572
 
According to the report, rations are distributed in order of priority basis, starting with 
the Party staff, National Safety Protection Agency, the Military, and military 
industries.
573
  The report also specifies the following: 
According to the testimony of a defector who came to South Korea after 
working for ten years at a grain administration office that handled grain 
purchase and distribution, the grains harvested at the farms are distributed 
to military units and the grains provided by the foreign sources are 
distributed mainly to the high-ranking officials; however, ordinary 
inhabitants receive 2-3 days worth of grain on major holidays like Kim Il 
Sung’s birthday, Kim Jong Il’s birthday, the Korean thanksgiving holiday, 
and so on.(citation omitted)
574
 
Furthermore, the report discloses that a defector from Pyongyang, who left in 2006, 
reported the conditions to be so bad that even the people living in the privileged city of 
Pyongyang, were receiving one week’s worth of grain rations for an entire month.
575
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According to the 2010 ROK Human Rights Report, the food that were coming 
into NK through international humanitarian groups were not reaching the parts of the 
general population that were most affected by the grain shortage.
576
  For example, the 
report reveals testimony from a defector that “[c]itizens would line up to receive beef 
rations provided by UN agencies. However, after the UN staff finished taking 
photographs and departed the scene, the citizens would have to return the beef to the 
stores (rationing authorities).(citation omitted)”
577
  The report also divulges that “A 
defector who once served as a ‘people’s unit’ leader testified that she cooked ‘foreign 
aid rice’ at home twice in an effort to show off for (i.e. deceive) on-site UN inspectors, 
but she never again received ‘foreign aid rice.’(citation omitted)”
578
  Furthermore, the 
report informs us that despite UNICEF workers’ efforts to directly dispense the rice to 
the locals, at least 80% would end up going to the military.
579
  The report finds that 
most North Korean citizens find it natural for the foreign aid rice to go to the military, 
                                                                                                                                
in a month.(citation omitted)”).  
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 See 2010 ROK HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 34, at 372 (“Despite the serious grain shortage, 
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ended up in the hands of the military . . . .(citation omitted)”). 
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and even if it is disapproved of, the people would act as if they had no complaints.
580
  
 
4. U.K. Human Rights Report  
The 2009 U.K. Human Rights Report states the following:  
The WFP remain concerned that high rates of malnutrition continue among 
millions of children and women in the DPRK. The situation is more acute 
during the winter as temperatures drop and energy needs become greater for 
the vulnerable. The international community, including the Republic of 
Korea and the US, has indicated that it will provide assistance if there is 
another major food crisis. In the past, the DPRK has usually been reluctant 
to ask for help.
581
  
The 2012 U.K. Human Rights Report also emphasizes that the WFP assesses that the 
North Korean people are chronically malnourished.
582
  Furthermore, the report 
explains that “Given the level of malnutrition . . . in the DPRK, many children do not 
have the basic necessities to enjoy their economic and social rights.”
583
  
The 2012 U.K. Human Rights Report suggests the prevalence of severe food 
shortages in all regions of North Korea except Pyongyang, the capital of the country, 
through the following statements: 
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The British Embassy in Pyongyang supported several small projects to 
improve nutrition for young children. These included one which supplied a 
secure source of soybean milk to young children, two which funded 
greenhouses to support food growth for childcare centres, and one which 
provided freezers to a fish production unit supplying 261 welfare facilities. 
All of these projects were aimed at improving the diet of children outside 
Pyongyang who suffer from a particularly poor diet.”
584
 
The 2012 Report also states that although Kim Jong Un has publicly pledged to better 
the living standards of his citizens over the year he’s been in power, the UK has not seen 
any substantial efforts in accomplishing this goal. The national priority is still proving to 
be focused on military spending. While the nation seeks international aid, North Korea 
still spent hundreds of millions of dollars launching two satellites in April and 
December.
585
  Finally, the report criticizes that “It [The DPRK] has . . . devoted 
significant resources to civic amenities such as amusement parks in Pyongyang, when it 
lacks the infrastructure to allow for effective food production or distribution in the rest 
of the country.”
586
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II. The Right to Health 
A. The Arguments of the North Korean Government and Its Main Grounds for 
the Arguments in the DPRK Official Reports  
Article 56 and Article 72 of the North Korean Constitution are the Fundamental 
Rights Articles concerning the issue of the right to health within the country.  Article 
56 of the Constitution declares that “The State shall protect the people’s lives and 
improve the working people’s health by consolidating and developing the system of 
universal free medical service and improving the district doctor system and the system 
of preventive medicine.”
587
  In addition, Article 72 of the same Constitution stipulates 
that “Citizens are entitled to free medical care . . . . This right is ensured by free medical 
care, an expanding network of hospitals, sanatoria and other medical institutions, State 
social insurance and other social security systems.”
588
 
North Korea uses a theoretical approach, which focuses on the core 
implementation mechanism of these Fundamental Rights Articles, as the main grounds 
for its arguments in defense of its practices of the right to health in the DPRK Official 
Reports.  That is to say, the country introduces Article 56 and Article 72 of its 
Constitution as the guaranteed mechanism for the domestic protection of the right to 
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health of its people, as well as the core implementer for the articles on this right in the 
international human rights treaties to which it has acceded in the reports.  
 
1. The Fundamental Rights Articles as the Guaranteed Mechanism for the 
Domestic Protection of the Right to Health 
North Korea adverts to this mechanism in a series of its official reports.  Thus, in 
paragraph 16 of the National Report, the North Korean government states that “The 
Constitution comprehensively provides for the fundamental rights and freedoms in all 
fields of State and public activity such as . . . the right[] to . . . free medical care . . . .”
589
  
Additionally, in paragraph 62 of the same report, the government emphasizes that 
“Complete and universal free medical care has been provided since February 1960, 
which was later legalized by [Article 56 and Article 72 of] the Constitution . . . . 
Everyone in the DPRK receives medical service of all categories equally, practically 
and free of charge.”
590
  
In paragraph 7 of the Second ICCPR Implementation Report, the North Korean 
government states that “The Constitution . . . stipulates the basic rights of citizens 
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including . . . the right to free medical care . . . .”
591
  In addition, in paragraph 33(b) of 
the same report, the government argues the following:  
The state has taken the legislative measures to protect human life and 
improve health, and thoroughly carries them out. Article 56 of the 
Constitution provides: “The state shall protect people’s lives and improve 
the working people’s health by consolidating and developing the system of 
universal free medical service and improving the district doctor system and 
the system of preventive medicine.”
592
  
Furthermore, in paragraph 145 of the report, the government maintains that “The 
Constitution provides for the protection of the rights of the child by stipulating . . . [the] 
consolidating and developing the system of universal free medical service (article 
56) . . . .”
593
 
Similarly, in paragraph 46 of the Second ICESCR Implementation Report, the 
North Korean government states that “The child is under special protection by the State 
and society. The State, in conformity with the principle of ‘the best of all to the child,’ 
provided in the Constitution for . . . consolidating and developing the system of 
universal free medical service (art. 56) . . . to protect the rights of the child.”
594
  
In paragraph 76 of the Initial CEDAW Implementation Report, the North Korean 
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government states that “The Constitution . . . provides that women are guaranteed, enjoy 
and exercise on an equal footing with men such basic rights as . . . the right to free 
medical care (article 72) . . . .”
595
  
Finally, in paragraph 58 of the Combined CRC Implementation Report, the North 
Korean government states that “The Constitution stipulates the fundamental rights . . . 
of citizens; [c]itizens are guaranteed . . . [the] right to free medical care (art. 72) . . . .”
596
 
 
2. The Fundamental Rights Articles as the Core Implementer for the Articles on 
the Right to Health in the International Human Rights Treaties   
Once again, North Korea presents the Fundamental Rights Articles to argue its 
adherence to international human rights treaties in various reports.  
Article 12, paragraph 1 of the ICESCR declares that “The States Parties to the 
present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health.”
597
  Article 12, paragraph 2 of the 
Covenant provides the following:  
The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to 
achieve the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for: (a) 
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 235 
The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality 
and for the healthy development of the child; (b) The improvement of all 
aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene; (c) The prevention, 
treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other 
diseases; (d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical 
service and medical attention in the event of sickness.
598
  
Regarding the right to health in the Covenant, North Korea offers, in paragraph 65 of 
the Second ICESCR Implementation Report, that Article 56 and Article 72 of its 
Constitution acts as the core implementer that carries out Article 12 of the ICESCR as 
follows: 
VII. ARTICLE 12 - RIGHT TO ENJOYMENT OF PHYSICAL AND 
MENTAL HEALTH 
A. Physical and mental health 
65. Every citizen is entitled to have his or her life protected and to enjoy 
physical and mental health under [Article 56 and Article 72 of] the 
Constitution . . . .
599
  
Article 24, paragraph 1 of the CRC stipulates the following:  
Article 24[.]1. States Parties recognize the right of the child to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health and to facilities for 
the treatment of illness and rehabilitation of health. States Parties shall 
strive to ensure that no child is deprived of his or her right of access to such 
health care services.
600
 
Additionally, paragraphs 2(a)-(d) of Article 24 of the Convention provide the following:  
[Article 24.]2. States Parties shall pursue full implementation of this right 
and, in particular, shall take appropriate measures: (a) To diminish infant 
and child mortality; (b) To ensure the provision of necessary medical 
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assistance and health care to all children with emphasis on the development 
of primary health care; (c) To combat disease and malnutrition, including 
within the framework of primary health care, through, inter alia, the 
application of readily available technology and through the provision of 
adequate nutritious foods and clean drinking-water, taking into 
consideration the dangers and risks of environmental pollution; (d) To 
ensure appropriate pre-natal and post-natal health care for mothers;
601
  
In paragraph 144 of the Combined CRC Implementation Report, the North Korean 
government provides Article 56 and Article 72 of its Constitution, amongst others, as 
the core mechanism to carry out Article 24 of the CRC:  
B. Health and health services (art. 24) 
144. Legislative measures [such as Article 56 and Article 72 of the 
Constitution] and the invariable State policy concerning the promotion of 
the right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of 
health and to facilities for treatment and rehabilitation have remained 
unchanged during the period under review.
602
  
 
3. The Diagrammatization of the Core Implementation Mechanism Model 
The core implementation mechanism model of Article 56 and Article 72, which 
shows both North Korea’s arguments in defense of its practices of the right to health and 
the main grounds for its arguments in the DPRK Official Reports, is diagrammatized 
below: 
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<Diagram 12> The Core Implementation Mechanism Model of the Fundamental Rights 
Articles in the DPRK Official Reports  
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Article 3, which provides the pursuit of the military-first policy, are the two Juchist and 
Marxist-Leninist Articles concerning the issue of the right to health within North Korea.   
We reviewed that the pursuit of a centrally planned economy essentially cannot 
coexist with the guarantee of the right to an adequate standard of living in the previous 
section.
603
  In addition, we reviewed that the pursuit of the military-first policy for the 
possession of strong military power against the imperialist forces is also essentially 
incompatible with the protection of the same right in the section.
604
  
As with the guarantee of the right to an adequate standard of living, the guarantee 
of the right to health is also a matter of the economic power and financial capacities of a 
country, which is the major premise in securing and promoting the welfare of its people.  
Thus, as long as North Korea adheres to a centrally planned economic system, which 
ultimately leads to public poverty and misery, as well as the collapse of the national 
economy, the domestic guarantee of the right to health of the North Korean people is not 
available.
605
  Additionally, so long as the country sticks to the military-first policy, 
which leaves a small budget and little resources for the welfare of the people, the 
implementation of the articles on the right to health in the international human rights 
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treaties is impossible.
606
  That is to say, the pursuit of a command economy and the 
military-first policy are essentially incompatible with the guarantee of the right to health.  
As reviewed, the pursuit of a command economy is the key economic tenet of 
Marxism-Leninism and Juche ideology.
607
  This tenet of the unofficial and official 
ruling ideologies of North Korea was publicly legislated in Article 34, which is one of 
the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Articles on the right to health.  
Additionally, the pursuit of the military-first policy for the possession of strong 
military power against the imperialist forces is the key military tenet of Marxism-
Leninism and Juche ideology.
608
  This tenet of the unofficial and official ruling 
ideologies of North Korea was publicly legislated in Article 3, which is one of the 
Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Articles on the right to health.  
 
C. The New Refuting Theory and Its Incapacitation Mechanism Model  
The North Korean Constitution contains two fundamentally distinct types of 
articles with opposing function and operation in terms of the guarantee of the right to 
health.  One type is the Fundamental Rights Article, such as Article 56 and Article 72, 
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and the other is the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Article, such as Article 34 and Article 3.  
As reviewed earlier, Article 56 and Article 72 serve as the core implementing 
mechanism of the North Korean Constitution for its right to health.
609
  Thus, as is 
argued by North Korea in the DPRK Official Reports, the Fundamental Rights Articles 
are, in their very nature, supposed to protect this fundamental right of the North Korean 
people.  
On the other hand, the pursuit of a centrally planned economy and the pursuit of 
the possession of strong military power against imperialism are key tenets of Juche 
ideology and Marxism-Leninism.
610
  Thus, from the logical and theoretical standpoint, 
it is natural for the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Articles, which faithfully incorporate 
the core principles of the two anti-fundamental rights and ruling ideologies controlling 
North Korea, to take the disposition of anti-fundamental rights articles in order to 
pursue and consolidate a command economy and the military-first policy, and to 
position themselves as the ruling articles.  Namely, Article 34 and Article 3 are not 
only the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Articles, but also work as the anti-fundamental 
rights and ruling articles from the logical and theoretical standpoint.  
We reviewed that the clash in function and role between the guarantee of the right 
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 See supra Chapter Five.II.A.  
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 See supra Chapter Five.I.B; see also supra Chapter Five.II.B.  
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to health and the pursuit of a command economy and the military-first policy is 
inevitable from a logical and theoretical standpoint.
611
  Similarly, these two extremes, 
both in their very nature and workings, are bound to clash with each other in performing 
their function and role within one constitutional boundary, as demonstrated by the clash 
of Articles 56 and 72 with Articles 34 and 3.  
The issue of the functional clash is solved by the relationship of superiority and 
relative inferiority between the two types of articles.  Article 34 and Article 3, the anti-
fundamental rights and ruling articles for the consolidation of a command economy and 
the military-first policy, has superiority over Article 56 and Article 72, the Fundamental 
Rights Articles for the right to health, in their function and operation.  As a result, 
Article 34 and Article 3, which are also the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Articles, 
incapacitate the Fundamental Rights Articles, which are the core implementation 
mechanism of the North Korean Constitution, at the time of this functional clash.  
The resulting weakening of the Fundamental Rights Articles leads to the 
theoretical impossibility of performing the core implementation mechanism model 
centered on Article 56 and Article 72 in the DPRK Official Reports.  Consequently, all 
of the arguments of the North Korean government in defense of its practices of the right 
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 See supra Chapter Five.II.B. 
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to health in its official reports, which are grounded in this theoretical approach, are 
totally unrealizable given its constitutional structure and mechanism.  That is to say, 
this impossibility of performance proves false in the Incapacitation Stage any notion 
that North Korea guarantees the right to health of its people or that it complies with the 
articles on this right in the international human rights treaties from a logical and 
theoretical standpoint.  
After completely weakening the Fundamental Rights Articles, the Juchist and 
Marxist-Leninist Articles wield strong influence over the North Korean society at large 
without any difficulty or obstruction.  The practical results of this powerful leverage 
are manifested in the severe violations of fundamental rights and international human 
rights treaties in North Korea.
612
  In essence, since the sole function of the anti-
fundamental rights and ruling articles is to carry out the economic and military doctrines 
of Juche ideology and Marxism-Leninism, there is no constitutional basis to secure the 
right to health for the North Korean people or to prevent the government from violating 
such protections prescribed by international human rights treaties. 
It necessarily follows, logically and theoretically, that the arguments of the U.S., 
South Korea, and the U.K. condemning the DPRK’s violations of the right to health in 
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 See supra Chapter One.III.A; see also supra note 77 and accompanying text.  
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the LDC Annual Reports
613
 are proven true by the constitutional structure and 
mechanism of North Korea in the Human Rights Violation Stage. 
The following diagram incorporates all aspects of the newly developed refuting 
theory and its incapacitation mechanism model of Article 34 and Article 3, including the 
core premises, key factors, logical order and flow, and theoretical structure.  The 
diagram also incorporates the evidence for verifying the falsity of North Korea’s 
arguments in the DPRK Official Reports and for verifying the truth of the liberal 
democratic countries’ assertions in the LDC Annual Reports.  Finally, the diagram 
shows the relationships between the points of contention of the new refuting theory, the 
testimony of North Korean defectors, and the arguments of the U.S., South Korea, and 
the U.K. in the LDC Annual Reports, which are grounded in this testimony.
614
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<Diagram 13> The New Refuting Theory and Its Incapacitation Mechanism Model 
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D. The Major Contents of the LDC Annual Reports  
As evidenced in the analysis of the USCIRF Human Rights Report, the DPRK’s 
violations of the right to health, caused by the powerful influence of the Juchist and 
Marxist-Leninist Articles over North Korean society as a whole, as indicated in the new 
refuting theory, are in accord with the testimony of North Korean refugees who 
experienced and witnessed first-hand the severe violations of this right in their 
country.
615
  Thus, the DPRK’s violations of the right to health in the refuting theory 
coincide with the arguments of the U.S., South Korea, and the U.K. in the LDC Annual 
Reports, which are based on this testimony.  
In this way, the arguments of the new refuting theory and its incapacitation 
mechanism model presented by this dissertation not only logically and theoretically 
support the testimony of North Korean refugees and the contentions of the liberal 
democratic countries attacking North Korea’s violation of the right to health in the LDC 
Annual Reports, but they are, in turn, practically and factually supported by the 
testimony of North Korean escapees and the arguments of the liberal democratic camp. 
The major contents of the testimony of North Korean defectors, and the 
arguments and analyses of the U.S., South Korea, and the U.K., which are based on this 
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testimony, in the LDC Annual Reports are as follows: 
 
1. U.S. Human Rights Report  
The 2012 U.S. Human Rights Report cites a UNICEF report that “[t]he 
deteriorating health system, lack of medicine, and emergency referrals [in North Korea] 
affected the high rate of maternal mortality. The World Food Program found that 31 
percent of [North Korean] women surveyed suffered from anemia. Anemia increases the 
likelihood of maternal mortality.”
616
  The report also states the following:  
The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child repeatedly expressed 
concern over de facto discrimination against children with disabilities and 
the insufficient measures taken by the state to ensure these children had 
effective access to health . . . and social services. UNICEF has noted that 
very high levels of malnutrition indicated serious problems for both the 
physical growth and psychosocial development of young children.
617
 
Finally, the report divulges that “Although veterans with disabilities were treated well, 
other persons with physical and mental disabilities reportedly were sent from 
Pyongyang to internal exile, quarantined within camps, and forcibly sterilized.”
618
 
 
2. ROK Human Rights Report 
                                            
616
 2012 U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 32. 
 
617
 Id.  
 
618
 Id.  
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The 2010 ROK Human Rights Report describes the testimony of a medical doctor 
who defected to South Korea in 2007, and reveals much about health and medical 
systems and services in North Korea.  He reveals that in a certain district of Buryong 
County, North Hamkyung Province, free medical treatment is nearly nonexistent in 
recent years.  The hospital conditions prove to be very dire when a patient has to bring 
his own food and bedding, and provide himself heating in the winter by bringing an 
electric heater or firewood.  With the collapse of the economy, the free treatment 
system has disintegrated.
619
  The report also provides the account of Norbert Vollertsen, 
a German doctor who provided medical service in North Korea from July 1999 to 
December 2000, before he was expelled from the country.  Mr. Vollertsen testified that 
most hospitals did not have antibiotics or bandages, or even simple operating equipment, 
such as surgical knives.  However, hospitals for high-ranking military officers and the 
elite were almost on par with modern German hospitals, and included equipment like 
MRI, Ultra-sonar, EKG, and X-ray cameras, demonstrating the extreme inequality 
                                            
619
 The 2010 ROK Human Rights Report reveals the following: 
A defector who used to work as a medical doctor until before he defected to South Korea 
in 2007 testified in detail on North Korea’s health and medical system and services. This 
graduate of Chongjin Medical School provided the following details about the situation in 
XX district, Buryong County, North Hamkyung Province: . . . . The free medical treatment 
system has nearly ground to a halt in recent years. . . . Upon admission to the hospital, each 
patient must bring in food and his own bedding. Since there is no heating in winter, the 
patient must bring in an electric heater or firewood. . . . The so-called free treatment system 
has virtually disappeared with the collapse of the economy. . . .(citation omitted) 
2010 ROK HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 34, at 383-384.  
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between the different levels of hospitals.
620
  A defector doctor, who practiced as a 
pediatrician for 30 years before his defection to South Korea in 1998, testified that 
medical services had become “paralyzed” around 1990.  Most North Korean children 
are not vaccinated, despite the importance of preventative medicine as a policy, and 
BCG vaccines have been nonexistent after 1992.  Only the cholera and Japanese 
influenza vaccinations are still given to a small minority of the population, such as 
security agents and staff members who regularly travel.  All kinds of contagious 
diseases are rampant, due to the lack of proper vaccination at the correct stages of 
development.
621
  
In addition to the abovementioned reportings, the 2010 ROK Human Rights 
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 The report states the following: 
Norbert Vollertsen is a German doctor who provided medical service in North Korea 
between July 1999 and December 2000, when he was expelled. He testified that in most 
North Korean hospitals there were no antibiotics or bandages, nor such simple operating 
equipment as surgical knives. However, hospitals that were used for treatment of high-
ranking military officers and the elite were almost as modernly equipped as German 
hospitals. Their inventory included MRI, Ultra-sonar, EKG and X-ray cameras. He 
testified that an enormous inequality existed between the two levels of hospitals.(citation 
omitted) 
Id. at 381-382. 
 
621
 The 2010 ROK Human Rights Report discloses the following: 
Defector XXX had practiced medicine for 30 years in North Korea, after graduating from a 
medical school in 1968. Until before his defection to South Korea in 1998, he had worked 
as a pediatrician at XX City Hospital in North Hamkyung Province. He testified on the 
situation of medical service in North Korea: According to him, North Korean medical 
service became paralyzed about 1990. The most important medical policy is preventive 
medicine, but most children in North Korea do not receive preventive vaccination, and the 
BCG vaccines have disappeared after 1992 [with the collapse of the North Korean 
economy]. The only preventive vaccination still given is against cholera and Japanese 
influenza. But this vaccination is given only to a small minority such as security agents and 
staff members who frequently travel. Because children are not vaccinated at proper stages, 
all varieties of contagious diseases and illnesses are rampant. . . .(citation omitted) 
Id. at 382-383.  
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Report informs us that the WHO mission chief in North Korea, Eigil Sorensen, testified 
the inadequacy of North Korean medical service to a point of crisis.  Due to the 
insufficient electricity and running water, hospital hours are very limited, and patients in 
need of urgent care are often unable to receive treatment in time.  He also reports of 
the lack of heating for the patients during the winter.
622
  The 2004 ROK Human Rights 
Report also divulges the impact of economic hardships on the health and medical fields, 
including the shortage of necessities such as running water and electricity.  Many 
North Koreans suffer from diseases from contamination, due to lack of running water, 
and infectious diseases, such as cholera and paratyphoid are widespread.  Even 
tuberculosis, which had been reported to be eradicated in 1975, has made a widespread 
return to North Korea.
623
  Furthermore, the report finds that the death rate of pregnant 
mothers has been rising, due to the lack of obstetrics facilities and extensive 
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 The 2010 ROK Human Rights Report informs us with the following: 
The WHO [World Health Organization] mission chief in North Korea, Eigil Sorensen, 
testified at an interview with South Korean reporters in January 2004, that the level of 
medical service in North Korea was so inadequate as to call it a crisis.(citation omitted) 
According to Sorensen, hospital hours are limited due to the shortages of electricity and 
running water, and that very frequently patients needing urgent care could not be treated in 
time. He also noted a complete lack of heating in the patient wards in winter months. 
Id. at 381.  
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 The 2004 ROK Human Rights Report divulges the following: 
The economic hardship . . . had a considerable impact on the health and medical fields. It 
also contributed to the shortages of running water and electricity. Because there is no 
running water supply, many North Koreans suffer from, and are victimized by, the many 
diseases caused by contaminated water. Infectious diseases like cholera and paratyphoid 
are rampant, and tuberculosis, which North Korea reported completely eliminated in 1975, 
is once again widespread in North Korea. 
2004 ROK HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 34, at 37. 
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malnourishment.  From 1990 to 1996, there has been an increase from 70 out of 
100,000 to 110 in the mortality rate.  The infant mortality rate has also jumped from 14 
out of 1000 to 22.5, from 1993 to 1999.  About 30% of 450,000 breast-feeding 
mothers suffered from pernicious anemia and iron deficiency.  Underweight newborns 
are also increasing in number, while their average weight has decreased from 3.3 kg to 
2.2–2.6 kg.
624
  Finally, the 2010 ROK Human Rights Report indicates that North 
Korea receives several hundred tons of medicine from the international community 
every year, but is suspected to distribute most of it to special classes of the population, 
as there is no transparency in how the medicine is dispensed or used.
625
  
The report concludes that North Korea insists that it still operates by the universal 
medicare system, but the harsh reality of the dire economic situation proves their claim 
false.
626
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 The report explains the following: 
Due to the malnutrition of pregnant mothers and lack of obstetrics facilities, the death rate 
of pregnant mothers . . . increased steadily. In 1990, some 70 out of 100,000 died and the 
number increased to 110 in 1996. The infant mortality rate also increased from 14 deaths 
out of 1,000 in 1993 to 22.5 in 1999. Some 30 percent of 450,000 baby-feeding mothers 
were suffering from pernicious anemia and iron deficiency. The number of under-weight 
newborn babies has also increased steadily since 1995, and their average weight dropped 
from 3.3 kilograms to 2.2-2.6 kilograms. 
Id. 
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 See 2010 ROK HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 34, at 390 (“Each year, North Korea receives 
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it is being diverted for use by special classes of people, and there is absolutely no transparency as to the 
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 See id. at 381 (“North Korea maintains that its so-called universal medicare system still operates. 
However, the realities of economic hardship reveal otherwise.”). 
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3. U.K. Human Rights Report  
The 2009 U.K. Human Rights Report states that while the law requires free 
healthcare, North Korea’s economic hardships have caused a shortage in medicines and 
the breakdown of the public health system.
627
  The report also indicates the following: 
The DPRK says it has increased spending on health through a Strategy for 
the Promotion of Reproductive Health 2006–10, a Strategy for Prevention 
of AIDS for 2002–07, and a Primary Heath Care Strategy 2008–12. 
However, according to the UN there remains a shortage of reliable 
medicines and medical equipment. Progress will be slow in the absence of 
improved access for the World Health Organisation (WHO) and 
international NGOs working in the health field to assess the extent of the 
problem and the needs of the most vulnerable.
628
 
Furthermore, the 2012 U.K. Human Rights Report explains that with the poor 
healthcare in North Korea, children are not able to have the basic necessities to enjoy 
their economic and social rights.
629
  The 2007 U.K. Human Rights Report supports this 
claim by stating that “The government does not respect children’s rights in the basic 
sense of providing adequate nutrition and health services.”
630
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III. The Right to Education 
A. The Arguments of the North Korean Government and Its Main Grounds for 
the Arguments in the DPRK Official Reports 
Article 47 and Article 73 of the North Korean Constitution are the Fundamental 
Rights Articles concerning the issue of the right to education within the country.  
Article 47 of the Constitution declares that “The State shall provide education to all 
pupils and students free of charge and grant allowances to students at universities and 
colleges.”
631
  In addition, Article 73 of the same Constitution stipulates that “Citizens 
have the right to education. This right is ensured by an advanced educational system and 
by the educational measures enacted by the State for the benefit of the people.”
632
  
North Korea uses a theoretical approach, which focuses on the core 
implementation mechanism of these Fundamental Rights Articles, as the main grounds 
for its arguments in defense of its practices of the right to education in the DPRK 
Official Reports.  That is to say, the country introduces Article 47 and Article 73 of its 
Constitution as the guaranteed mechanism for the domestic protection of the right to 
education of its people, as well as the core implementer for the articles on this right in 
the international human rights treaties to which it has acceded in the reports. 
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 North Korean Constitution Chapter III, supra note 408. 
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 North Korean Constitution Chapter V, supra note 231.  
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1. The Fundamental Rights Articles as the Guaranteed Mechanism for the 
Domestic Protection of the Right to Education  
North Korea adverts to this mechanism in a series of its official reports.  Thus, in 
paragraph 16 of the National Report, the North Korean government states that “The 
Constitution comprehensively provides for the fundamental rights and freedoms in all 
fields of State and public activity such as . . . the right[] to . . . education . . . .”
633
  
Additionally, in paragraph 71 of the same report, the government emphasizes the 
following:  
All the children receive compulsory education free of charge starting from 
the age of six or seven under the universal 11-year free compulsory 
education system [prescribed by Article 47 and Article 73 of the 
Constitution], giving full scope to their wishes and talents. The enrolment 
rate in primary school is 100 per cent, the advancement rate 99.7 per cent 
and the graduation rate 100 per cent.
634
  
In paragraph 7 of the Second ICCPR Implementation Report, the North Korean 
government states that “The Constitution . . . stipulates the basic rights of citizens 
including . . . the right to free . . . education . . . .”
635
  In addition, in paragraph 145 of 
the same report, the government argues that “The Constitution provides for the 
protection of the rights of the child by stipulating . . . [the] provision of education to all 
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 2000 Second ICCPR Implementation Report, supra note 7, at 4-5.  
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pupils and students free of charge (article 47) . . . .”
636
  
Similarly, in paragraph 46 of the Second ICESCR Implementation Report, the 
North Korean government states that “The child is under special protection by the State 
and society. The State, in conformity with the principle of ‘the best of all to the child,’ 
provided in the Constitution for . . . [the] education of all pupils and students free of 
charge (art. 47) . . . to protect the rights of the child.”
637
  In addition, in paragraph 87 of 
the same report, the government maintains that “Those who have finished the 11-year 
compulsory education are entitled to get higher education according to their hope and 
aptitude under [Article 47 and Article 73 of] the Constitution . . . .”
638
 
In paragraph 76 of the Initial CEDAW Implementation Report, the North Korean 
government states that “The Constitution . . . provides that women are guaranteed, enjoy 
and exercise on an equal footing with men such basic rights as . . . the right to education 
(article 73) . . . .”
639
  In addition, in paragraph 131 of the same report, the government 
argues that “All citizens both male and female fully enjoy the right to education thanks 
to the advanced educational system and popular education policies. The right to 
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 2002 Initial CEDAW Implementation Report, supra note 9, at 12.  
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education and the guarantee of its realization are stipulated comprehensively in [Article 
47 and Article 73 of] the Constitution . . . .”
640
  
Finally, in paragraph 58 of the Combined CRC Implementation Report, the North 
Korean government states that “The Constitution stipulates the fundamental rights . . . 
of citizens; [c]itizens are guaranteed . . . [the] right to education (art. 73) . . . .”
641
 
 
2. The Fundamental Rights Articles as the Core Implementer for the Articles on 
the Right to Education in the International Human Rights Treaties 
Once again, North Korea presents the Fundamental Rights Articles to argue its 
adherence to international human rights treaties in various reports.  
Article 13, paragraph 1 of the ICESCR stipulates that “The States Parties to the 
present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to education. . . .”
642
  Article 13, 
paragraph 2 of the Covenant provides the following:  
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, with a view to 
achieving the full realization of this right: (a) Primary education shall be 
compulsory and available free to all; (b) Secondary education in its 
different forms, including technical and vocational secondary education, 
shall be made generally available and accessible to all by every appropriate 
means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education; 
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 ICESCR, supra note 4, art. 13, ¶ 1. 
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(c) Higher education shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of 
capacity, by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive 
introduction of free education; (d) Fundamental education shall be 
encouraged or intensified as far as possible for those persons who have not 
received or completed the whole period of their primary education; (e) The 
development of a system of schools at all levels shall be actively pursued, 
an adequate fellowship system shall be established, and the material 
conditions of teaching staff shall be continuously improved.
643
 
Regarding the right to education in the Covenant, North Korea offers, in paragraph 84 
of the Second ICESCR Implementation Report, that Article 47 and Article 73 of its 
Constitution acts as the core implementer that carries out Article 13 of the ICESCR as 
follows:  
VIII. ARTICLE 13 - RIGHT TO EDUCATION 
A. Education policy 
84. The State, under the policy of putting education ahead of all other work, 
spares nothing for the education of the rising generation. By the progressive 
education system and the popular policy of education, every citizen fully 
enjoys the right to education. The right to education and its realization is 
guaranteed by [Article 47 and Article 73 of] the Constitution . . . .
644
 
Paragraphs 1(a)-(e) of Article 28 of the CRC stipulates the following:  
Article 28[.]1. States Parties recognize the right of the child to education, 
and with a view to achieving this right progressively and on the basis of 
equal opportunity, they shall, in particular: (a) Make primary education 
compulsory and available free to all; (b) Encourage the development of 
different forms of secondary education, including general and vocational 
education, make them available and accessible to every child, and take 
appropriate measures such as the introduction of free education and offering 
financial assistance in case of need; (c) Make higher education accessible to 
all on the basis of capacity by every appropriate means; (d) Make 
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educational and vocational information and guidance available and 
accessible to all children; (e) Take measures to encourage regular 
attendance at schools and the reduction of drop-out rates.
645
 
In paragraph 173 of the Combined CRC Implementation Report, the North Korean 
government provides Article 47 and Article 73 of its Constitution, amongst others, as 
the core mechanism to carry out Article 28 of the CRC:  
VII. EDUCATION . . .  
A. Education, including vocational training and guidance (art. 28) 
173. The legislative measures [such as Article 47 and Article 73 of the 
Constitution] and policies [were] adopted to recognize and ensure the right 
of the child to education . . . .
646
 
 
3. The Diagrammatization of the Core Implementation Mechanism Model 
The core implementation mechanism model of Article 47 and Article 73, which 
shows both North Korea’s arguments in defense of its practices of the right to education 
and the main grounds for its arguments in the DPRK Official Reports, is 
diagrammatized below: 
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<Diagram 14> The Core Implementation Mechanism Model of the Fundamental Rights 
Articles in the DPRK Official Reports 
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Article 3, which provides the pursuit of the military-first policy, are the two Juchist and 
Marxist-Leninist Articles concerning the issue of the right to education within North 
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Korea. 
We reviewed that the pursuit of a centrally planned economy essentially cannot 
coexist with the guarantee of the right to an adequate standard of living in the previous 
section.
647
  In addition, we reviewed that the pursuit of the military-first policy for the 
possession of strong military power against the imperialist forces is also essentially 
incompatible with the protection of the same right in the section.
648
 
As with the guarantee of the right to an adequate standard of living, the guarantee 
of the right to education is also a matter of the economic power and financial capacities 
of a country, which is the major premise in securing and promoting the welfare of the 
people.  Thus, as long as North Korea adheres to a centrally planned economic system, 
which ultimately leads to public poverty and misery, as well as the collapse of the 
national economy, the domestic guarantee of the right to education of the North Korean 
people is not available.
649
  Additionally, so long as the country sticks to the military-
first policy, which leaves a small budget and little resources for the welfare of the 
people, the implementation of the articles on the right to education in the international 
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human rights treaties is impossible.
650
  That is to say, the pursuit of a command 
economy and the military-first policy are essentially incompatible with the guarantee of 
the right to education. 
As reviewed, the pursuit of a command economy is the key economic tenet of 
Marxism-Leninism and Juche ideology.
651
  This tenet of the unofficial and official 
ruling ideologies of North Korea was publicly legislated in Article 34, which is one of 
the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Articles on the right to education.  
Additionally, the pursuit of the military-first policy for the possession of strong 
military power against the imperialist forces is the key military tenet of Marxism-
Leninism and Juche ideology.
652
  This tenet of the unofficial and official ruling 
ideologies of North Korea was publicly legislated in Article 3, which is one of the 
Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Articles on the right to education.  
 
C. The New Refuting Theory and Its Incapacitation Mechanism Model  
The North Korean Constitution contains two fundamentally distinct types of 
articles with opposing function and operation in terms of the guarantee of the right to 
                                            
650
 See supra id.; see also infra id. 
 
651
 See supra Chapter Five.I.B.1; see also supra Chapter Five.I.B.2.  
 
652
 See supra Chapter Five.I.B.3; see also supra Chapter Five.I.B.4.  
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education.  One type is the Fundamental Rights Article, such as Article 47 and Article 
73, and the other is the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Article, such as Article 34 and 
Article 3. 
As reviewed earlier, Article 47 and Article 73 serve as the core implementing 
mechanism of the North Korean Constitution for its right to education.
653
  Thus, as is 
argued by North Korea in the DPRK Official Reports, the Fundamental Rights Articles 
are, in their very nature, supposed to protect this fundamental right of the North Korean 
people.  
On the other hand, the pursuit of a centrally planned economy and the pursuit of 
the possession of strong military power against imperialism are key tenets of Juche 
ideology and Marxism-Leninism.
654
  Thus, from the logical and theoretical standpoint, 
it is natural for the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Articles, which faithfully incorporate 
the core principles of the two anti-fundamental rights and ruling ideologies controlling 
North Korea, to take the disposition of anti-fundamental rights articles in order to 
pursue and consolidate a command economy and the military-first policy, and to 
position themselves as the ruling articles.  Namely, Article 34 and Article 3 are not 
only the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Articles, but also work as the anti-fundamental 
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 See supra Chapter Five.III.A. 
 
654
 See supra Chapter Five.I.B; see also supra Chapter Five.III.B. 
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rights and ruling articles from the logical and theoretical standpoint.  
We reviewed that the clash in function and role between the guarantee of the right 
to education and the pursuit of a command economy and the military-first policy is 
inevitable from a logical and theoretical standpoint.
655
  Similarly, these two extremes, 
both in their very nature and workings, are bound to clash with each other in performing 
their function and role within one constitutional boundary, as demonstrated by the clash 
of Articles 47 and 73 with Articles 34 and 3. 
The issue of the functional clash is solved by the relationship of superiority and 
relative inferiority between the two types of articles.  Article 34 and Article 3, the anti-
fundamental rights and ruling articles for the consolidation of a command economy and 
the military-first policy, has superiority over Article 47 and Article 73, the Fundamental 
Rights Articles for the right to education, in their function and operation.  As a result, 
Article 34 and Article 3, which are also the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Articles, 
incapacitate the Fundamental Rights Articles, which are the core implementation 
mechanism of the North Korean Constitution, at the time of this functional clash.  
The resulting weakening of the Fundamental Rights Articles leads to the 
theoretical impossibility of performing the core implementation mechanism model 
                                            
655
 See supra Chapter Five.III.B. 
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centered on Article 47 and Article 73 in the DPRK Official Reports.  Consequently, all 
of the arguments of the North Korean government in defense of its practices of the right 
to education in its official reports, which are grounded in this theoretical approach, are 
totally unrealizable given its constitutional structure and mechanism.  That is to say, 
this impossibility of performance proves false in the Incapacitation Stage any notion 
that North Korea guarantees the right to education of its people or that it complies with 
the articles on this right in the international human rights treaties from a logical and 
theoretical standpoint.  
After completely weakening the Fundamental Rights Articles, the Juchist and 
Marxist-Leninist Articles wield strong influence over the North Korean society at large 
without any difficulty or obstruction.  The practical results of this powerful leverage 
are manifested in the severe violations of fundamental rights and international human 
rights treaties in North Korea.
656
  In essence, since the sole function of the anti-
fundamental rights and ruling articles is to carry out the economic and military doctrines 
of Juche ideology and Marxism-Leninism, there is no constitutional basis to secure the 
right to education for the North Korean people or to prevent the government from 
violating such protections prescribed by international human rights treaties. 
                                            
656
 See supra Chapter One.III.A; see also supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
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It necessarily follows, logically and theoretically, that the arguments of the U.S., 
South Korea, and the U.K. condemning the DPRK’s violations of the right to education 
in the LDC Annual Reports
657
 are proven true by the constitutional structure and 
mechanism of North Korea in the Human Rights Violation Stage.  
The following diagram incorporates all aspects of the newly developed refuting 
theory and its incapacitation mechanism model of Article 34 and Article 3, including the 
core premises, key factors, logical order and flow, and theoretical structure.  The 
diagram also incorporates the evidence for verifying the falsity of North Korea’s 
arguments in the DPRK Official Reports and for verifying the truth of the liberal 
democratic countries’ assertions in the LDC Annual Reports.  Finally, the diagram 
shows the relationships between the points of contention of the new refuting theory, the 
testimony of North Korean defectors, and the arguments of the U.S., South Korea, and 
the U.K. in the LDC Annual Reports, which are grounded in this testimony.
658
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<Diagram 15> The New Refuting Theory and Its Incapacitation Mechanism Model  
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D. The Major Contents of the LDC Annual Reports 
As evidenced in the analysis of the USCIRF Human Rights Report, the DPRK’s 
violations of the right to education, caused by the powerful influence of the Juchist and 
Marxist-Leninist Articles over North Korean society as a whole, as indicated in the new 
refuting theory, are in accord with the testimony of North Korean refugees who 
experienced and witnessed first-hand the severe violations of this right in their 
country.
659
  Thus, the DPRK’s violations of the right to education in the refuting theory 
coincide with the arguments of the U.S., South Korea, and the U.K. in the LDC Annual 
Reports, which are based on this testimony. 
In this way, the arguments of the new refuting theory and its incapacitation 
mechanism model presented by this dissertation not only logically and theoretically 
support the testimony of North Korean refugees and the contentions of the liberal 
democratic countries attacking North Korea’s violation of the right to education in the 
LDC Annual Reports, but they are, in turn, practically and factually supported by the 
testimony of North Korean escapees and the arguments of the liberal democratic camp. 
The major contents of the testimony of North Korean defectors, and the 
arguments and analyses of the U.S., South Korea, and the U.K., which are based on this 
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 See supra Chapter One.III.A; see also supra note 77 and accompanying text.  
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testimony, in the LDC Annual Reports are as follows:  
 
1. U.S. Human Rights Report 
According to the 2012 U.S. Human Rights Report, NGO reports found that due to 
hidden fees or lack of food, some children were not able to attend school regularly.
660
  
The same report also informs us that “On September 25, [2012,] the SPA announced 
that the state would provide free compulsory education for all children for 12 years, an 
increase of one year.
661
  However, reports indicated some children were denied 
educational opportunities . . . .”
662
  Finally, the report states that the UN Committee on 
the Rights of the Child has voiced major concerns over the discrimination against 
children with disabilities, and the lack of proper measures by the state to enable these 
children to access education and social services.
663
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 See 2012 U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 32 (“NGO reports . . . indicated some children 
were unable to attend school regularly because of hidden fees or insufficient food.”).  
 
661
 North Korea adopted the resolution of the 11-year free compulsory education system at the 4th 
Session of the 5th SPA, 1972. Additionally, according to the resolution, the 11-year free compulsory 
education has been fully executed in the country since 1975. However, North Korea adopted a new 12-
year free compulsory education resolution at the 6th Session of the 12th SPA, on September 25, 2012. 
This was a sweeping change in the school system of North Korea, occurring about forty years after the 
full execution of the 11-year free compulsory education in the country. 
 
662
 2012 U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 32.  
 
663
 See id. (“The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child repeatedly expressed concern over de facto 
discrimination against children with disabilities and the insufficient measures taken by the state to ensure 
these children had effective access to . . . education[] and social services.”).  
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2. ROK Human Rights Report 
According to the 2010 ROK Human Rights Report, many facilities in charge of 
children’s education and protection, including nurseries, kindergartens and school, are 
not able to function due to the worsening economic conditions.  Many children are 
known to skip school in most provinces, besides Pyongyang and a few larger cities.
664
  
Defectors testimony also reveals that due to the economic situation, a great number of 
students were forced to quit school.
665
 
The 2011 ROK Human Rights Report states that “North Korea’s educational 
facilities and equipment are known to be extremely poor. Since the economic hardships 
set in the early 1990s, the supply of educational equipment was mostly cut off and 
maintenance stopped.”
666
  The report also explains that since September of 1975, 
North Korea has offered a free 11-year compulsory education program, in which the 
government would pay for all expenses.  Defectors testified that free education was 
provided in most areas up until the nation was struck by the economic crisis in the 
1990s.  Since the crisis, the school supplies, which had previously been provided for 
                                            
664
 See 2010 ROK HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 34, at 29 (“As the economic hardships [of North 
Korea] have worsened, various facilities responsible for children’s education and protection, such as 
nurseries, kindergartens, and schools, are unable to fulfill their functions. In most provinces outside of 
Pyongyang and a few large cities, many children skip school . . . .”).  
 
665
 See id. at 449-450 (“According to our defector testimonies . . . there were a significant number of 
students who quit school due to the ongoing economic difficulties.”).  
 
666
 2011 ROK HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 34, at 434; See id. at 435 (“[T]he school facilities and 
educational equipment in most regions of North Korea outside of Pyongyang were very poor.”). 
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free every semester, were decreased to being distributed every 3-5 years, and finally 
came to a halt as the economic situation worsened.
667
  Furthermore, the report informs 
us with the following: 
As economic conditions deteriorated, many North Korean young people 
suffered from the inferior educational environment and the poor quality of 
education. This is clear from student attendance records. With regard to the 
sharp drop in students’ attendance, the UN Committee on the Rights of the 
Child expressed “concern over the seasonally low attendance record of 
60~80 percent and the long-term absentees due to the extended economic 
difficulties (Sec. 54a).” The committee also recommended that North Korea 
“take necessary measures to reduce and prevent student absenteeism and 
provide classroom heating in the winter season (Sec. 55a).”
668
  
In addition to the aforementioned, the 2011 ROK Human Rights Report refers to 
a magazine report that describes the inability of elementary and middle schools in South 
Pyongan and North Hamkyong provinces to conduct normal class schedules because of 
low student attendance.  The students were unable to attend due to hunger or because 
they were suffering from various diseases.  Poverty was forcing parents to give up the 
opportunity to educate their children.
669
  The report also informs us that many North 
                                            
667
 The report also explains the following:  
Since September 1975[,] North Korea has offered an 11-year compulsory education 
program . . . . North Korea has insisted that all education programs are completely free as 
the government pays for all expenses. North Korean defectors have testified that free 
education was indeed provided in most areas until the economic crisis hit the nation. From 
the 1990s, however, free school supplies, which had previously been provided every 
semester, were issued every 3~5 years, and as the economic crisis worsened these supplies 
were completely cut off. 
Id. at 432. 
 
668
 Id. at 433-434. 
 
669
 The 2011 ROK Human Rights Report states the following:  
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Korean students are driven from the classroom to the scenes of forced labor due to 
national poverty.  Thus, they do not receive much proper education or normal school 
training.  For example, the report describes an account of a defector who used to teach 
at a middle school.  The defector testifies that middle school students are sent to work 
on farms or construction sites for four weeks in the spring, while high school students 
work eight weeks total.  The students’ education is interfered by the heavy 
workload.
670
  The report also divulges another magazine report, which claims that 
“[c]hildren are not as a rule assigned to 8-hour workdays. But the middle school 
students in Shinuiju City, North Pyongan Province[,] were mobilized for ‘8-hour-day’ 
work for the development of an orchard.(citation omitted)”
671
  Furthermore, the report 
discloses that “Even in recent years, North Korean students are mobilized 2~3 times a 
year for farming and construction projects.(citation omitted) During the peak farming 
season, students above the 3rd grade in elementary school are mobilized for 1~2 hours a 
                                                                                                                                
According to a magazine report, elementary and middle schools in South Pyongan and 
North Hamkyong Provinces were unable to operate on normal class schedules due to the 
low student attendance rate. Students would be unable to come to school because they 
were hungry or suffering from various diseases. Many parents would give up on educating 
their children due to poverty . . . .(citation omitted) 
Id. at 434. 
 
670
 The report reveals the following:  
According to a defector who previously taught at a middle school, North Korean middle 
school students are mobilized for work for four weeks in the spring. High school students 
are mobilized for work for eight weeks (four in the spring and four in the fall). They work 
on farms or at construction sites. Their workload is so heavy that it often interferes with 
their education.(citation omitted) 
Id. at 427-428.  
 
671
 Id. at 428.  
 271 
day for farming projects.(citation omitted)”
672
   
The report concludes that while North Korean authorities argued that all children 
were receiving their 11 years of free compulsory education, along with sufficient 
opportunity to develop their talents and hopes, the reality is that the children are not 
being given their guarantee of the right to an education.
673
  
 
3. U.K. Human Rights Report 
The 2011 U.K. Human Rights Report states that North Korea is not able to fulfill 
some of the most basic human rights, including adequate food and education.  Even 
children were to participate in military drills, and many reports indicate that instead of 
receiving the free education they are entitled to, these children are being forced to work 
and provide goods and services if they wish to receive it.
674
  The 2012 U.K. Human 
Rights Report also informs that children have been removed from school for long 
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 The report comes to the conclusion with the following: 
The North Korean authorities continued to insist that all North Korean children were 
receiving 11 years of free education and were given full opportunities to develop their 
individual talents and youthful hopes under the free education system. . . . Contrary to 
these assertions, however, North Korean children in reality are not guaranteed their right to 
an education. 
Id. at 435.  
 
674
 The 2011 U.K. Human Rights Report state the following:  
Some of the most basic rights, including access to food and education, were not adequately 
fulfilled [in North Korea]. Relatively young children were subjected to military drills, and 
consistent reports suggested that children had to undertake work and provide goods and 
services if they were to receive the free education to which they were formally entitled. 
2011 U.K. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 35, at 223.  
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periods of time to partake in national events, such as the annual Arirang Festival, a mass 
gymnastics and cultural event.  It also reports evidence of children’s forceful 
participation in military drills and also child labor.
675
  The 2012 U.K. Human Rights 
Report and the 2009 U.K. Human Rights Report emphasize these poor educational 
environments of North Korea through their respective statements that “We also 
supported two small-scale projects which improved the facilities in schools for disabled 
people.”
676
 and that “Our Embassy in Pyongyang sponsors a range of small-scale 
projects to promote longer-term cooperation with the DPRK. This includes the 
installation of a central heating system at a local nursery school . . . .”
677
  Finally, the 
2009 U.K. Human Rights Report notes North Korea’s claims of increasing education 
spending in recent years, through policies such as the National Programme of Action of 
the Well-Being of Children 2001–10, that is formulated to include some of the UN 
Millennium Development goals.  But without independent verification, the 
                                            
675
 The 2012 U.K. Human Rights Report informs us with the following: 
Children are formally entitled to free education . . . . In September, the DPRK extended the 
period of compulsory education from 11 to 12 years. Over the past year, however, children 
have been removed from school for a substantial amount of time to participate in national 
events, for example the annual (mass gymnastics and cultural) Arirang Festival. There is 
also evidence that children have been forced to participate in military drills and are used 
for child labour. 
2012 U.K. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 35, at 160. 
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 2009 U.K. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 15, at 108; See 2009 ROK HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, 
supra note 34, at 373 (“In the case of firewood, for example, . . . in middle schools[,] they [students] are 
required to bring firewood [for classrooms in the winter] from nearby hills, which often are barren of 
trees and where firewood is not easily available.”). 
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international community cannot assess the impact of these initiatives in action.
678
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
678
 The 2009 U.K. Human Rights Report indicates the following:  
The DPRK says it has . . . increased spending on education in recent years. It formulated a 
National Programme of Action of the Well-Being of Children 2001–10, reflecting some of 
the UN Millennium Development Goals. Without independent verification it is difficult for 
the international community to assess the impact of these initiatives. 
2009 U.K. Human Rights Report, supra note 15, at 107.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
 
                        “Is this not the fast which I choose,  
To loosen the bonds of wickedness,  
To undo the bands of the yoke,  
And to let the oppressed go free  
And break every yoke?” 
– Isaiah 58:6 (New American Standard Bible) 
  
We have systematically studied and thoroughly examined whether the arguments 
of the North Korean government in the DPRK Official Reports are true or not in the 
body of this dissertation so far.  According to the objective and logical sub-conclusions 
drawn from the rigorous and in-depth research on the incapacitation mechanism model 
of the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Articles against the core implementation mechanism 
model of the Fundamental Rights Articles in Chapter Four and Five, all of the claims of 
North Korea that it guarantees the fundamental rights of its people or that it complies 
with the major international human rights treaties are totally unrealizable, given its 
constitutional structure, from a theoretical standpoint.  Additionally, the new refuting 
theory and its incapacitation mechanism model proved that the liberal democratic 
countries’ arguments about North Korea’s violation of the fundamental rights and the 
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international human rights treaties in the LDC Annual Reports, which are based on a 
factual approach, are true.  Thus, we can draw a final conclusion to the issue raised in 
Chapter One of this dissertation not only that the arguments of the North Korean 
government in the DPRK Official Reports are false, but furthermore, that the North 
Korean government has seriously infringed upon the fundamental freedoms of its 
people and has severely violated the international human rights treaties.  
We addressed the resulting infringements of three representative civil and 
political rights in Chapter Four, and three economic, social and cultural rights in 
Chapter Five, on account of space considerations.  However, the new refuting theory 
and its incapacitation mechanism model of the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Articles can 
be used in application to refute the arguments of the North Korean government on the 
guarantee of all of the other fundamental rights in the DPRK Official Reports in 
addition to the ones already dealt within the chapters of this dissertation. 
To cite one typical example, we can examine the right to equality. Article 65 of 
the North Korean Constitution stipulates that “Citizens enjoy equal rights in all spheres 
of State and public activity.”
679
  This is the Fundamental Rights Article concerning the 
issue of the right to equality within the country.  North Korea uses a theoretical 
                                            
679
 North Korean Constitution Chapter V, supra note 231.  
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approach, which focuses on the core implementation mechanism of this Fundamental 
Rights Article, as the main grounds for its arguments in defense of its practices of the 
right to equality in the DPRK Official Reports.  That is to say, the country introduces 
Article 65 of its Constitution as the guaranteed mechanism for the domestic protection 
of the right to equality of its people,
680
 as well as the core implementer for the articles 
on this right in the international human rights treaties to which it has acceded in the 
reports.
681
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 See, e.g., 2000 Second ICCPR Implementation Report, supra note 7, at 4-5 (“The Constitution 
provides for the principles and popular policies to be maintained in political, economic, cultural and all 
other fields of social life, declares that every citizen is particularly ensured the true democratic rights, 
freedom, . . . and stipulates the basic rights of citizens including the right to equality, . . . .”); see also id. 
at 39 (“Every citizen of the DPRK has the right to pubic service on equal terms. This right is provided by 
article 65 of the Constitution that ensures equal rights in all spheres of the state and public activities.”); 
2002 Second ICESCR Implementation Report, supra note 8, at 8 (“The State . . . does not permit any 
distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference made on the basis of race, colour, sex, religion, political 
opinion, nationality or social origin. Citizens enjoy equal rights in their choice of occupation by article 65 
of the Constitution . . . .”); Id. at 11 (“Every citizen is entitled to equal opportunity for promotion. Under 
article 65 of the Constitution that stipulates the equal rights of citizens in all spheres of State and public 
activity, the opportunity for promotion is open to anyone who has passed the ability examination . . . .”); 
Id. at 28 (“Now that all health facilities are owned by the State and society and the Government values 
health promotion of working people without any thought of profit, the citizens are guaranteed medical 
service of the highest possible quality on an equal footing, irrespective of region, stratum, occupation, etc. 
[by Article 65 of the Constitution.]”); Id. at 32 (“The State takes positive measures to let every child enjoy 
an equal right to education [under Article 65 of the Constitution]. Education is completely free at all 
levels and therefore is not affected by the difference in the income of the parents. The State grants 
subsidies as well as scholarships to the students . . . . Such benefits are bestowed without discrimination 
to all of the urban or rural areas and social groups.”); 2002 Initial CEDAW Implementation Report, supra 
note 9, at 33 (“The constitutional principle of sex equality in every field of State and social life [in Article 
65 and so forth] includes equal status and right of men and women before the law. By this constitutional 
principle . . . , everybody is entitled to equality before the law and the equal and indiscriminate protection 
by the law.”); 2007 Combined CRC Implementation Report, supra note 10, at 17 (“The Constitution 
stipulates the fundamental rights and duties of citizens; [c]itizens shall enjoy equal rights in all spheres of 
State and public activity (art. 65) . . . .”).  
 
681
 See, e.g., 2000 Second ICCPR Implementation Report, supra note 7, at 6 (“The Constitution stipulates 
in article 65: ‘Citizens enjoy equal rights in all spheres of state and public activity.’ The DPRK citizens 
are ensured all the rights recognized in the Covenant without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status.”).  
Regarding the right to equality in the ICCPR, North Korea offers, in paragraph 161 of the Second ICCPR 
Implementation Report, that Article 65 of its Constitution is the core mechanism to carry out Article 26 of 
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On the other hand, the North Korean Constitution also contains Article 12, which 
is the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Article concerning the issue of the right to equality in 
the country.  As reviewed in Chapter Four, Article 12 proclaims a political system that 
works to pursue and consolidate a one-man dictatorship.
682
  Generally, official or 
unofficial policies to maintain and strengthen the despotic power of a dictator are 
instituted under this type of political system.  One of the key examples is the 
classification of social strata based on a dictator’s assessment of the people’s political 
loyalty.  Under the system of political hierarchy, those who form the political bedrock 
of a dictator or those who support his dictatorship receive excessively preferential 
treatment in everything from the enjoyment of culture, healthcare, and education to 
occupation, court rulings, and marriage.
683
  On the contrary, those who oppose or resist 
the dictatorship experience irrational discrimination and disadvantage in every aspect of 
life under this governmental policy.
684
  The Kim family of North Korea has 
                                                                                                                                
the Covenant as follows: 
Article 26. Equality before the Law 
161. All the citizens of the DPRK are equal before the law and enjoy, without any 
discrimination, the right to equal protection of the law. The Constitution . . . guarantee[s] 
this right. Article 65 of the Constitution provides: “Citizens enjoy equal rights in all 
spheres of state and public activity.” The citizens of the DPRK exercise equal rights in all 
spheres of state and public activity without discrimination on any ground such as race, 
color, sex, language, religion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. . . .  
Id. at 39.  
 
682
 See supra Chapter Four.II.B.  
 
683
 See infra note 686 and accompanying text.  
 
684
 See infra id.  
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implemented a system of 3 Classes and 51 Sub-Classes, which is the social hierarchy 
according to the political allegiance of an individual and his or her family to their 
regimes, to maintain and consolidate their dictatorships as follows:  
 
<Table 5> The 3 Classes and 51 Sub-classes
685
 
 
3 Classes 
 
 
51 Sub-classes 
 
 
Treatment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Core 
Class 
(28%) 
People from the families of laborers, hired 
peasants (farm servants), poor farmers, and 
administrative clerical workers during the 
Yi Dynasty and Japanese occupation, 
Korean Workers’ Party cadre members; 
bereaved families of the revolution (killed 
in anti-Japan struggles); bereaved families 
of patriots (killed as noncombatants during 
the Korean War); revolutionary intellectuals 
(trained by North Korea after liberation 
from Japan); families of those killed during 
the Korean Wars; families of the fallen 
during the Korean War; Servicemen’s 
families (families of active People’s Army 
officers and men); and families of honored 
wounded soldiers (family members of 
service members wounded during the 
Korean War). 
• Recruit[ed] as staff of 
party, government or 
military.  
• Set apart from individuals 
of other classes, and offer 
special privileges (in 
matriculation, promotion, 
rations, residence, treatment 
and other areas).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
People from the families of small 
merchants, artisans, small factory owners, 
small service traders; medium service 
traders; unaffiliated persons hailing from 
South Korea; families of those who went to 
the South (1st Category); families of those 
who went to the South (2nd Category); 
• Employ[ed] as low-level 
managers or technicians. 
• [A] limited number 
[promoted] to the “core 
masses” class.  
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 2006 ROK HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 34, at 94. 
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Wavering 
Class 
(45%) 
People who formerly were medium-scale 
farmers; national capitalists; families of 
those who went to the South (3rd Category); 
those who repatriated from China; 
intellectuals trained before national 
liberation; the lazy and corrupt; tavern 
hostesses; practitioners of superstition; 
family members of Confucianists; people 
who were previously locally influential 
figures; and economic offenders. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hostile 
Class 
(27%) 
 
 
 
 
People from the families of wealthy 
farmers, merchants, industrialists, 
landowners, or those whose private assets 
have been completely confiscated; pro-
Japan and pro-US people; reactionary 
bureaucrats; defectors from the South; 
members of the Chondoist Chongu Party; 
Buddhists; Catholics; expelled party 
members; expelled public officials; those 
who helped South Korea during the Korean 
War; family members of anyone arrested or 
imprisoned; spies; anti-party and counter-
revolutionary sectarians; families of people 
who were executed; anyone released from 
prison; political prisoners; Members of the 
Democratic Party, capitalists whose private 
assets have been completely confiscated.  
• Assign[ed] to dangerous or 
heavy-duty labor. 
• Block[ed] and suppress[ed] 
from school admissions, 
matriculations, and party 
membership. 
• Classif[ied][] as subjects of 
control, surveillance and 
persuasion. 
• Control: By forcible 
relocation, separate 
accommodation[s].  
• Surveillance: Place[d] 
under constant surveillance 
of movements.  
• Persuasion: Intensive 
reeducation. [V]ery limited 
numbers [reclassified][.] (ex. 
Children) 
※ The following is a sample of [the] 1970 classification based on the results of a citizen registration project at the 
time. Source: Ministry of Unification, An Overview of North Korea, 2000, p. 420. 
 
Thus, we come to understand that the pursuit and consolidation of a dictatorship 
in Article 12 is essentially incompatible with the right to equality in Article 65 of the 
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North Korean Constitution through the abovementioned political stratification of the 3 
Classes and 51 Sub-Classes. 
The incompatibility between the North Korean political system of a one-man 
dictatorship and the right to equality in the country has also been argued by the U.S., 
South Korea, and the U.K. in the LDC Annual Reports.  They have condemned North 
Korea’s violations of the right to equality under its dictatorial system using a factual 
approach, centered on the analyses of testimony by North Korean refugees and the 
interpretation of information gathered from foreign visitors of the country.
686
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 The U.S. Human Rights Reports, ROK Human Rights Reports and U.K. Human Rights Reports have 
many related paragraphs and sentences. However, I will introduce five representative examples from the 
U.S. Human Rights Reports and U.K. Human Rights Reports respectively, and fifteen instances from the 
ROK Human Rights Reports due to space limitations of this dissertation. See supra note 31 and 
accompanying text. 
See, e.g., 2010 U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 32 (“The government divided citizens into strict 
loyalty-based classes known as songbun, which determined access to employment, higher education, 
place of residence, medical facilities, certain stores, and marriage prospects.”); see also id. (“The 
constitution grants equal rights to all citizens. However, the government has reportedly never granted its 
citizens most fundamental human rights in practice, and it continued pervasive discrimination on the basis 
of social status.”); Id. (“Only members of a very small elite class . . . had access to personal vehicles, and 
movement was hampered by the absence of an effective transport network and by military and police 
checkpoints on main roads at the entry to and exit from every town.”); Id. (“Class background and family 
connections could be as important as professional competence in deciding who received particular jobs, 
and foreign companies that have established joint ventures continued to report that all their employees 
must be hired from registers screened by the government.”); Id. (“[A]ccess to health care was largely 
dependent upon loyalty to the government.”); 2010 ROK HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 34, at 226 
(“[T]he [North Korean] regime strictly classifies every individual according to his or her family 
background (or class origin) and degree of loyalty to the regime.”); Id. at 229 (“Defectors have testified 
that this classification, along with the background discrimination policy, has an important impact on the 
daily lives of the people in terms of political and social status, education opportunities, jobs, and 
marriage.”); Id. at 230 (“High-level cadres live in luxurious residences, send their children to special 
schools, and possess modern home appliances. . . . They own private telephones, and are allowed to read 
foreign publications and listen to foreign broadcasts.”); Id. (“Most of them live in Pyongyang and other 
major cities, enjoying privileges such as party membership, or administrative or military positions. In 
effect, they form a feudal hereditary class entitled to benefits in education, promotions, food rations, 
housing, and medical services.”); Id. at 230-231 (“Former medical doctor XXX testified that different 
levels of medical service were provided to people depending on their status and background. Large 
hospitals maintained special units for the treatment and care of party officials.”(citation omitted)); Id. at 
236 (“Officially, North Korea does not admit to any social discrimination based on family background. . . . 
Nevertheless, the discriminatory practice persists in North Korea, and many people are deprived of their 
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Eventually, the workings of the incapacitation mechanism model of Article 12 
against the core implementation mechanism model of Article 65 come to provide the 
theoretical and logical evidence for verifying the falsity of North Korea’s arguments in 
defense of its practices of the right to equality in the DPRK Official Reports and for 
verifying the truth of the liberal democratic countries’ assertions to serve as rebuttals to 
                                                                                                                                
political and social rights due to the background check policy.”); Id. at 238 (“Many defectors testified that 
‘defector families’ and families of former (South Korean) POWs [Prisoners of War] are subjected to 
serious discrimination.”); Id. at 238-239 (“One defector testified that her father was a former POW (South 
Korean soldier captured during the Korean War). Due to this ‘defective’ or ‘bad’ family background, she 
was unable to go on to a good school even though her grades were excellent. Her brother could not join 
the Party. Her father and brother were both assigned to work in coal mines.”(citation omitted)); Id. at 243 
(“Another defector testified that the children of defector families could never get a job anywhere, 
regardless of how bright they were or excellent their capabilities. They could never become a party 
member, either.”(citation omitted)); Id. at 245 (“[A] person’s family background is considered when 
determining the level of punishment. If the suspect had many party members in his family, the authorities 
would assume that the suspect could be reformed by dint of his good family environment.”); Id. (“The 
Security Agency has a set of standing regulations when handling cases. For example, if the suspect had 
more than 9 party members in the family, he would get a three-year reduction of punishment.”); Id. at 246 
(“Personal background also affects marriages. Men with unfavorable personal background have little 
chance to overcome the class barriers . . . .(citation omitted) If one’s background is unfavorable, control 
apparatus such as the Security Agency will often systematically interfere with personal affairs.”); Id. at 
247 (“North Korea assigns housing to people according to their background and forcibly relocates people 
from one place to another.”); 2006 ROK HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 34, at 96 (“North Korean 
authorities [] [regard] one’s personal background [] [as] the most critical factor when selecting the 
candidates for positions in the Party or law-enforcement agencies, on the assumption that the class origin 
of those who harbor an extreme enmity toward the system does not change, even after three 
generations.”); Id. (“When appointing military officers, party officials, or officials for the judiciary, 
people with an unfavorable personal background are fired or reassigned to other positions. In extreme 
cases, even vehicle drivers at party or judiciary organizations have been fired because of a poor personal 
background.”); 2008 U.K. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 35, at 141 (“The government divides 
North Koreans into three political groups: a loyal core class; a suspect wavering class; and a politically 
unreliable class. The three groups are then subdivided into 51 categories, based on the social origins of 
each citizen.”); Id. (“On the basis of this classification, the government determines where people may live 
and work, what job they may do and what benefits (if any) they may receive. Only those citizens 
classified as politically loyal can hope to obtain responsible positions in North Korean society or to live in 
Pyongyang.”); Id. at 140 (“Access to educational opportunities depends . . . on the family’s class . . . .”); 
2007 U.K. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 35, at 149 (“The government does not respect children’s 
rights in the basic sense of providing adequate nutrition and health services. The rights of children depend 
on the government’s political classification of the family into which they are born.”); 2009 U.K. HUMAN 
RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 15, at 107 (“The DPRK operates a population classification system in which 
the ruling elite and those most loyal to the regime enjoy better access to food than others, especially those 
hostile to the authorities.”). 
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the ones of North Korea in the LDC Annual Reports.
687
 
In addition to this right to equality, the incapacitation mechanism model of the 
Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Articles against the core implementation mechanism model 
of the Fundamental Rights Articles presented by this dissertation can logically be used 
in application to prove the falsity of North Korea’s arguments in defense of the freedom 
of residence and movement, the right to privacy, the right to work, the right to culture, 
and so forth in the DPRK Official Reports.  Furthermore, the incapacitation 
mechanism model can be widely applied to theoretically prove the truth of the 
arguments of the U.S., South Korea, and the U.K. attacking North Korea’s practices of 
these freedoms and rights in the LDC Annual Reports. 
North Korea will continue to use a theoretical approach, focusing on the 
Fundamental Rights Articles of its Constitution as the core implementation mechanism, 
to defend itself and to deceive the world with the official Implementation Reports which 
it will release in the future, unless it makes enough real and sustainable progress on the 
issue of its human rights violations to confidently allow the UN special rapporteur for 
human rights in North Korea or human rights activists of international human rights 
NGOs to visit its territory for the assessment of the human rights.  However, 
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 See supra Chapter One.III; see also supra Chapter Four.I.C; supra Chapter Four.II.C; supra Chapter 
Four.III.C; supra Chapter Five.I.C; supra Chapter Five.II.C; supra Chapter Five.III.C. 
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unfortunately, the country has neither a bit of conscience or courage to admit its 
violations of domestic human rights and the international human rights treaties, nor the 
true will to improve its human rights situations in close cooperation with the U.N. and 
the liberal democratic countries.  As Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-Il had not, the current 
dictator Kim Jong-Un will never renounce his dictatorship, thus he will also never 
abandon the anti-human rights nature of Juche and Marxism-Leninism, which are very 
useful in maintaining and strengthening his one-man dictatorship.  In addition, as long 
as he does not give up these ideologies, they will maintain the foursquare position as the 
two ruling ideologies controlling North Korea.  All in all, this means that the arbitrary 
incapacitation of the Fundamental Rights Articles by the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist 
Articles under the constitutional structure and mechanism of North Korea will continue 
to occur now and forever.  Furthermore, this continuous incapacitation means the 
severe violations of fundamental rights and international human rights treaties under the 
incapacitation mechanism of the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Articles will continue in 
North Korea in the future. 
From the logical and theoretical standpoint, there is a simple enough solution to 
secure the fundamental freedoms of the North Korean people and to prevent the 
government from violating such protections prescribed by international human rights 
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treaties—it is the replacement of Juche ideology and Marxism-Leninism with liberal 
democracy.  As shown in the diagrams for the new refuting theory and its 
incapacitation mechanism model, the two existing anti-human rights and ruling 
ideologies controlling North Korea is not only the theoretical starting point for the 
incapacitation mechanism of the Juchist and Marxist-Leninist Articles but also the 
fundamental source of the logical streams of the mechanism.
688
  Thus, if we can 
replace them with liberal democracy, an ideology that is human rights-friendly by nature, 
the Fundamental Rights Articles of the North Korean Constitution can actually function 
normally.  Additionally, the practical results of these normal and smooth functions of 
the articles would be manifested in the faithful guarantees of the fundamental rights of 
its people and the active adherence to the international human rights treaties in North 
Korea.   
I think the issue of the replacement of Juche ideology and Marxism-Leninism 
with liberal democracy in North Korea is in need of further interdisciplinary research in 
fields such as international diplomacy, international relations, political science, 
economics, jurisprudence, sociology, military science
689
 and so forth, because the 
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 See supra <Diagram 3>; see also supra <Diagram 5>; supra <Diagram 7>; supra <Diagram 9>; supra 
<Diagram 11>; supra <Diagram 13>; supra <Diagram 15>.  
 
689
 This doesn’t necessarily mean a war. This is mainly for the prompt military intervention of the liberal 
democratic countries to ensure the North Korean people’s safety and to build order and security in the 
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overthrow of the dictatorial regime and the establishment of a democratic government in 
North Korea is most likely to be brought on by complex factors that include the 
deepening isolation of North Korea from the rest of the world due to its failure in 
diplomatic strategies and responses, the intensified pressure and sanctions of the U.N. 
and the international society on North Korea, North Korea’s adherence to a centrally 
planned economy and a military-first policy, the collapse of the North Korean economy, 
severe food shortage, mass starvation, massive North Korean defections, the weakening 
of North Korea’s control over its people, pro-democracy revolts led by the Hostile Class 
and Wavering Class,
690
 and so forth. 
I expect the arguments of the new refuting theory and its incapacitation 
mechanism model presented by this dissertation to be useful reference material, which 
enable the liberal democratic camp to make more effective responses against North 
Korea’s specious arguments grounded in the core implementation mechanism of the 
Fundamental Rights Articles in the DPRK Official Reports and official Implementation 
Reports to be released in the future. 
I also hope this dissertation will serve as an opportunity to raise awareness about 
the importance of research on North Korean human rights through theoretical 
                                                                                                                                
country when North Korea faces unexpected implosion.  
 
690
 See supra <Table 5>.  
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refutations and the necessity for the revival of studies on this subject, based on 
theoretical approaches. 
Finally, I sincerely hope this dissertation will help the world gain interest in the 
actual circumstances of the terrible human rights violations in North Korea behind the 
veil of falsehood and deception.  
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APPENDICES 
 
<APPENDIX I> COMPARISON TABLES FOR THE RELATED PROVISIONS OF THE 
NORTH KOREAN CONSTITUTIONS 
 
<Table 6> Comparison Table for the Related Provisions of the North Korean 
Constitutions Regarding the Freedom of Religion 
Classification 
Freedom of Religion 
The Fundamental Rights 
Article 
The Juchist and Marxist-
Leninist Article 
The 
North 
Korean 
Consti-
tution 
of 
2009 
 
The first part of Article 68. 
Citizens have freedom of 
religious belief. This right is 
granted through the approval 
of the construction of religious 
buildings and the holding of 
religious ceremonies.
691
  
 
The latter part of Article 68. 
Religion must not be used as a 
pretext for drawing in foreign 
forces or for harming the State 
or social order.
692
  
 
 
2012 
 
Same as above. 
 
Same as above. 
2010 
 
Same as above. 
 
Same as above. 
1998 
 
Same as above. 
 
Same as above. 
                                            
691
 North Korean Constitution Chapter V, supra note 231.  
 
692
 Id.  
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1992 Same as above. Same as above. 
1972 
 
Article 54. Citizens have 
freedom of religious 
belief . . . .
693
 
 
Article 54. Citizens have . . . 
freedom of anti-religious 
propaganda.
694
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
693
 Foreign Languages Publishing House [of DPRK], supra note 187, at 240. 
 
694
 Id.  
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<Table 7> Comparison Table for the Related Provisions of the North Korean 
Constitutions Regarding the Right to Vote and to Be Elected  
Classification 
The Right to Vote and to Be Elected 
The Fundamental Rights 
Article 
The Juchist and Marxist-
Leninist Article 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The 
North 
Korean 
Consti-
tution 
of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009 
 
Article 66. All citizens who 
have reached the age of 17 
have the right to elect and to be 
elected, irrespective of sex, 
race, occupation, length of 
residence, property status, 
education, party affiliation, 
political views or religious 
belief.  
Citizens serving in the armed 
forces also have the right to 
elect and to be elected. A 
person who has been 
disenfranchised by a Court 
decision and a person legally 
certified insane do not have the 
right to elect or to be 
elected.
695
 
 
Article 12. The State shall . . . 
strengthen the dictatorship of 
the people’s democracy so as 
to firmly defend the people’s 
power and socialist system 
against all subversive acts of 
hostile elements at home and 
abroad.
696
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2012 Same as above. Same as above. 
2010 Same as above. Same as above. 
                                            
695
 North Korean Constitution Chapter V, supra note 231. 
 
696
 North Korean Constitution Chapter I, supra note 205. 
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The 
North 
Korean 
Consti-
tution 
of 
1998 Same as above. Same as above. 
1992 Same as above. Same as above. 
1972 
 
Article 52. All citizens who 
have reached the age of 17 
have the right to elect and to be 
elected, irrespective of sex, 
race, occupation, length of 
residence, property status, 
education, party affiliation, 
political views, and religion. 
Citizens serving in the Armed 
Forces also have the right to 
elect and to be elected. Those 
who are deprived by a court 
decision of the right to vote 
and insane persons are denied 
the right to elect and to be 
elected.
697
 
 
Article 10. The Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea 
exercises the dictatorship of 
the proletariat . . . .
698
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
697
 Foreign Languages Publishing House [of DPRK], supra note 187, at 239-240.  
 
698
 Id. at 233.  
As reviewed earlier, “the dictatorship of the people’s democracy” and “dictatorship of the proletariat” are 
equivalent in meaning. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.  
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<Table 8> Comparison Table for the Related Provisions of the North Korean 
Constitutions Regarding the Freedom of Speech, Press, Assembly, and 
Association  
Classification 
Freedom of Speech, Press, Assembly, and Association 
The Fundamental Rights 
Article 
The Juchist and Marxist-
Leninist Articles 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The 
North 
Korean 
Consti-
tution 
of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009 
 
Article 67. Citizens are 
guaranteed freedom of speech, 
the press, assembly, 
demonstration and association. 
The State shall guarantee the 
conditions for the free 
activities of . . . social 
organizations.
699
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Article 63. In the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea the 
rights and duties of citizens are 
based on the collectivist 
principle: “One for all and all 
for one.”
700
   
 
Article 42. The State shall 
eliminate the way of life 
inherited from the outmoded 
society and establish a new 
socialist way of life 
[emphasizing collectivism
701
] 
in every sphere.
702
 
 
2012 Same as above. 
Article 63. Same as above. 
 
Article 42. Same as above. 
                                            
699
 North Korean Constitution Chapter V, supra note 231. 
 
700
 Id.  
 
701
 See supra note 407 and accompanying text. 
 
702
 North Korean Constitution Chapter III, supra note 408.  
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The 
North 
Korean 
Consti-
tution 
of 
 
 
 
2010 Same as above. 
Article 63. Same as above. 
 
Article 42. Same as above. 
1998 Same as above. 
 
Article 63. Same as above. 
 
Article 42. Same as above. 
 
1992 Same as above. 
 
Article 63. Same as above. 
 
Article 42. Same as above. 
 
1972 
 
Article 53. Citizens have 
freedom of speech, the press, 
assembly, association, and of 
demonstration.  
The state guarantees conditions 
for the free activities of . . . 
social organizations.
703
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Article 49. In the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea, 
the rights and duties of citizens 
are based on the collectivist 
principle of “One for all and 
all for one.”
704
  
 
Article 38. The state eliminates 
the way of life left over from 
the old society and introduces 
the new socialist way of life 
[emphasizing collectivism
705
] 
in all fields.
706
  
 
 
                                            
703
 Foreign Languages Publishing House [of DPRK], supra note 187, at 240.  
 
704
 Id. at 239.  
 
705
 See supra note 407 and accompanying text. 
 
706
 Foreign Languages Publishing House [of DPRK], supra note 187, at 238.  
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<Table 9> Comparison Table for the Related Provisions of the North Korean 
Constitutions Regarding the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living  
Classification 
The Right to an Adequate Standard of Living 
The Fundamental Rights 
Article 
The Juchist and Marxist-
Leninist Articles 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The 
North 
Korean 
Consti-
tution 
of  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009 
 
Article 25. The Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea 
regards the steady 
improvement of the 
material . . . standards of the 
people as the supreme 
principle of its activities. 
The increasing material wealth 
of society in our country, 
where taxes have been 
abolished, is used entirely to 
promote the well-being of the 
working people.  
The State shall provide all the 
working people with every 
condition for obtaining food, 
clothing and housing.
707
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Article 34. The national 
economy of the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea is 
a [centrally] planned economy. 
The State shall draw up and 
implement the plans for the 
development of the national 
economy in accordance with 
the laws of socialist economic 
development so that the 
balance between accumulation 
and consumption can be 
maintained correctly, economic 
construction accelerated, the 
people’s standard of living 
steadily raised and the nation’s 
defence capabilities 
strengthened. 
The State shall ensure a high 
rate of growth in production 
and a balanced development of 
the national economy by 
implementing unified and 
detailed planning.
708
  
 
Article 3. The Democratic 
                                            
707
 North Korean Constitution Chapter II, supra note 486. 
 
708
 Id.  
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The 
North 
Korean 
Consti-
tution 
of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
People’s Republic of Korea is 
guided in its activities by . . . 
the Songun [military-first] 
idea . . . .”
709
  
 
2012 Same as above. 
 
Article 34. Same as above. 
 
Article 3. Same as above. 
 
2010 Same as above. 
 
Article 34. Same as above. 
 
Article 3. Same as above. 
 
1998 Same as above. 
 
Article 34. Same as above. 
 
Article 3. The Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea is 
guided in its activities by the 
Juche idea . . . .
710
 
 
1992 Same as above. 
 
Article 34. Same as above. 
 
Article 3. Same as above. 
 
                                            
709
 North Korean Constitution Chapter I, supra note 205. 
 
710
 FOREIGN LANGUAGES PUBLISHING HOUSE [OF DPRK], SOCIALIST CONSTITUTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA 4 (Foreign Languages Publishing House [of DPRK] trans., 1998).  
As reviewed earlier, the Juche idea already contains the Songun [military-first] idea within itself. See 
supra Chapter Three.II.A; see also supra note 206 and accompanying text.   
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1972 
 
Article 23. The state regards it 
as the supreme principle of its 
activities to steadily improve 
the material . . . standards of 
the people.  
The constantly increasing 
material wealth of society in 
the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea is used 
entirely to promote the well-
being of the working people.
711
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Article 31. The national 
economy of the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea is 
a [centrally] planned economy.  
In accordance with the laws of 
economic development of 
socialism, the state draws up 
and carries out the plans for 
the development of the 
national economy so that the 
balance of accumulation and 
consumption can be 
maintained correctly, economic 
construction accelerated, the 
people’s living standards 
steadily raised, and the nation’s 
defense potential strengthened. 
The state ensures a high rate of 
growth in production and a 
proportionate development of 
the national economy by 
implementing a policy of 
unified and detailed 
planning.
712
  
 
Article 4. The Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea is 
guided in its activity by the 
Chuch’e idea . . . .
713
 
 
 
                                            
711
 Foreign Languages Publishing House [of DPRK], supra note 187, at 235. 
 
712
 Id. at 237.  
 
713
 Id. at 232.  
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<Table 10> Comparison Table for the Related Provisions of the North Korean 
Constitutions Regarding the Right to Health 
Classification 
The Right to Health 
The Fundamental Rights 
Articles 
The Juchist and Marxist-
Leninist Articles 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The 
North 
Korean 
Consti-
tution 
of  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009 
 
Article 56. The State shall 
protect the people’s lives and 
improve the working people’s 
health by consolidating and 
developing the system of 
universal free medical service 
and improving the district 
doctor system and the system 
of preventive medicine.
714
   
 
Article 72. Citizens are entitled 
to free medical care . . . . This 
right is ensured by free 
medical care, an expanding 
network of hospitals, sanatoria 
and other medical institutions, 
State social insurance and 
other social security 
systems.
715
 
 
Article 34. Same as the 
relevant contents of <Table 9>. 
 
Article 3. Same as the relevant 
contents of <Table 9>.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2012 
 
Article 56. Same as above.  
 
Article 72. Same as above. 
 
 
Article 34. Same as above.  
 
Article 3. Same as above. 
 
                                            
714
 North Korean Constitution Chapter III, supra note 408. 
 
715
 North Korean Constitution Chapter V, supra note 231. 
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The 
North 
Korean 
Consti-
tution 
of 
2010 
 
Article 56. Same as above. 
 
Article 72. Same as above. 
 
 
Article 34. Same as above. 
 
Article 3. Same as above. 
 
1998 
Article 56. Same as above. 
 
Article 72. Same as above. 
Article 34. Same as above. 
 
Article 3. Same as the relevant 
contents of <Table 9>.  
1992 
Article 56. Same as above. 
 
Article 72. Same as above. 
Article 34. Same as above. 
 
Article 3. Same as above. 
1972 
Article 48. The state 
consolidates and develops the 
system of universal free 
medical service and pursues a 
policy of preventive medical 
care so as to protect people’s 
lives and promote the health of 
the working people.
716
  
 
Article 58. Citizens are entitled 
to free medical care . . . . This 
right is ensured by free 
medical care, a growing 
network of hospitals, sanatoria, 
and other medical institutions, 
and the state social insurance 
and security system.
717
  
Article 31. Same as the 
relevant contents of <Table 9>.  
 
Article 4. Same as the relevant 
contents of <Table 9>. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
716
 Foreign Languages Publishing House [of DPRK], supra note 187, at 239. 
 
717
 Id. at 240.  
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<Table 11> Comparison Table for the Related Provisions of the North Korean 
Constitutions Regarding the Right to Education 
Classification 
The Right to Education 
The Fundamental Rights 
Articles 
The Juchist and Marxist-
Leninist Articles 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The 
North 
Korean 
Consti-
tution 
of  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009 
 
Article 47. The State shall 
provide education to all pupils 
and students free of charge and 
grant allowances to students at 
universities and colleges.
718
   
 
Article 73. Citizens have the 
right to education. This right is 
ensured by an advanced 
educational system and by the 
educational measures enacted 
by the State for the benefit of 
the people.
719
 
 
Article 34. Same as the 
relevant contents of <Table 9>. 
 
Article 3. Same as the relevant 
contents of <Table 9>.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2012 
 
Article 47. Same as above. 
 
Article 73. Same as above.  
 
 
Article 34. Same as above.  
 
Article 3. Same as above. 
 
2010 
 
Article 47. Same as above. 
 
Article 73. Same as above. 
 
 
Article 34. Same as above. 
 
Article 3. Same as above. 
 
                                            
718
 North Korean Constitution Chapter III, supra note 408.  
 
719
 North Korean Constitution Chapter V, supra note 231. 
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The 
North 
Korean 
Consti-
tution 
of 
1998 
Article 47. Same as above. 
 
Article 73. Same as above. 
 
Article 34. Same as above. 
 
Article 3. Same as the relevant 
contents of <Table 9>. 
 
1992 
 
Article 47. Same as above. 
 
Article 73. Same as above. 
 
 
Article 34. Same as above. 
 
Article 3. Same as above. 
 
1972 
 
Article 41. . . . . The state 
grants to all pupils and 
students education free of 
charge.
720
  
 
Article 42. . . . . Students of 
higher educational institutions 
and higher specialized schools 
are granted scholarships.
721
 
 
Article 59. Citizens have the 
right to education. This right is 
ensured by an advanced 
educational system, free 
compulsory education, and 
other state educational 
measures for the people.
722
  
 
Article 31. Same as the 
relevant contents of <Table 9>.  
 
Article 4. Same as the relevant 
contents of <Table 9>. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
720
 Foreign Languages Publishing House [of DPRK], supra note 187, at 238. 
 
721
 Id.  
 
722
 Id. at 240. 
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<APPENDIX II> THE SOCIALIST CONSTITUTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (THE NORTH KOREAN 
CONSTITUTION OF 2009) 
 
PREAMBLE
723
 
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is the socialist motherland of Juche 
which has applied the idea and leadership of the great leader Comrade Kim Il Sung.  
The great leader Comrade Kim Il Sung is the founder of the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea and the father of socialist Korea. 
Comrade Kim Il Sung authored the immortal Juche idea and, by organizing and 
leading the anti-Japanese revolutionary struggle under its banner, created the glorious 
revolutionary traditions and achieved the historic cause of national restoration. On the 
basis of laying a solid foundation for the building of an independent and sovereign State 
in the political, economic, cultural and military fields, he founded the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea. 
Having put forward Juche-oriented revolutionary lines, Comrade Kim Il Sung 
wisely led various stages of social revolution and construction work, thus strengthening 
and developing the Republic into a socialist country centred on the masses, into a 
socialist State which is independent, self-sufficient and self-reliant in defence.  
Comrade Kim Il Sung elucidated the fundamental principles of the building and 
activities of the State, established the best State and social system, the best mode of 
politics and system and methods of administering society, and laid solid foundations for 
                                            
723
 Naenara [My Country]: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Constitution: Preamble, 
http://naenara.com.kp/en/great/constitution.php?1 (last visited May 3, 2012). 
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the prosperity of the socialist motherland and for the inheritance and consummation of 
the revolutionary cause of Juche. 
Regarding “The people are my God” as his maxim, Comrade Kim Il Sung 
always mixed with the people, devoted his whole life to them and turned the whole of 
society into a large family which is united in one mind by taking care of the people and 
leading them through his noble benevolent politics.  
The great leader Comrade Kim Il Sung is the sun of the nation and the lodestar 
of national reunification. Regarding the reunification of the country as the supreme 
national task, Comrade Kim Il Sung devoted all his efforts and care for its realization. 
He made the Republic a powerful bastion for national reunification. At the same time, 
he set forth the fundamental principle and ways of national reunification and developed 
the movement for national reunification into a nationwide movement, opening the way 
for achieving the cause of reunification through the united efforts of the whole nation.  
The great leader Comrade Kim Il Sung clarified the basic ideals of the foreign 
policy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. On the basis of this, he expanded 
and developed the country’s foreign relations and ensured that the international prestige 
of the Republic was exalted. As a veteran statesman in the world, Comrade Kim Il 
Sung opened up the new era of independence, carried out energetic activities for the 
strengthening and development of the socialist movement and the non-aligned 
movement, as well as for world peace and for friendship among the peoples and made 
an imperishable contribution to the cause of human independence. 
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Comrade Kim Il Sung was a genius in ideology and theory, a master of 
leadership art, an ever-victorious iron-willed brilliant commander, a great revolutionary 
and statesman and a great man.  
The great idea of Comrade Kim Il Sung and the great achievements made under 
his leadership are the lasting treasures of the Korean revolution and the basic guarantee 
for the prosperity of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.  
Under the leadership of the Workers’ Party of Korea, the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea and the Korean people will uphold the great leader Comrade Kim Il 
Sung as the eternal President of the Republic and carry the revolutionary cause of 
Juche through to completion by defending and carrying forward the idea and 
achievements of Comrade Kim Il Sung.  
The Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea shall be 
called Kim Il Sung’s Constitution, the codification of the great leader Comrade Kim 
Il Sung’s Juche-oriented ideas on and exploits in State building.  
 
CHAPTER I POLITICS
724
 
Article 1: The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is an independent socialist State 
representing the interests of all the Korean people.  
Article 2: The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is a revolutionary State which 
has inherited the brilliant traditions formed during the glorious revolutionary 
struggle against the imperialist aggressors and in the struggle to achieve the 
liberation of the homeland and the freedom and well-being of the people. 
                                            
724
 North Korean Constitution Chapter I, supra note 205.  
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Article 3: The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is guided in its activities by the 
Juche idea and the Songun idea, a world outlook centred on people, a 
revolutionary ideology for achieving the independence of the masses of the 
people. 
Article 4: The sovereignty of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea resides in the 
workers, peasants, soldiers, working intellectuals and all other working people. 
The working people exercise State power through their representative organs–
the Supreme People’s Assembly and local People’s Assemblies at all levels.  
Article 5: All State organs in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are formed 
and function on the principle of democratic centralism.  
Article 6: The organs of State power at all levels, from the county People’s Assembly to 
the Supreme People’s Assembly, are elected on the principle of universal, 
equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot.  
Article 7: Deputies to the organs of State power at all levels have close ties with their 
constituents and are accountable to them for their work. 
The electors may recall at any time the deputies they have elected if the latter 
lose the trust of the former.  
Article 8: The social system of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is a people-
centred system under which the working people are the masters of everything 
and everything in society serves them. 
The State shall defend the interests of the workers, peasants, soldiers, working 
intellectuals and all other working people who have been freed from 
exploitation and oppression and become the masters of the State and society, 
and respect and protect human rights.  
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Article 9: The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea shall strive to achieve the 
complete victory of socialism in the northern half of Korea by strengthening 
the people’s power and vigorously performing the three revolutions–
ideological, technological and cultural–and reunify the country on the 
principle of independence, peaceful reunification and great national unity.  
Article 10: The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is underpinned by the politico-
ideological unity of all the people based on the worker-peasant alliance led 
by the working class. 
The State shall revolutionize all the members of society, and assimilate them 
to the working class by intensifying the ideological revolution, and shall turn 
the whole of society into a collective, united [group] in a comradely way.  
Article 11: The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea shall conduct all activities 
under the leadership of the Workers’ Party of Korea. 
Article 12: The State shall adhere to the class line and strengthen the dictatorship of the 
people’s democracy so as to firmly defend the people’s power and socialist 
system against all subversive acts of hostile elements at home and abroad.  
Article 13: The State shall implement the mass line and apply the Chongsanri spirit and 
Chongsanri method to all its activities, the spirit and method by which 
superiors assist their subordinates, mix with the masses to find solutions to 
problems and rouse them to conscious enthusiasm by giving precedence to 
political work, work with people. 
Article 14: The State shall determinedly conduct the Three-Revolution Red Flag 
Movement and other mass movements so as to accelerate the building of 
socialism to the maximum.  
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Article 15: The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea shall champion the democratic 
national rights of Koreans overseas and their rights recognized by 
international law as well as their interests.  
Article 16: The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea shall guarantee the legal rights 
and interests of foreigners in its territory.  
Article 17: Independence, peace and friendship are the basic ideals of the foreign policy 
and the principles of the external activities of the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea. 
The State shall establish diplomatic as well as political, economic and 
cultural relations with all friendly countries, on the principles of complete 
equality, independence, mutual respect, non-interference in each other’s 
affairs and mutual benefit. 
The State shall promote unity with people all over the world who defend 
their independence, and resolutely support and encourage the struggles of all 
people who oppose all forms of aggression and interference and fight for 
their countries’ independence and national and class emancipation.  
Article 18: The law of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea reflects the wishes 
and interests of the working people and is a basic instrument for State 
administration. 
Respect for the law and strict adherence to and execution of it is the duty of 
all institutions, enterprises, organizations and citizens. 
The State shall perfect the system of socialist law and promote the socialist 
law-abiding life.  
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CHAPTER II THE ECONOMY
725
 
Article 19: The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea relies on socialist relations of 
production and on the foundation of an independent national economy.  
Article 20: In the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea the means of production are 
owned by the State and social, cooperative organizations.  
Article 21: The property of the State belongs to all the people. 
There is no limit to the property which the State can own. 
All natural resources, railways, air transport service, post and 
telecommunications establishments, as well as major factories and 
enterprises, ports and banks of the country are owned solely by the State. 
The State shall protect and develop on a preferential basis State property 
which plays the leading role in the economic development of the country.  
Article 22: The property of social, cooperative organizations is collectively owned by 
the working people involved in the organizations concerned.  
Land, farm machinery and ships, as well as small and medium-sized 
factories and enterprises may be owned by social, cooperative organizations. 
The State shall protect the property of social, cooperative organizations.  
Article 23: The State shall enhance the ideological consciousness and the technical and 
cultural level of the peasants, increase the role of the property of all the 
people in leading the cooperative property so as to combine the two forms of 
property in an organic way, and shall consolidate and develop the socialist 
cooperative economic system by improving the guidance and management 
of the cooperative economy and gradually transform the property of 
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cooperative organizations into the property of the people as a whole based on 
the voluntary will of all their members.  
Article 24: Private property is property owned and consumed by individual citizens.  
Private property is derived from socialist distribution according to work done 
and from supplementary benefits granted by the State and society.  
The products of individual sideline activities including those from kitchen 
gardens, as well as income from other legal economic activities shall also be 
private property.  
The State shall protect private property and guarantee by law the right to 
inherit it.  
Article 25: The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea regards the steady improvement 
of the material and cultural standards of the people as the supreme principle 
of its activities.  
The increasing material wealth of society in our country, where taxes have 
been abolished, is used entirely to promote the well-being of the working 
people.  
The State shall provide all the working people with every condition for 
obtaining food, clothing and housing.  
Article 26: The independent national economy of the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea is a solid foundation for the people’s happy socialist life and for the 
country’s prosperity.  
The State, adhering to the line of building a socialist, independent national 
economy, shall endeavour to promote the national economy on a Juche-
oriented, modern and scientific basis so as to make the national economy a 
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highly developed, Juche-oriented economy and build material and technical 
foundations commensurate with a completely socialist society.  
Article 27: The technological revolution is a basic link for developing the socialist 
economy. 
The State shall conduct all economic activities giving primary preference to 
technical development at all times, push ahead with scientific and 
technological development and the technical renovation of the national 
economy and vigorously promote the mass technical innovation movement 
so as to free the working people from difficult, tiresome labour and to 
narrow the distinctions between physical and mental labour.  
Article 28: The State shall industrialize and modernize agriculture through the rural 
technical revolution and improve the role of the county and its guidance and 
assistance to rural areas in order to eliminate the difference between town 
and countryside and the class distinction between workers and peasants.  
The State shall undertake, at its own expense, the building of production 
facilities for cooperative farms and modern houses in the countryside.  
Article 29: Socialism is built by the creative labour of the working people.  
Labour in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is independent and 
creative labour of the working people, freed from exploitation and 
oppression.  
The State renders the labour of our working people, to whom unemployment 
is unknown, more joyful and worthwhile, so that they willingly work with 
conscious enthusiasm and creativeness for society, the collective and 
themselves.  
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Article 30: The working day shall be eight hours.  
The length of the working day shall be reduced by the State in arduous trades 
and other special categories of work.  
The State shall guarantee that the working hours are fully utilized through 
proper organization of labour and enforcement of labour discipline.  
Article 31: In the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea the minimum working age is 
16 years.  
The State shall prohibit the employment of those under the minimum 
working age.  
Article 32: The State shall firmly adhere to the principle of properly combining political 
guidance with economic and technical guidance, the unified guidance of the 
State with the creativeness of each unit, unitary direction with democracy, 
and political and moral incentive with material incentive in the guidance and 
management of the socialist economy.  
Article 33: The State shall direct and manage the national economy through the Taean 
work system, a socialist form of economic management whereby the 
economy is operated and managed scientifically and rationally on the basis 
of the collective efforts of the producer masses, and through the system of 
agricultural guidance whereby agricultural management is conducted by 
industrial methods.  
The State shall enforce the self-accounting system in economic management 
to meet the requirements of the Taean work system, and shall make proper 
use of such economic levers as cost, price and profit.  
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Article 34: The national economy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is a 
planned economy.  
The State shall draw up and implement the plans for the development of the 
national economy in accordance with the laws of socialist economic 
development so that the balance between accumulation and consumption can 
be maintained correctly, economic construction accelerated, the people’s 
standard of living steadily raised and the nation’s defence capabilities 
strengthened.  
The State shall ensure a high rate of growth in production and a balanced 
development of the national economy by implementing unified and detailed 
planning.  
Article 35: The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea shall compile and implement 
the State budget according to the national economic development plan.  
The State shall systematically increase its material accumulation and expand 
and develop socialist property by intensifying the campaign for increased 
production and greater economy and by exercising strict financial control in 
all spheres.  
Article 36: In the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea foreign trade is conducted by 
the State organs and enterprises, and social, cooperative organizations.  
The State shall develop foreign trade on the principles of complete equality 
and mutual benefit.  
Article 37: The State shall encourage institutions, enterprises and organizations in the 
country to conduct equity or contractual joint ventures with foreign 
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corporations and individuals, and to establish and operate enterprises of 
various kinds in special economic zones.  
Article 38: The State shall pursue a tariff policy to protect the independent national 
economy.  
 
CHAPTER III CULTURE
726
 
Article 39: Socialist culture, which is flourishing and developing in the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea, contributes to improving the creative ability of 
the working people and to meeting their sound cultural and aesthetic 
demands. 
Article 40: The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea shall, by carrying out a 
thorough cultural revolution, train all the people to be builders of socialism 
equipped with a profound knowledge of nature and society and a high level 
of culture and technology, thus making the whole of society intellectual.  
Article 41: The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea shall develop a truly people-
oriented, revolutionary culture which serves the socialist working people. 
In building a socialist national culture, the State shall oppose the cultural 
infiltration of imperialism and any tendency to return to the past, protect its 
national cultural heritage, and develop it in keeping with the existing 
socialist situation.  
Article 42: The State shall eliminate the way of life inherited from the outmoded society 
and establish a new socialist way of life in every sphere.  
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Article 43: The State shall embody the principles of socialist pedagogy so as to raise the 
rising generation to be steadfast revolutionaries who will fight for society 
and the people, to be people of the new, Juche type who are knowledgeable, 
morally sound and physically healthy.  
Article 44: The State shall give precedence to public education and the training of 
cadres for the nation and closely combine general education with 
technological education, and education with productive labour.  
Article 45: The State shall develop universal compulsory eleven-year education which 
includes compulsory one-year preschool education at a high level in 
accordance with the trend of modern science and technology and the 
practical requirements of socialist construction.  
Article 46: The State shall train competent technicians and experts by enhancing the 
regular educational system as well as different forms of studying while 
working, and by improving the scientific and theoretical levels of 
technological education and education in the social and basic sciences.  
Article 47: The State shall provide education to all pupils and students free of charge 
and grant allowances to students at universities and colleges.  
Article 48: The State shall strengthen social education and provide the working people 
with all conditions for study.  
Article 49: The State shall maintain all children of preschool age in creches and 
kindergartens at State and public expense.  
Article 50: The State shall establish Juche in scientific research, introduce advanced 
science and technology in every possible way, open up new areas of science 
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and technology and raise the country’s science and technology to the world 
level.  
Article 51: The State shall elaborate a correct plan to develop science and technology, 
set up a strict discipline to implement it, and strengthen creative cooperation 
among scientists, technicians and producers.  
Article 52: The State shall develop Juche-oriented, revolutionary art and literature, 
national in form and socialist in content. 
The State shall encourage creative workers and artists to produce works of 
high ideological and artistic value and enlist the broad sections of the masses 
in literary and artistic activities.  
Article 53: The State shall provide sufficient modern cultural facilities to meet the 
demands of the people who want to continually improve themselves, both 
mentally and physically, so that the working people enjoy a full socialist 
cultured, aesthetic life.  
Article 54: The State shall safeguard our language from all attempts to obliterate it and 
shall develop it to meet present-day needs.  
Article 55: The State shall thoroughly prepare all the people for work and national 
defence by popularizing physical culture and sport and making it their daily 
regime, and augment sporting skills to meet our country’s reality and the 
trend in modern sporting skills.  
Article 56: The State shall protect the people’s lives and improve the working people’s 
health by consolidating and developing the system of universal free medical 
service and improving the district doctor system and the system of 
preventive medicine. 
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Article 57: The State shall adopt measures to protect the environment, giving it 
preference over production, preserve and promote the natural environment 
and prevent environmental pollution so as to provide the people with a 
hygienic living environment and working conditions.  
 
CHAPTER IV NATIONAL DEFENCE
727
 
Article 58: The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is shored up by the all-people, 
nationwide defence system.  
Article 59: The mission of the armed forces of the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea is to defend the leadership of the revolution, to safeguard the interests 
of the working people, to defend the socialist system and the gains of the 
revolution, and to protect the freedom, independence and peace of the 
country from foreign aggression by implementing the Songun-based 
revolutionary line.  
Article 60: The State shall implement the line of self-reliant defence, the import of 
which is to train the army to be a cadre army, modernize the army, arm all 
the people and fortify the country on the basis of equipping the army and the 
people politically and ideologically.  
Article 61: The State shall establish a revolutionary command system and military 
climate, strengthen military and mass disciplines in the army, and give full 
play to the noble traditional traits of unity between officers and men, 
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combination of the military and political work and unity between the army 
and the people.  
 
CHAPTER V FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF CITIZENS
728
  
Article 62: The requirements for becoming a citizen of the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea are defined by the Law on Nationality.  
A citizen is under the protection of the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea regardless of domicile.  
Article 63: In the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea the rights and duties of 
citizens are based on the collectivist principle: “One for all and all for one.”  
Article 64: The State shall effectively guarantee the genuine democratic rights and 
freedoms as well as the material and cultural well-being of all its citizens. 
In the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea the rights and freedoms of 
citizens shall be amplified with the consolidation and development of the 
socialist system.  
Article 65: Citizens enjoy equal rights in all spheres of State and public activity.  
Article 66: All citizens who have reached the age of 17 have the right to elect and to be 
elected, irrespective of sex, race, occupation, length of residence, property 
status, education, party affiliation, political views or religious belief.  
Citizens serving in the armed forces also have the right to elect and to be 
elected.  
A person who has been disenfranchised by a Court decision and a person 
legally certified insane do not have the right to elect or to be elected.  
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Article 67: Citizens are guaranteed freedom of speech, the press, assembly, 
demonstration and association.  
The State shall guarantee the conditions for the free activities of democratic 
political parties and social organizations.  
Article 68: Citizens have freedom of religious belief. This right is granted through the 
approval of the construction of religious buildings and the holding of 
religious ceremonies.  
Religion must not be used as a pretext for drawing in foreign forces or for 
harming the State or social order.  
Article 69: Citizens are entitled to submit complaints and petitions.  
The State shall investigate and deal with complaints and petitions impartially 
as stipulated by law.  
Article 70: Citizens have the right to work.  
All able-bodied citizens may choose occupations in accordance with their 
wishes and skills and are provided with stable jobs and working conditions.  
Citizens work according to their abilities and are paid in accordance with the 
quantity and quality of their work.  
Article 71: Citizens have the right to relaxation. This right is ensured by the 
establishment of working hours, and the provision of holidays, paid leave, 
accommodation at health resorts and holiday homes at State expense and by 
a growing network of cultural facilities.  
Article 72: Citizens are entitled to free medical care, and all persons who are no longer 
able to work because of old age, illness or physical disability, and seniors 
and minors who have no means of support are all entitled to material 
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assistance. This right is ensured by free medical care, an expanding network 
of hospitals, sanatoria and other medical institutions, State social insurance 
and other social security systems.  
Article 73: Citizens have the right to education. This right is ensured by an advanced 
educational system and by the educational measures enacted by the State for 
the benefit of the people.  
Article 74: Citizens are free to engage in scientific, literary and artistic pursuits.  
The State shall grant benefits to inventors and innovators.  
Copyrights, inventions and patents shall be protected by law.  
Article 75: Citizens have freedom of residence and travel.  
Article 76: Revolutionary fighters, the families of revolutionary and patriotic martyrs, 
the families of soldiers of the People’s Army and soldiers disabled on duty 
enjoy the special protection of the State and society.  
Article 77: Women are accorded equal social status and rights with men.  
The State shall afford special protection to mothers and children by 
providing maternity leave, reduced working hours for mothers with several 
children, a wide network of maternity hospitals, creches and kindergartens, 
and other measures.  
The State shall provide all conditions for women to play their full roles in 
society.  
Article 78: Marriage and the family shall be protected by the State.  
The State pays great attention to consolidating the family, the basic unit of 
social life.  
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Article 79: Citizens are guaranteed inviolability of the person and the home, and privacy 
of correspondence.  
No citizen can be placed under control or arrest nor can a citizen’s home be 
searched without a legal warrant.  
Article 80: The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea shall grant the right of asylum 
to foreign nationals persecuted for struggling for peace and democracy, 
national independence and socialism or for the freedom of scientific and 
cultural pursuits.  
Article 81: Citizens shall firmly safeguard the political and ideological unity and 
solidarity of the people.  
Citizens shall cherish their organization and collective and work devotedly 
for the good of society and the people.  
Article 82: Citizens shall strictly observe the laws of the State and the socialist standards 
of life and defend their honour and dignity as citizens of the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea.  
Article 83: Work is the noble duty and honour of a citizen.  
Citizens shall willingly and conscientiously participate in work and strictly 
observe labour discipline and working hours.  
Article 84: Citizens shall take good care of the property of the State and social, 
cooperative organizations, combat all forms of misappropriation and waste 
and manage the nation’s economy diligently as the masters. 
The property of the State and social, cooperative organizations is inviolable.  
Article 85: Citizens shall constantly increase their revolutionary vigilance and devotedly 
fight for the security of the State.  
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Article 86: National defence is the supreme duty and honour of citizens.  
Citizens shall defend the country and serve in the armed forces as required 
by law. 
 
CHAPTER VI STATE ORGANS 
SECTION 1. THE SUPREME PEOPLE’S ASSEMBLY
729
 
Article 87: The Supreme People’s Assembly is the highest organ of State power in the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.  
Article 88: Legislative power is exercised by the Supreme People’s Assembly.  
The Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly also may exercise 
legislative power when the Supreme People’s Assembly is not in session.  
Article 89: The Supreme People’s Assembly is composed of deputies elected on the 
principle of universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot.  
Article 90: The Supreme People’s Assembly is elected for a term of five years.  
A new Supreme People’s Assembly is elected according to a decision of the 
Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly prior to the expiry of the 
former’s term of office.  
When unavoidable circumstances render an election impossible, the term of 
office of the Supreme People’s Assembly is prolonged until an election can 
be held.  
Article 91: The Supreme People’s Assembly has the authority to: 
1. amend or supplement the Constitution; 
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2. adopt, amend or supplement laws; 
3. approve the major laws adopted by the Presidium of the Supreme People’s 
Assembly, when the Supreme People’s Assembly is not in session; 
4. establish the basic principles of the State’s domestic and foreign policies; 
5. elect or recall the Chairman of the National Defence Commission of the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; 
6. elect or recall the President of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s 
Assembly; 
7. elect or recall the First Vice-Chairman, Vice-Chairmen and members of 
the National Defence Commission on the recommendation of the 
Chairman of the National Defence Commission of the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea;  
8. elect or recall the Vice-Presidents, Honorary Vice-Presidents, Secretary 
and members of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly;  
9. elect or recall the Premier of the Cabinet; 
10. appoint the Vice-Premiers, Chairmen, Ministers and other members of the 
Cabinet on the recommendation of the Premier of the Cabinet; 
11. appoint or remove the Prosecutor General of the Supreme Public 
Prosecutors Office;  
12. elect or recall the President of the Supreme Court;  
13. elect or recall the Chairmen, Vice-Chairmen and members of the 
Committees of the Supreme People’s Assembly; 
14. deliberate and approve the State plan for the development of the national 
economy and the report on its implementation;  
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15. deliberate and approve the State budget and the report on its 
implementation; 
16. hear a report on the work of the Cabinet and the central bodies when 
necessary, and adopt relevant measures;  
17. decide on ratification and nullification of treaties suggested to the Supreme 
People’s Assembly.  
Article 92: The Supreme People’s Assembly holds regular and extraordinary sessions.  
Regular sessions are convened once or twice a year by the Presidium of the 
Supreme People’s Assembly.  
Extraordinary sessions are convened when the Presidium of the Supreme 
People’s Assembly deems them necessary, or at the request of a minimum of 
one-third of the total number of deputies.  
Article 93: The Supreme People’s Assembly requires a quorum of at least two-thirds of 
the total number of deputies in order to meet.  
Article 94: The Supreme People’s Assembly elects its Speaker and Deputy Speaker.  
The Speaker presides over the sessions.  
Article 95: Items to be considered at the Supreme People’s Assembly are submitted by 
the Chairman of the National Defence Commission, the National Defence 
Commission, the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly, the Cabinet 
and the Committees of the Supreme People’s Assembly of the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea.  
Items can also be presented by deputies.  
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Article 96: The first session of each Supreme People’s Assembly elects the Credentials 
Committee and, on hearing the Committee’s report, adopts a decision 
confirming the credentials of deputies.  
Article 97: The Supreme People’s Assembly issues laws, ordinances and decisions.  
Laws, ordinances and decisions of the Supreme People’s Assembly are 
adopted when more than half of the deputies attending signify approval by a 
show of hands.  
The Constitution is amended or supplemented with the approval of more 
than two-thirds of the total number of deputies to the Supreme People’s 
Assembly.  
Article 98: The Supreme People’s Assembly appoints the Bills Committee, the Budget 
Committee and other Committees.  
The Committees of the Supreme People’s Assembly consist of Chairman, 
Vice-Chairman and members.  
The Committees of the Supreme People’s Assembly assist in the work of the 
Supreme People’s Assembly; they plan or deliberate the State policy and 
bills and take measures for their implementation.  
The Committees of the Supreme People’s Assembly work under the 
guidance of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly during the 
intervals between sessions of the Supreme People’s Assembly.  
Article 99: Deputies to the Supreme People’s Assembly are guaranteed inviolability.  
No deputy to the Supreme People’s Assembly may be arrested or punished 
without the consent of the Supreme People’s Assembly or, when it is not in 
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session, without the consent of its Presidium, unless he or she is caught in 
the act.  
 
SECTION 2. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL DEFENCE 
COMMISSION OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA
730
 
Article 100: The Chairman of the National Defence Commission of the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea is the supreme leader of the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea. 
Article 101: The term of office of the Chairman of the National Defence Commission of 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is the same as that of the 
Supreme People’s Assembly.  
Article 102: The Chairman of the National Defence Commission of the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea is the supreme commander of the whole armed 
forces of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and commands and 
directs all the armed forces of the State.  
Article 103: The Chairman of the National Defence Commission of the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea has the following duties and authority to: 
1. direct the overall affairs of the State;  
2. personally guide the work of the National Defence Commission;  
3. appoint or remove key cadres in the field of national defence;  
4. ratify or rescind major treaties concluded with other countries;  
5. exercise the right of granting special pardon;  
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6. proclaim a state of emergency, a state of war and mobilization order 
within the country.  
Article 104: The Chairman of the National Defence Commission of the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea issues orders.  
Article 105: The Chairman of the National Defence Commission of the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea is accountable to the Supreme People’s 
Assembly.  
 
SECTION 3. THE NATIONAL DEFENCE COMMISSION
731
 
Article 106: The National Defence Commission is the supreme defence leadership body 
of State power.  
Article 107: The National Defence Commission consists of the Chairman, the First 
Vice-Chairman, Vice-Chairmen and members.  
Article 108: The term of office of the National Defence Commission is the same as that 
of the Supreme People’s Assembly.  
Article 109: The National Defence Commission has the following duties and authority 
to:  
1. map out important policies of the State for carrying out the Songun-
based revolutionary line;  
2. direct the whole armed forces and defence building of the State;  
3. exercise supervision over the fulfilment of the orders of the Chairman of 
the National Defence Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic 
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of Korea and the decisions and directives of the National 
DefenceCommission, and take measures for their fulfilment;  
4. abrogate decisions and directives of State organs which run counter to 
the orders of the Chairman of the National Defence Commission of the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the decisions and directives 
of the National Defence Commission;  
5. establish or abolish central bodies in the field of national defence;  
6. enact military ranks and confer the ranks of major general and above. 
Article 110: The National Defence Commission issues decisions and directives.  
Article 111: The National Defence Commission is accountable to the Supreme People’s 
Assembly.  
 
SECTION 4. THE PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE’S ASSEMBLY
732
 
Article 112: The Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly is the highest organ of 
State power when the Supreme People’s Assembly is not in session.  
Article 113: The Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly consists of the President, 
Vice-Presidents, Secretary and members.  
Article 114: The Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly may have a few 
Honorary Vice-Presidents.  
Honorary Vice-Presidents of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s 
Assembly may be deputies to the Supreme People’s Assembly who have 
                                            
732
 Naenara [My Country]: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Constitution: Chapter VI State 
Organs: Section 4. The Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly, 
http://naenara.com.kp/en/great/constitution.php?10 (last visited May 3, 2012). 
 354 
participated in the work of State building for a long time and rendered 
distinguished service.  
Article 115: The term of office of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly is 
the same as that of the Supreme People’s Assembly.  
The Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly continues its work until 
a new Presidium is elected, even after the term of the Supreme People’s 
Assembly expires.  
Article 116: The Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly has the following duties 
and authority to:  
1. convene sessions of the Supreme People’s Assembly;  
2. deliberate and adopt the new draft bills and regulations and amendments 
and supplements to the current laws and regulations raised in the 
intervals between sessions of the Supreme People’s Assembly and obtain 
the approval of the next session of the Supreme People’s Assembly for 
major laws which are adopted and enforced;  
3. deliberate and approve the State plan for the development of the national 
economy, the State budget and plans for their adjustment raised for 
unavoidable reasons in the intervals between sessions of the Supreme 
People’s Assembly;  
4. interpret the Constitution as well as current laws and regulations;  
5. supervise law observance by the State organs and take relevant measures;  
6. rescind the decisions and directives of State bodies which run counter to 
the Constitution, laws, ordinances and decisions of the Supreme People’s 
Assembly, orders of the Chairman of the National Defence Commission 
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of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the decisions and 
directives of the National Defence Commission, and the decrees, 
decisions and directives of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s 
Assembly, and suspend the implementation of unwarranted decisions of 
local People’s Assemblies;  
7. conduct the election of deputies to the Supreme People’s Assembly and 
organize the elections of deputies to the local People’s Assemblies;  
8. work with the deputies to the Supreme People’s Assembly;  
9. work with the Committees of the Supreme People’s Assembly;   
10. set up or abolish Commissions and Ministries of the Cabinet; 
11. appoint or remove Vice-Premiers, Chairmen, Ministers and other 
members of the Cabinet on the recommendation of the Premier of the 
Cabinet when the Supreme People’s Assembly is not in session;  
12. appoint or remove members of Committees of the Presidium of the 
Supreme People’s Assembly;  
13. elect or recall the Judges and People’s Assessors of the Supreme Court;  
14. approve or nullify treaties concluded with other countries;  
15. decide and make public the appointment or recall of diplomatic 
representatives to other countries;  
16. institute decorations, medals, titles of honour and diplomatic ranks and 
confer decorations, medals and titles of honour;  
17. grant general amnesties;  
18. establish or alter administrative units and districts;  
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19. conduct external activities including contacts with foreign parliaments 
and inter-parliamentary organizations.  
Article 117: The President of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly 
organizes and guides the work of the Presidium.  
The President of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly 
represents the State and receives the credentials and letters of recall of 
diplomatic representatives accredited by foreign countries.  
Article 118: The Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly convenes Plenary 
Meetings and Meetings of the Permanent Committee.  
The Plenary Meeting consists of all the members. The Meeting of the 
Permanent Committee consists of the President, Vice-Presidents and 
Secretary.  
Article 119: The Plenary Meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly 
deliberates and decides on important matters arising in fulfilling the duties 
of the Presidium and exercising its authority. 
The Meeting of the Permanent Committee deliberates and decides on 
matters entrusted to it by the Plenary Meeting.  
Article 120: The Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly issues decrees, decisions 
and directives.  
Article 121: The Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly may have Committees 
to assist it in its work.  
Article 122: The Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly is accountable to the 
Supreme People’s Assembly.  
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SECTION 5. THE CABINET
733
 
Article 123: The Cabinet is the administrative and executive body of the highest State 
power and organ of overall State administration.  
Article 124: The Cabinet consists of the Premier, Vice-Premiers, Chairmen, Ministers 
and other members as required.  
The term of office of the Cabinet is the same as that of the Supreme 
People’s Assembly.  
Article 125: The Cabinet has the following duties and authority to:  
1. adopt measures for the implementation of State policies;  
2. adopt, amend or supplement the regulations on State administration on 
the basis of the Constitution and the laws;  
3. direct the work of the Commissions and Ministries of the Cabinet, organs 
directly under its authority and local People’s Committees;  
4. establish or abolish organs directly under its authority, major 
administrative and economic bodies and enterprises, and adopt measures 
for improving State administration bodies;  
5. draft the State plan for the development of the national economy and 
adopt measures to put it into effect;  
6. compile the State budget and adopt measures to implement it;  
7. organize and execute the work of industry, agriculture, construction, 
transport, post and telecommunications, commerce, foreign trade, land 
administration, municipal administration, education, science, culture, 
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health service, physical culture and sport, labour administration, 
protection of environment, tourism, and so on;  
8. adopt measures to strengthen the monetary and banking system;  
9. inspect and control the establishment of order in State administration;  
10. adopt measures to maintain public order, protect the property and 
interests of the State and social, cooperative organizations, and safeguard 
the rights of citizens;  
11. conclude treaties with foreign countries and conduct external affairs;  
12. rescind the decisions and directives of administrative and economic 
bodies which run counter to the decisions and directives of the Cabinet. 
Article 126: The Premier of the Cabinet organizes and guides the work of the Cabinet.  
The Premier of the Cabinet represents the Government of the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea.  
Article 127: The Cabinet convenes Plenary Meetings and Meetings of the Permanent 
Committee. 
The Plenary Meeting of the Cabinet consists of all the members of the 
Cabinet. The Meeting of the Permanent Committee consists of the Premier, 
Vice-Premiers and other members of the Cabinet appointed by the Premier.  
Article 128: The Plenary Meeting of the Cabinet deliberates and decides on new and 
important administrative and economic matters.  
The Meeting of the Permanent Committee deliberates and decides on 
matters referred to it by the Plenary Meeting of the Cabinet.  
Article 129: The Cabinet issues decisions and directives.  
Article 130: The Cabinet may have non-permanent committees to assist it in its work.  
 359 
Article 131: The Cabinet is accountable to the Supreme People’s Assembly and to the 
Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly when the Supreme People’s 
Assembly is not in session.  
Article 132: The newly-elected Premier of the Cabinet takes an oath of allegiance on 
behalf of the members of the Cabinet at the Supreme People’s Assembly.  
Article 133: The Commissions and Ministries of the Cabinet are departmental executive 
bodies of the Cabinet and central departmental bodies of administration.  
Article 134: The Commissions and Ministries of the Cabinet supervise and guide the 
work of the sectors concerned in a uniform way under the guidance of the 
Cabinet.  
Article 135: The Commissions and Ministries of the Cabinet run committee meetings 
and cadre meetings.  
The committee meeting and cadre meeting deliberate and decide on the 
measures for the implementation of the decisions and directives of the 
Cabinet and other important matters.  
Article 136: The Commissions and Ministries of the Cabinet issue directives. 
 
SECTION 6. THE LOCAL PEOPLE’S ASSEMBLY
734
 
Article 137: The People’s Assembly of a province (or municipality directly under 
central authority), city (or district) or county is the local organ of State 
power.  
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Article 138: The local People’s Assembly consists of deputies elected on the principle 
of universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot.  
Article 139: The term of office of the People’s Assembly of a province (or municipality 
directly under central authority), city (or district) or county is four years.  
A new local People’s Assembly is elected according to the decision of the 
local People’s Committee at the corresponding level prior to the expiry of 
the former’s term of office.  
When unavoidable circumstances render an election impossible, the term of 
office of the local People’s Assembly is prolonged until an election can be 
held.   
Article 140: The local People’s Assembly has the following duties and authority to:  
1. deliberate and approve the local plan for the development of the national 
economy and the report on its implementation;  
2. deliberate and approve the local budget and the report on its 
implementation;  
3. adopt measures to observe State laws in the area concerned;  
4. elect or recall the Chairman, Vice-Chairmen, Secretary and members of 
the People’s Committee at the corresponding level;  
5. elect or recall the Judges and People’s Assessors of the Court at the 
corresponding level;  
6. rescind unwarranted decisions and directives of the People’s Committee 
at the corresponding level and the People’s Assemblies and People’s 
Committees at lower levels. 
Article 141: The local People’s Assembly convenes regular and extraordinary sessions.  
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Regular sessions are convened once or twice a year by the People’s 
Committee at the corresponding level.  
Extraordinary sessions are convened when the People’s Committee at the 
corresponding level deems them necessary or at the request of a minimum 
of one-third of the total number of deputies.  
Article 142: The local People’s Assembly requires a quorum of at least two-thirds of the 
total number of deputies in order to meet.  
Article 143: The local People’s Assembly elects its Speaker. The Speaker presides over 
the sessions.  
Article 144: The local People’s Assembly issues decisions.  
 
SECTION 7. THE LOCAL PEOPLE’S COMMITTEE
735
 
Article 145: The People’s Committee of a province (or municipality directly under 
central authority), city (or district) or county exercises the function of the 
local organ of State power when the People’s Assembly at the 
corresponding level is not in session and the administrative and executive 
organ of State power at the corresponding level.  
Article 146: The local People’s Committee consists of the Chairman, Vice-Chairmen, 
Secretary and members.  
The term of office of the local People’s Committee is the same as that of 
the corresponding People’s Assembly.  
Article 147: The local People’s Committee has the following duties and authority to:  
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1. convene sessions of the People’s Assembly;  
2. organize the election of deputies to the People’s Assembly;  
3. work with the deputies to the People’s Assembly;  
4. implement the decisions and directives of the corresponding local 
People’s Assembly and the People’s Committees at higher levels, the 
laws, ordinances and decisions of the Supreme People’s Assembly, the 
orders of the Chairman of the National Defence Commission of the 
Democratic People’ Republic of Korea, the decisions and directives of 
the National Defence Commission, the decrees, decisions and directives 
of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly and the decisions 
and directives of the Cabinet and the Commissions and Ministries of the 
Cabinet;  
5. organize and carry out all administrative affairs in the given area;  
6. draft the local plan for the development of the national economy and 
adopt measures to implement it;  
7. compile the local budget and adopt measures for its implementation;  
8. adopt measures to maintain public order, protect the property and 
interests of the State and social, cooperative organizations and safeguard 
the rights of citizens in the given area;  
9. inspect and control the establishment of order in State administration in 
the given area;  
10. direct the work of the People’s Committees at lower levels;  
 363 
11. rescind unwarranted decisions and directives of the People’s Committees 
at lower levels, and suspend the implementation of unwarranted 
decisions of the People’s Assemblies at lower levels. 
Article 148: The local People’s Committee convenes Plenary Meetings and Meetings of 
the Permanent Committee.  
The Plenary Meeting of the local People’s Committee consists of all its 
members. The Meeting of the Permanent Committee consists of the 
Chairman, Vice-Chairmen and Secretary.  
Article 149: The Plenary Meeting of the local People’s Committee deliberates and 
decides on important matters arising in implementing its duties and 
exercising its authority.  
The Meeting of the Permanent Committee deliberates and decides on the 
matters referred to it by the Plenary Meeting.  
Article 150: The local People’s Committee issues decisions and directives.  
Article 151: The local People’s Committee may have non-permanent committees to 
assist it in its work.  
Article 152: The local People’s Committee is accountable to the corresponding People’s 
Assembly.  
The local People’s Committee is subordinate to the People’s Committees at 
higher levels, the Cabinet and the Presidium of the Supreme People’s 
Assembly.  
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SECTION 8. THE PUBLIC PROSECUTORS OFFICE AND THE COURT
736
 
Article 153: Investigation and prosecution are conducted by the Supreme Public 
Prosecutors Office, the Public Prosecutors Offices of a province (or 
municipality directly under central authority), city (or district) or county 
and the Special Public Prosecutors Office.   
Article 154: The term of office of the Prosecutor General of the Supreme Public 
Prosecutors Office is the same as that of the Supreme People’s Assembly.  
Article 155: Public prosecutors are appointed or removed by the Supreme Public 
Prosecutors Office.  
Article 156: The functions of the Public Prosecutors Office are to:  
1. ensure the strict observance of State laws by institutions, enterprises, 
organizations and citizens;  
2. ensure that the decisions and directives of State bodies conform with the 
Constitution, the laws, ordinances and decisions of the Supreme People’s 
Assembly, the orders of the Chairman of the National Defence 
Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the 
decisions and directives of the National Defence Commission, the 
decrees, decisions and directives of the Presidium of the Supreme 
People’s Assembly, and the decisions and directives of the Cabinet;  
3. identify and institute legal proceedings against criminals and offenders in 
order to protect the State power of the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea, the socialist system, the property of the State and social, 
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cooperative organizations, personal rights as guaranteed by the 
Constitution and the people’s lives and property. 
Article 157: Investigation and prosecution are conducted under the unified direction of 
the Supreme Public Prosecutors Office, and all Public Prosecutors Offices 
are subordinate to their higher offices and the Supreme Public Prosecutors 
Office.  
Article 158: The Supreme Public Prosecutors Office is accountable to the Supreme 
People’s Assembly and to the Presidium of the Supreme People’s 
Assembly when the Supreme People’s Assembly is not in session.  
Article 159: Justice is administered by the Supreme Court, the Court of a province (or 
municipality directly under central authority), the City (or District) or 
County People’s Courts, and the Special Court.  
Verdicts are delivered in the name of the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea.  
Article 160: The term of office of the President of the Supreme Court is the same as that 
of the Supreme People’s Assembly.  
The term of office of Judges and People’s Assessors of the Supreme Court, 
the Court of a province (or municipality directly under central authority) 
and the City (or District) or County People’s Courts is the same as that of 
the People’s Assembly at the corresponding level.  
Article 161: The President and Judges of the Special Court are appointed or removed by 
the Supreme Court.  
The People’s Assessors of the Special Court are elected by the soldiers of 
the unit concerned or by employees at their meetings.  
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Article 162: The functions of the Court are to:  
1. protect through judicial procedure the State power and the socialist 
system established in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the 
property of the State and social, cooperative organizations, personal 
rights as guaranteed by the Constitution, and the lives and property of 
citizens;  
2. ensure that all institutions, enterprises, organizations and citizens abide 
strictly by State laws and staunchly combat class enemies and all law-
breakers;  
3. give judgements and findings with regard to property and conduct 
notarial work. 
Article 163: Justice is administered by a Court consisting of one Judge and two People’s 
Assessors. In special cases there may be three Judges.  
Article 164: Court cases are heard in public and the accused is guaranteed the right of 
defence.  
Hearings may be closed to the public as stipulated by law.  
Article 165: Judicial proceedings are conducted in the Korean language. Foreign 
citizens may use their own language during court proceedings. 
Article 166: In administering justice, the Court is independent, and judicial proceedings 
are carried out in strict accordance with the law. 
Article 167: The Supreme Court is the highest judicial organ of the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea.  
The Supreme Court supervises the judicial activities of all the Courts.  
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Article 168: The Supreme Court is accountable to the Supreme People’s Assembly and 
to the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly when the Supreme 
People’s Assembly is not in session. 
 
CHAPTER VII EMBLEM, FLAG, ANTHEM AND CAPITAL
737
 
Article 169: The national emblem of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea bears 
the design of a grand hydroelectric power station under Mt. Paektu, the 
sacred mountain of the revolution, and the beaming light of a five-pointed 
red star, with ears of rice forming an oval frame, bound with a red ribbon 
bearing the inscription “The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.” 
Article 170: The national flag of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea consists of 
a central red panel, bordered both above and below by a narrow white stripe 
and a broad blue stripe. The central red panel bears a five-pointed red star 
within a white circle near the hoist. 
The ratio of the width to the length is 1:2. 
Article 171: The national anthem of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is “The 
Patriotic Song.” 
Article 172: The capital of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is Pyongyang. 
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